No easy choice. For Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and Shafik, a general of the old regime, the post of President is a huge prize which each of them is already claiming. But the Supreme Presidential Elections Commission is yet to declare a winner. That Commission, headed by Judge Sultan, who also heads the Supreme Constitutional Court, is still deciding on more than 400 charges of voting irregularities levelled by the two men and their supporters.
In the meantime, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the de facto executive of Egypt since the deposing of Mubarak, has dissolved Parliament, reinstated emergency laws, promulgated an interim constitution, decided upon which powers cannot be vested in a new President including civilian oversight over the military, and warned that Tahrir Square cannot be permanently occupied by protesters.
As a result, the expected happened. The Brotherhood demonstrated; the dissolution of Parliament was challenged as illegal; the Constitutional Court was called an instrument of manipulation in the hands of SCAF; the Beads declared that they would surly protect the January 25 Revolution from the Bayonets; and the Bayonets barricaded Parliament pending the holding of new parliamentary elections based on a constitution which is to be drafted by its own chosen 100 member-strong constituent assembly. Add to all of these destabilizing factors the possibility of Mubarak's death in the short term.
The question thus arises: is Egypt hovering on the brink of a civil war? In human affairs, nothing is impossible. But an Egypt plunging into a classic civil war is highly improbable.
The factors militating against that grim prospect are too numerous to count, Foremost among these factors are: orderly governance is an ingrained habit in Egypt for thousands of years; the armed forces are conscripted, representing all of Egypt, with loyalty belonging not to regions but to Egypt as both a homeland and a concept; Egypt's cosmopolitanism is enduring, thanks to the country being at the cross-roads of Europe, Asia and Africa; the recent moves by SCAF (some call it 'the soft coup d'etat') is a reminder to the Muslim Brotherhood that its newly-won freedom could be extinguished and Al-Azher's weight cannot be discounted in keeping the Copts, especially after the passing of the great unifier Pope Shenouda, integrally engaged in Muslim/Christian harmony.
The adage inherited from Pope Shenouda, in whose honor an Egyptian postal stamp has been issued, goes like this: "Egypt is not a country in which we live. Egypt is a country which lives in us."
Yes the stalemate resulting from the need to preserve the Revolution and the need to ensure the security of Egypt is very unsettling to millions of Egyptians. Rumors have therefore crowded out credible information. Even the repeated declarations by the SCAF that they are keen on handing over powers to an elected president are met with deep scepticism. The date for the transfer of power to a civilian government is now said to have moved from June 30 to "after the election of a President."
The big question is: would that President be a representative of the Beards or of the Bayonets? The answer shall determine the future of the Arab Spring, not only in Egypt, but also within the Arab homeland.
The cover pages of two Egyptian newspapers reflect the views of the majority of Egyptian masses. The cover of Al-Mossawwar reads: "We shall not be governed by the Supreme Guide (of the Brotherhood). And the cover of Sawt Al-Azhar (the voice of Al-Azhar) declares: "The Al-Azhar Rector says: Egypt is a democratic State: Neither Secular nor Religious. The people need to banish the world 'exclusion.' Women's rights should be observed. Eliminate any difference between a Muslim and a Copt."
Monday, June 25, 2012
Thursday, June 14, 2012
The Egyptian Revolution: It is Stuttering Not Sputtering
By this weekend, Egypt, though stuttering, would have elected by popular vote a President. It shall be a historic choice not available to the presumably oldest State on earth for 10,000 years. Whether it shall be Muhammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood or Ahmed Shafik who was the last Prime Minister under Mubarak will determine the course of the Arab Spring well beyond Egypt's borders.
The age-old struggle to determine the identity of Egypt, whether Arab (Muslim or Christian), or Islamic, or Mediterranean (secular and African) is back. With more than 10% of Egyptians being Coptic, the adherents of the first Christian Church, the Church of Alexandria, nervous about the new Parliament with 70% of its seats being occupied by adherents of political Islam, the struggle for Egypt's identity is destined to have international connotations.
As of January 25, 2011 when the flame of the Arab Spring jumping from Tunisia, where it started, to Egypt, Tahrir Square in Cairo hoisted a flag where the Crescent and the Cross embraced. But as the Revolution attained its immediate objective, the toppling of Mubarak which occurred on February 11, 2011, the super-organized Muslim Brotherhood stepped in. The Governance void was filled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF); a group, less tolerant of diversity, called the Salafis, came in from behind; and more than 36 other movements and political parties, mostly secularists, liberal and Nasserite, kept the revolutionary legitimacy alive through occupying Tahrir Square.
