Dr. Hesham Kandeel is now PM of the new Egypt. Chosen by President Mohamed Morsi for that post, he is a technocrat of 50 years of age. Like Morsi, he is an engineer, with extensive training in the U.S. As promised by Morsi, Kandeel was picked up from outside the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood.
One of the gravest problems facing Egypt is the possible reduction of its quota from the water of the Nile. That quota was set by a treaty concluded in 1929 when Egypt was a semi-protectorate of Great Britain which had a final say not only in Egypt, but also in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.
The Blue Nile runs from Ethiopia through the Sudan causing the great annual flood in Egypt; the White Nile runs from Lake Victoria, Uganda, also through the Sudan, up north.
From Khartoum, the Sudan, the two rivers combine in the majestic Nile River which empties in the Mediterranean after leaving its bounty to give life to Egypt. Now 7 African States, which are also Nile reparians, having become independent since the 1960's, demand a revision of that treaty. They aim at benefiting from better quotas of the waters of the mighty Nile. So far Egypt and the Sudan have been reluctant; but their stance cannot possibly trump agreed needs of these sister States for more Nile water for development.
Against this complex watery background, the selection of Dr. Kandeel to lead the first Egyptian Cabinet, following the heady days of the January 25, 2011 revolution, assumes special significance. He has been the Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources in the interim cabinet of Dr. El-Ganzoury. Africa, the NileValley, and infrastructure are expected to become new ministerial portfolios in the about to be announced Kandeel Cabinet.
Comments by politicians, academics and the youth made to various Arabic language media reflect enthusiasm for the emerging character of the Kandeel Cabinet. Prominent among those are statements made by Dr. Mustafa Elwi, distinguished professor in the Cairo University Faculty of Economics and Political Science.
Dr. Elwi stresses the importance of the technocratic nature of the new Cabinet with ministers chosen, not on the basis of political or party considerations. The main criterion for selection, he pointed out, should be meritocracy which is the only way to lift the new Egypt out of the present primal chaos.
In the same vein, the liberals represented by Al-Wafd party, which is much older than the Muslim Brotherhood, gave an unqualified support to a Cabinet of technocrats. In this respect, Al-Wafd party expressed its good wishes to Kandeel whose Cabinet is expected to include at least one Coptic minister, the present Minister of Tourism, Munir Fakhr El-Din, a member of the Wafd.
The burdens of the new Cabinet, which is expected to include a broad spectrum of a variety of Egyptian parties, forces, and organizations, cannot be underestimated. Its most pressing problems are the economy and the restoration of tranquility and peace to the Egyptian street.
As to the issue of relations with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), an active process of dialogue and consultation is afoot since June 30. That is the date when SCAF handed most of the reigns of power to the newly-elected President of Egypt, Dr. Morsi. Here the main issues of these consultations between the civilian administration and the SCAF are the selection of the Minister of Defense, the degree of scrutiny over the military budget, the SCAF's concern for the balance of powers between the three branches of government, and the continued secularity of the new Egypt.
A few hours from the posting of this blog, the new Cabinet of Kandeel would have taken the oath of office before President Morsi. Following that historic event, a new Presidential Advisory Council would also be declared. It is expected to include a leading Coptic political thinker, Samir Morkos, in a newly created position of decision-making, called Assistant President.
The new Egypt is finally taking shape. A Kandeel (a lantern) is throwing some light into the fog which has enveloped the country since January 25, 2011. Said Prime Minister Kandeel (not Kandil): "My Cabinet shall be an integrated team, and shall include at least one woman. The new ministerial portfolio on the Nile Valley is directly related to our national security."
Friday, July 27, 2012
Thursday, July 19, 2012
AL-WASAT (Middle of the Road): Egypt's New Ideology Between Islamism and Cosmopolitanism
President Morsi seems to have 82 million advisors!! They constitute the entire population of Egypt, as per the recent census. We have here a bit of exaggeration intended to depict the advisories avalanche which continues to swamp the Presidential palace.