The collapse of the old regime, an extension of 60 years of military dictatorship, brought with its two clear and present dangers: a security void, and an economy in a free fall.
Scrambling for a modicum of order, and responding to the demand by millions for a democratic system of government, 70% of 53 million eligible voters cast their ballots in March 2012 for a new bi-cameral Parliament. The two major Islamist parties, the Brotherhood and the Salafis, routed their secular opponents who now hold only 30% of parliamentary seats. Al-Azhar's efforts to moderate that result, through its various declarations for inclusiveness, went largely unheeded.
Looking at the source of legitimacy in the new Egypt, we find multiple and competing sources: for revolutionary legitimacy, we find it in Tahrir Square; for law and order executive governance, we find it in the SCAF; for the people's corporate will, we find it in Parliament; for the interpretation of laws enacted both during and after Mubarak, we find it in the Egyptian judiciary; for a constitutional sanction, we find it, not in a permanent Constitution which is yet to be drafted, but in a patch work of the old Constitution as amended in a plebiscite after January 25, 2011, and promulgated by SCAF.
It is in the temporariness of the constitutional design that we find the stuttering voice of the Egyptian Revolution.
The body charged with drafting Egypt's, basic law is not yet set up. Its prospective 100 membership is supposed to reflect all shades of Egyptian public opinion. The role of Parliament , with its present Islamist majority, in the selection of the constituent assembly is the focus of secularist opposition.
The squabbling political parities were brought together by SCAF with a deadline for agreement on the standards for selection. SCAF issued an ultimatum: if you do not agree on those standards, we shall re-promulgate the 1971 Constitution. Agreement was reached, but when Parliament, with its two chambers convened on June 12, twelve parties defected from the consensus on selection standards.
Why the lack of consensus? The secularists felt that the Islamists in Parliament wanted to shape the constituent assembly in its Islamists image. They declared that their withdrawal was due to the absence of a broad agreement guaranteeing that the new constitution, which shall be voted upon after a new President has been chosen, should be "balanced and expressive of all sectors and colors" of the Egyptian rainbow. Even Dr. Muhammad El-Baradei, the first voice to oppose the Mubarak one-man rule, attacked the method of that selection describing it as "the burial of the Egyptian Revolution."
In the midst of that confusion, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court added its own dose: a review of the legitimacy of presidential elections in response to a challenge to Shafik being a run-off candidate. This happened only two days before Egypt votes for selecting either Morsi; the Islamist, or Shafik, the Secularist!!
Coupled with the re-imposition of martial law by SCAF, that Court upheld the results of the run-off between those two personalities. Stuttering goes the Egyptian Revolution forward to anoint a President whose constitutional powers are yet to be written.
The age-old struggle to determine the identity of Egypt, whether Arab (Muslim or Christian), or Islamic, or Mediterranean (secular and African) is back. With more than 10% of Egyptians being Coptic, the adherents of the first Christian Church, the Church of Alexandria, nervous about the new Parliament with 70% of its seats being occupied by adherents of political Islam, the struggle for Egypt's identity is destined to have international connotations.
As of January 25, 2011 when the flame of the Arab Spring jumping from Tunisia, where it started, to Egypt, Tahrir Square in Cairo hoisted a flag where the Crescent and the Cross embraced. But as the Revolution attained its immediate objective, the toppling of Mubarak which occurred on February 11, 2011, the super-organized Muslim Brotherhood stepped in. The Governance void was filled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF); a group, less tolerant of diversity, called the Salafis, came in from behind; and more than 36 other movements and political parties, mostly secularists, liberal and Nasserite, kept the revolutionary legitimacy alive through occupying Tahrir Square.
The collapse of the old regime, an extension of 60 years of military dictatorship, brought with its two clear and present dangers: a security void, and an economy in a free fall.
Scrambling for a modicum of order, and responding to the demand by millions for a democratic system of government, 70% of 53 million eligible voters cast their ballots in March 2012 for a new bi-cameral Parliament. The two major Islamist parties, the Brotherhood and the Salafis, routed their secular opponents who now hold only 30% of parliamentary seats. Al-Azhar's efforts to moderate that result, through its various declarations for inclusiveness, went largely unheeded.
Looking at the source of legitimacy in the new Egypt, we find multiple and competing sources: for revolutionary legitimacy, we find it in Tahrir Square; for law and order executive governance, we find it in the SCAF; for the people's corporate will, we find it in Parliament; for the interpretation of laws enacted both during and after Mubarak, we find it in the Egyptian judiciary; for a constitutional sanction, we find it, not in a permanent Constitution which is yet to be drafted, but in a patch work of the old Constitution as amended in a plebiscite after January 25, 2011, and promulgated by SCAF.
It is in the temporariness of the constitutional design that we find the stuttering voice of the Egyptian Revolution.
The body charged with drafting Egypt's, basic law is not yet set up. Its prospective 100 membership is supposed to reflect all shades of Egyptian public opinion. The role of Parliament , with its present Islamist majority, in the selection of the constituent assembly is the focus of secularist opposition.
The squabbling political parities were brought together by SCAF with a deadline for agreement on the standards for selection. SCAF issued an ultimatum: if you do not agree on those standards, we shall re-promulgate the 1971 Constitution. Agreement was reached, but when Parliament, with its two chambers convened on June 12, twelve parties defected from the consensus on selection standards.
Why the lack of consensus? The secularists felt that the Islamists in Parliament wanted to shape the constituent assembly in its Islamists image. They declared that their withdrawal was due to the absence of a broad agreement guaranteeing that the new constitution, which shall be voted upon after a new President has been chosen, should be "balanced and expressive of all sectors and colors" of the Egyptian rainbow. Even Dr. Muhammad El-Baradei, the first voice to oppose the Mubarak one-man rule, attacked the method of that selection describing it as "the burial of the Egyptian Revolution."
In the midst of that confusion, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court added its own dose: a review of the legitimacy of presidential elections in response to a challenge to Shafik being a run-off candidate. This happened only two days before Egypt votes for selecting either Morsi; the Islamist, or Shafik, the Secularist!!
Coupled with the re-imposition of martial law by SCAF, that Court upheld the results of the run-off between those two personalities. Stuttering goes the Egyptian Revolution forward to anoint a President whose constitutional powers are yet to be written.
Friday, June 8, 2012
Where are Those Millions of Egyptians Going With The Revolution? So Far Nowhere!!
The Song of Soroor "KHALAS" means two things: "It is over," and "Deliverance." Very appropriate to the revolutionary go-around which has plagued Egypt's march towards a functioning democratic State - toward the Indian model of the Arab world.
What is wrong? Egypt is electing a president whose powers are still written in the sky - non-defined. Why? The permanent Constitution is not yet drafted, let alone approved in a national plebiscite. So, are there any provisional constitutional bases for either of the two run-off candidates for president (Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood; and Shafik, the last Prime Minister under Mubarak) to operate? Yes: in the revised provisional Constitution promulgated by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).
OK!! So it looks as if the new Parliament, with 50% of the seats held by the Muslim Brotherhood, and 20% of those seats held by the Salafis -the Egyptian version of Wahhabism, together with Morsi, the most likely candidate to become president, might turn Egypt into an Islamist State. Not likely, but possibly.
But why then are we assuming that Shafik, the secular candidate might lose? Well, because several of the candidates who did not make it to the run-off are now throwing their lot with Morsi. While Shafik brandishes the fear from the emergence of an Islamist State, Morsi reminds his supporters of the possibility of a return of the old regime through Shafik.
Consequently, millions of demonstrators poured into Tahrir Square for a variety of reasons. The triggering event was opposition to what the masses considered a light sentence which a judge imposed on Mubarak and his former Interior Minister, El-Adly. The judgement called for a life sentence for both men, but absolved Mubarak's two sons, Gamal and Alaa, and several Interior Ministry top officers of corruption and other charges. Some demonstrators carried nooses to symbolize their demand for tougher sentences including capital punishment. Mubarak, El-Adly and others are accused of direct responsibility or complicity in the killing of more than 800 peaceful demonstrators in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and other Egyptian cities.
Yet other segments of those demonstrators in Tahrir had different though supplementary agendas, supported by former presidential candidates who were unsuccessful in reaching the run-off echelon. Prominent among those run-off failures are Hamdain Sabbahi, a leftist Nasserite, and Abdel-Moneim Aboul-Fotouh, a liberal Islamist. Their call was, and continues to be, to disqualify Shafik, a run-off presidential candidate, on the basis of excluding all those, like Shafik, who served Mubarak in prominent positions.
The Islamist dominated Parliament had adopted a law on political exclusion of all those who symbolized the face of the Mubarak regime. Though the law in theory applies to Shafik, yet he was permitted by the Supreme Presidential Elections Commission, headed by Judge Sultan, to enter the presidential race. To disqualify him after millions, including the majority of Copts who are fearful of an Islamist State, had voted for him, would be tantamount to disfranchising all of those millions. Not only that. Such unheard of action would give Dr. Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, an uncontested victory which might sow the seeds of later delegitimation.