There is a historic Arab proverb that says: "The best position is the Middle." This is backed up by a peasant adage which advises the holder of a club to show his non-threatening intentions by "Hold your club from the middle." This preference for the "Middle of the Road" is also reflected religiously in the Quran where, in describing Muslims, it says: "You are a middle-road nation: ummattan wasatan."
Unfortunately this centrism has been buried under the tsunami of Islamic militancy. Under Islamic Sharia (Law), jihad does not mean aggression. It means either fighting inner negative urges to do bad things, or self-defense when aggressed against territorially. The maniacs who perpetrated 9/11 have been terribly misguided. In Islam, war cannot be for aggression; only for self-defense.
In post-Mubarak Egypt, the forces of 38 organizations, movements, political parties and others are vying for prominence. The spectrum stretches from the Salafis, the extreme Muslim right, to the socialists and Nasserites, on the left. The Muslim Brotherhood had moved inexorably from the right to the center to accommodate Egypt's cosmopolitanism which is watched over by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).
Handing power over on June 30 to the newly-elected President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, does not mean a full isolation of the military from governance. The return to the barracks is so far only symbolic. The Turkish model of the army being the protector of the secularism of the State since 1923, is indelibly imprinted in the minds of SCAF which commands vast human and economic resources. In a recent statement by Field Marshall Tantawi, while ordering disbanding the Islamist-led Parliament, he followed up by saying: "We shall never allow Egypt to fall in the hands of one faction." It was a clear signal to the Brotherhood: Don't push us too far!!
Signals pointing to centrism, middle of the road, cosmopolitanism as a guiding principle in post-Mubarak Egypt are multiplying. Here are some of these road signs as gleaned from the Egyptian street and the Arabic-language media.
There is a historic Arab proverb that says: "The best position is the Middle." This is backed up by a peasant adage which advises the holder of a club to show his non-threatening intentions by "Hold your club from the middle." This preference for the "Middle of the Road" is also reflected religiously in the Quran where, in describing Muslims, it says: "You are a middle-road nation: ummattan wasatan."
Unfortunately this centrism has been buried under the tsunami of Islamic militancy. Under Islamic Sharia (Law), jihad does not mean aggression. It means either fighting inner negative urges to do bad things, or self-defense when aggressed against territorially. The maniacs who perpetrated 9/11 have been terribly misguided. In Islam, war cannot be for aggression; only for self-defense.
In post-Mubarak Egypt, the forces of 38 organizations, movements, political parties and others are vying for prominence. The spectrum stretches from the Salafis, the extreme Muslim right, to the socialists and Nasserites, on the left. The Muslim Brotherhood had moved inexorably from the right to the center to accommodate Egypt's cosmopolitanism which is watched over by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).
Handing power over on June 30 to the newly-elected President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, does not mean a full isolation of the military from governance. The return to the barracks is so far only symbolic. The Turkish model of the army being the protector of the secularism of the State since 1923, is indelibly imprinted in the minds of SCAF which commands vast human and economic resources. In a recent statement by Field Marshall Tantawi, while ordering disbanding the Islamist-led Parliament, he followed up by saying: "We shall never allow Egypt to fall in the hands of one faction." It was a clear signal to the Brotherhood: Don't push us too far!!
Signals pointing to centrism, middle of the road, cosmopolitanism as a guiding principle in post-Mubarak Egypt are multiplying. Here are some of these road signs as gleaned from the Egyptian street and the Arabic-language media.
- A new Egyptian party, crystallizing the middle of the road ideology, has been formed. Its name is "AL-WASAT" (Middle of the Road).
- Al-Azhar has regained its dynamic role in declaring that moderation is its historic creed. In this case, moderation and inclusiveness go hand in hand. Al-Azhar insists on having the Copts and women play energetic roles in shaping the future of Egypt.
- President Morsi referred to the Court of Cassation the SCAF decision to disband the Egyptian Parliament, together with his decree defying that ban. This case of a ban and counter-ban began with a judgment by the Supreme Constitutional Court which cast doubts on the constitutionality of the laws under which Parliament was elected. Legal experts, reflecting the Egyptian mentality of moderation, predicted that Cassation and the Constitutional Courts shall never stand in defiance of one another. These experts reasoned that Morsi's decree is an executive order and, as such, is referable to Cassation, while the Constitutional Court judgment did not call for the dissolution of Parliament.