Summing up the overall picture of this stuttering revolution, tracing it from its root, it could be said that the constituent assembly of 100 should have been established to draft the permanent constitution well before the presidential elections were held. But now Egypt shall have a president by the end of this month with powers undefined except through make-shift Constitutional provisions promulgated by SCAF. SCAF is still grappling with the issue of selecting those 100 members of the Constituent Assembly, and Parliament is still considering whether it should get involved in that selection.
By July 1, SCAF is expected to retire from governing, handing over executive powers to a President with ill-defined powers. Stay tuned!!
What is wrong? Egypt is electing a president whose powers are still written in the sky - non-defined. Why? The permanent Constitution is not yet drafted, let alone approved in a national plebiscite. So, are there any provisional constitutional bases for either of the two run-off candidates for president (Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood; and Shafik, the last Prime Minister under Mubarak) to operate? Yes: in the revised provisional Constitution promulgated by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).
OK!! So it looks as if the new Parliament, with 50% of the seats held by the Muslim Brotherhood, and 20% of those seats held by the Salafis -the Egyptian version of Wahhabism, together with Morsi, the most likely candidate to become president, might turn Egypt into an Islamist State. Not likely, but possibly.
But why then are we assuming that Shafik, the secular candidate might lose? Well, because several of the candidates who did not make it to the run-off are now throwing their lot with Morsi. While Shafik brandishes the fear from the emergence of an Islamist State, Morsi reminds his supporters of the possibility of a return of the old regime through Shafik.
Consequently, millions of demonstrators poured into Tahrir Square for a variety of reasons. The triggering event was opposition to what the masses considered a light sentence which a judge imposed on Mubarak and his former Interior Minister, El-Adly. The judgement called for a life sentence for both men, but absolved Mubarak's two sons, Gamal and Alaa, and several Interior Ministry top officers of corruption and other charges. Some demonstrators carried nooses to symbolize their demand for tougher sentences including capital punishment. Mubarak, El-Adly and others are accused of direct responsibility or complicity in the killing of more than 800 peaceful demonstrators in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and other Egyptian cities.
Yet other segments of those demonstrators in Tahrir had different though supplementary agendas, supported by former presidential candidates who were unsuccessful in reaching the run-off echelon. Prominent among those run-off failures are Hamdain Sabbahi, a leftist Nasserite, and Abdel-Moneim Aboul-Fotouh, a liberal Islamist. Their call was, and continues to be, to disqualify Shafik, a run-off presidential candidate, on the basis of excluding all those, like Shafik, who served Mubarak in prominent positions.
The Islamist dominated Parliament had adopted a law on political exclusion of all those who symbolized the face of the Mubarak regime. Though the law in theory applies to Shafik, yet he was permitted by the Supreme Presidential Elections Commission, headed by Judge Sultan, to enter the presidential race. To disqualify him after millions, including the majority of Copts who are fearful of an Islamist State, had voted for him, would be tantamount to disfranchising all of those millions. Not only that. Such unheard of action would give Dr. Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, an uncontested victory which might sow the seeds of later delegitimation.
Summing up the overall picture of this stuttering revolution, tracing it from its root, it could be said that the constituent assembly of 100 should have been established to draft the permanent constitution well before the presidential elections were held. But now Egypt shall have a president by the end of this month with powers undefined except through make-shift Constitutional provisions promulgated by SCAF. SCAF is still grappling with the issue of selecting those 100 members of the Constituent Assembly, and Parliament is still considering whether it should get involved in that selection.
By July 1, SCAF is expected to retire from governing, handing over executive powers to a President with ill-defined powers. Stay tuned!!
Friday, June 1, 2012
Narrowing the Field of Choice
Voting for a president for the first time in 5000 years, the Egyptians narrowed the field of choice from 12 to 2. The two who are slated for a runoff in June are Dr. Muhammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and former Air Force General Ahmed Shafik. No choice could be more stark: Between an Islamist of the moderate type, and a military man who had upraided the January 25 revolutionaries as insolent children as they rose against Mubarak.
In effect it is a duel between the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and what is perceived as the old order of Mubarak and military rule attempting a come back. The daily newspaper of Cairo Al-Akhbar summed it up: "It is between a Sheikh and a field marshall." Each of the two has burst on the national scene with heavy baggage of the past -a contest between the Islamists who are untried in governance, and the old hands (Shafik was the last Prime Minister under Mubarak) who had unfortunately made of Egypt a security State.
In comes the art of compromise to win the hearts and minds of 53 million Egyptians who will have the rare chance of elevating one of these two controversial candidates to the presidency.
For Morsi, the assurances of a government of national unity, and a readiness, if elected, to have a prime minister from outside the Muslim Brotherhood. And for Shafik, a renewed commitment to the principles of the January 25 Revolution, a non-reintroduction of the defunct regime, and non-interference in the upcoming criminal trials of Mubarak & Sons.
With the Brotherhood controlling 50% of seats in the new Parliament (the Salafis have 20%, but no coalition is expected to emerge between the moderate Islamists and the Salafis who are regarded as Wahabbi-oriented), the Morsi campaign is busy assuring the country that concentrating power in Parliament together the Presidency would be bad for Egypt. Their declarations focus on the following themes: the Government should reflect the views of all political forces in Egypt; there shall be a presidential advisory group including Copts and other parties representatives with a role in decision-making; and a revolutionary front to confront the remnants of the now-dissolved National Democratic Party of the Mubarak era.
Shafik seems to have a more difficult time assuring the electorate that, as president, he would turn his back completely on the Egypt of Mubarak. His main appeal is that his law and order background would ensure the augmentation of security, nationally and on the street. He cites his experience in executive matters, together with his military background as necessary ingredients for assuring the outside world about the secularity of Egypt and for attracting foreign investments.
Yet attacks on Shafik continue unabated (his campaign, headquarters was recently attacked and was partly damaged by arson.) Some of these attacks take an extreme form such as the claim that Al-Azhar had issued a fatwa (religious advice or edict) that voting for Shafik would be un-Islamic. Al-Azhar, the Cairo-based venerable citadel of Islamic moderation and inclusiveness for more than a 1000 years, quickly denied that news.
Beyond these efforts by Morsi and Shafik to attract votes and secure victory later this month in the second and final round of voting, the political scene in Egypt keeps on producing assurances for a future democratic Egypt:
In effect it is a duel between the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and what is perceived as the old order of Mubarak and military rule attempting a come back. The daily newspaper of Cairo Al-Akhbar summed it up: "It is between a Sheikh and a field marshall." Each of the two has burst on the national scene with heavy baggage of the past -a contest between the Islamists who are untried in governance, and the old hands (Shafik was the last Prime Minister under Mubarak) who had unfortunately made of Egypt a security State.
In comes the art of compromise to win the hearts and minds of 53 million Egyptians who will have the rare chance of elevating one of these two controversial candidates to the presidency.
For Morsi, the assurances of a government of national unity, and a readiness, if elected, to have a prime minister from outside the Muslim Brotherhood. And for Shafik, a renewed commitment to the principles of the January 25 Revolution, a non-reintroduction of the defunct regime, and non-interference in the upcoming criminal trials of Mubarak & Sons.
With the Brotherhood controlling 50% of seats in the new Parliament (the Salafis have 20%, but no coalition is expected to emerge between the moderate Islamists and the Salafis who are regarded as Wahabbi-oriented), the Morsi campaign is busy assuring the country that concentrating power in Parliament together the Presidency would be bad for Egypt. Their declarations focus on the following themes: the Government should reflect the views of all political forces in Egypt; there shall be a presidential advisory group including Copts and other parties representatives with a role in decision-making; and a revolutionary front to confront the remnants of the now-dissolved National Democratic Party of the Mubarak era.
Shafik seems to have a more difficult time assuring the electorate that, as president, he would turn his back completely on the Egypt of Mubarak. His main appeal is that his law and order background would ensure the augmentation of security, nationally and on the street. He cites his experience in executive matters, together with his military background as necessary ingredients for assuring the outside world about the secularity of Egypt and for attracting foreign investments.
Yet attacks on Shafik continue unabated (his campaign, headquarters was recently attacked and was partly damaged by arson.) Some of these attacks take an extreme form such as the claim that Al-Azhar had issued a fatwa (religious advice or edict) that voting for Shafik would be un-Islamic. Al-Azhar, the Cairo-based venerable citadel of Islamic moderation and inclusiveness for more than a 1000 years, quickly denied that news.
Beyond these efforts by Morsi and Shafik to attract votes and secure victory later this month in the second and final round of voting, the political scene in Egypt keeps on producing assurances for a future democratic Egypt:
- A new charter called "The Obligation" or "The Commitment" (Al-Aahd) promulgated by the new Egyptian Democratic Party and endorsed by several other political parties, called for the formation of an inclusive presidential group to advise the new president. It also called for the formation of a coalition government of national unity which would include youth, woman and Copts.
- Parliament Legislative Committee has approved a draft bill for general amnesty applicable to political malfeasants whose infractions do not rise up to the level of criminal activity.
- Seven political groupings in Assiut, Upper Egypt, have decided to boycott the run-off elections. They felt that neither presidential candidate has met their expectations. But the Mofti of Egypt, the progressive Dr. Aly Gomaa, issued an appeal to all Egyptians to vote and to stand behind whoever wins this month.
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