- Only 50% of eligible voters cast their votes in the run-off for the Office of President (Morsi v. Shafik), with Morsi getting slightly more than half of these votes. Absence of a landslide. Thus towing the line in the middle of the road in presiding over Egypt is a natural course of action.
- A huge conference on the ideology and the merits of the "Middle of the Road" was held in Cairo where Al-Azhar played a prominent role.
- The constituent Assembly which is charged with drafting the Egyptian Constitution is said to be keeping unchanged the text of Article 2 of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution. This article states interalia that the "principles of Sharia are the primary source of legislation." Principles are not legal provisions. They are only guidelines.
- The Salafi attempts to make Sharia the only source of legislation have faltered as those attempts were totally rebuffed by the Rector of Al-Azhar, Dr. Ahmed El-Tayib. His declaration was met with enthusiastic approval by both the Muslim Brotherhood, the Copts and women. The first part of that Article reads "Islam is the official religion of the State, and the Arabic language is its official language."
AL-WASAT IS EGYPT'S ROAD TO RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY FROM SIXTY YEARS OF MILITARY DICTATORSHIP WHICH BEGAN ON JULY 23, 1952 BY COLONEL NASSER. THAT DARK PERIOD IS NOW OVER!!
Friday, July 13, 2012
Mirror Mirror on the Wall: WHO IS THE FAIREST OF THEM ALL? The Court, the Palace or the Barracks?
The grade is a passing grade, but there are no flying colors!!
The month of June 2012 witnessed three historic events in Cairo:
First: The Supreme Constitutional Court issued a judgment casting constitutional doubts upon the legal basis for electing one-third of the lower house of Parliament. In Egypt there are three high court systems: The Supreme Constitutional is charged with reviewing the constitutionality of laws; the Court of Cassation is the highest court of appeal from judgments rendered by lower courts; and High Administrative Court is a court of appeal from administrative, executive decisions taken by any government administrative authority.
Second: On the basis of the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court, whose judges are all appointees of the defunct Mubarak regime, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) dissolved the Islamist-led Parliament. That was before SCAF, as per its prior pledge, surrendered all of its executive powers on June 30 to the newly-elected President, Dr. Muhammad Morsi.
Third: With the departure of SCAF from governance, which it assumed since the ouster of Mubarak, President Morsi issued a presidential decree calling the dissolved Parliament into session. By that decree, the President, who ran in the May elections as the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, nullified SCAF's order of parliamentary dissolution. Simultaneously, Morsi's decree put the legality of the judgment of the Supreme Constitutional Court in doubt.
So who is the fairest of them all? The Constitutional Court, the presidential decree, or the SCAF order of dissolution? To answer these questions, a million people marched, each to his or her tune; countless constitutional lawyers entered the fray; and writers, most of whom seem to have little training in conflict of laws, penned down long opinions about who is legally right and who is legally wrong; and judges, in a country where the judiciary since the days of the pharaohs are nearly at par with religious authorities, got also in the act.
While the SCAF maintained discreet silence except to admonish that no one was above the law, the Constitutional Court reaffirmed its earlier judgment. But Morsi, in an attempt to soften the blow of his decree, said through a spokesman that his decree is intended to find a legal mechanism for putting the contested judgment into operation.
Responding to the presidential decree, 347 members of the People's Assembly, the lower house convened in their chamber for only 20 minutes, while 161 members did not show up. Gavelling the lower house into session, Dr. El-Katatni, its spokesman/presiding officer/Islamist, the House referred the controversial judgment to the Court of Cassation to determine "the mechanism for implementing the Constitutional Court decision." Then it adjourned, after transferring its legislative powers to Morsi pending Cassation's decision (Egypt's permanent constitution is still being drafted).
The move thus accomplished a number of primary objectives of the Morsi Administration: it bestowed on Morsi temporary legislative authority. A banned House of Representatives cannot legislate while its legitimacy is in doubt. It also manifested at least a pro forma respect for the judiciary and the laws. It reframed the judicial question into one of separation of powers -the Constitutional Court cannot dissolve Parliament, a co-equal branch of government. More importantly it tended to clarify the fog surrounding the decision of the Constitutional Court. The decision did not call for the dissolution of Parliament. It had merely put in question the legality of electing one-third of the membership which had been allocated to individual (non-party affiliated) candidates, a restriction which apparently was not observed by the political parties.
So who is for Morsi's decree and who is against it? Of course, the Islamists (70% of seats -both Brotherhood and Salafis) were supportive. Cassation, they maintained, has jurisdiction over questions of legality of parliamentary representation. Liberals and others derided the reconvening of the House of Representatives asserting that the Constitutional Court decision is final, non-appealable; and that that judgment needs no clarification of implementation mechanism. Amongst them was Dr. Yehia El-Gamal, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt after the fall of Mubarak.
In a colorful interview with one of Egypt's popular TV channels, Dr. El-Gamal, who is considered one of the foremost constitutional lawyers in the Arab world, quipped: "Parliament is dead. Even President Morsi cannot bring the dead back to life!!!"
The month of June 2012 witnessed three historic events in Cairo:
First: The Supreme Constitutional Court issued a judgment casting constitutional doubts upon the legal basis for electing one-third of the lower house of Parliament. In Egypt there are three high court systems: The Supreme Constitutional is charged with reviewing the constitutionality of laws; the Court of Cassation is the highest court of appeal from judgments rendered by lower courts; and High Administrative Court is a court of appeal from administrative, executive decisions taken by any government administrative authority.
Second: On the basis of the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court, whose judges are all appointees of the defunct Mubarak regime, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) dissolved the Islamist-led Parliament. That was before SCAF, as per its prior pledge, surrendered all of its executive powers on June 30 to the newly-elected President, Dr. Muhammad Morsi.
Third: With the departure of SCAF from governance, which it assumed since the ouster of Mubarak, President Morsi issued a presidential decree calling the dissolved Parliament into session. By that decree, the President, who ran in the May elections as the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, nullified SCAF's order of parliamentary dissolution. Simultaneously, Morsi's decree put the legality of the judgment of the Supreme Constitutional Court in doubt.
So who is the fairest of them all? The Constitutional Court, the presidential decree, or the SCAF order of dissolution? To answer these questions, a million people marched, each to his or her tune; countless constitutional lawyers entered the fray; and writers, most of whom seem to have little training in conflict of laws, penned down long opinions about who is legally right and who is legally wrong; and judges, in a country where the judiciary since the days of the pharaohs are nearly at par with religious authorities, got also in the act.
While the SCAF maintained discreet silence except to admonish that no one was above the law, the Constitutional Court reaffirmed its earlier judgment. But Morsi, in an attempt to soften the blow of his decree, said through a spokesman that his decree is intended to find a legal mechanism for putting the contested judgment into operation.
Responding to the presidential decree, 347 members of the People's Assembly, the lower house convened in their chamber for only 20 minutes, while 161 members did not show up. Gavelling the lower house into session, Dr. El-Katatni, its spokesman/presiding officer/Islamist, the House referred the controversial judgment to the Court of Cassation to determine "the mechanism for implementing the Constitutional Court decision." Then it adjourned, after transferring its legislative powers to Morsi pending Cassation's decision (Egypt's permanent constitution is still being drafted).
The move thus accomplished a number of primary objectives of the Morsi Administration: it bestowed on Morsi temporary legislative authority. A banned House of Representatives cannot legislate while its legitimacy is in doubt. It also manifested at least a pro forma respect for the judiciary and the laws. It reframed the judicial question into one of separation of powers -the Constitutional Court cannot dissolve Parliament, a co-equal branch of government. More importantly it tended to clarify the fog surrounding the decision of the Constitutional Court. The decision did not call for the dissolution of Parliament. It had merely put in question the legality of electing one-third of the membership which had been allocated to individual (non-party affiliated) candidates, a restriction which apparently was not observed by the political parties.
So who is for Morsi's decree and who is against it? Of course, the Islamists (70% of seats -both Brotherhood and Salafis) were supportive. Cassation, they maintained, has jurisdiction over questions of legality of parliamentary representation. Liberals and others derided the reconvening of the House of Representatives asserting that the Constitutional Court decision is final, non-appealable; and that that judgment needs no clarification of implementation mechanism. Amongst them was Dr. Yehia El-Gamal, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt after the fall of Mubarak.
In a colorful interview with one of Egypt's popular TV channels, Dr. El-Gamal, who is considered one of the foremost constitutional lawyers in the Arab world, quipped: "Parliament is dead. Even President Morsi cannot bring the dead back to life!!!"
Monday, July 9, 2012
In Egypt, Islamism Comes in Three Flavors
First, there is the Islamism of Al-Azhar: Moderate, inclusive, with legitimacy going back 1050 years ago. That was when the Fatimides, the Shii reign which established Cairo itself, in 975 AD, then built Al-Azhar University. Its scholarship covers Sunni as well as Shii schools of Islamic thought.
Second, there is the Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by a charismatic school teacher, Hassan El-Banna, in 1928 in Ismailia on the Suez Canal. Born as a reform movement, it soon spread from Egypt to other Arab countries east of Suez and west of Alexandria. As of 1947, its suppression became a tool by the pre-Nasser and the post-Nasser governments for the maintenance of Egypt as a secular State. Its ideology fluctuated between militancy and moderateness in accommodation of the complex nature of cosmopolitan Egypt.
Third, there is Islamism of the Salafis, who are to the extreme right of the Islamic spectrum in Egypt. For inspiration, they look to Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. Their rise to notoriety in Egypt could be dated to the early years of the Mubarak regime in the early 1980's. That defunct dictatorship, wishing to keep the Muslim Brotherhood under check, encouraged the rise of the Salafi movement as a counterpoise to the vastly bigger and more articulate Brotherhood.
Thus it could be said that the Salafis constitute the extreme right of Islamism in Egypt, with the Brotherhood occupying a centrist position, and Al-Azhar constituting the most liberal, the most neutral, and the most influential in matters of faith interpretation, as compared to the other two types of Islamism in post-Mubarak Egypt.
When it comes to decision-making in Egypt after the January 25, 2011 Revolution, it could be said that Al-Azhar provided quiet guidance through its Rector, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Taiyeb.
But the Brotherhood, through its recently-formed political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, was able to gain 50% of the seats in the lower house of Parliament. Subsequently it gained the upperhand in the presidential run-off of late May 2012. As a result, its candidate, Dr. Mohamed Morsi became Egypt's President. The Salafis were able to muster enough votes in the Parliamentary election of March 2012 to gain 20% of the seats in the lower house. Now Parliament has been dissolved as a result of a judicial decision enforced by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (SCAF).
As of June 30, 2012, the SCAF turned to President Morsi the reigns of government, if not the reigns of actual power. Yet there are indications of gradually clothing President Morsi with specific prerogatives and other symbols of presidential powers. Examples on this trend are multiplying.
The SCAF invited Morsi this month to hand the new graduates of the Naval Academy and the Air Force Academy their commissions upon graduation. Morsi has been left free to select his Prime Minister who is expected not to be from the Brotherhood. He has been able to declare that he intended to have a Copt (Christian) and a woman as two VPs. The Salafi opposition in this regard was to no avail. Even prior to the drafting of a new Constitution, he has decreed the formation of a high commission to investigate and hold accountable those who might be charged with causing the death of nearly 1000 Egyptian demonstrators in various parts of Egypt, as of January 25, 2011.
And if beards have become ID cards for Islamists in Egypt as well as elsewhere, the Court of Administrative Justice has disallowed the freedom of members of the Police force to grow beards as being against regulations.
A presidential decree was also promulgated by Morsi on July 4, 2012 constituting a committee to scrutinize all judgements issued by the military from January 25, 2011 until the SCAF retirement on June 30, 2012 against civilian detainees. The jurisdiction of the Committee, under that presidential decree (Decree No. 5, 2012) also extends to judgments issued by civilian courts against detainees during the same period indicated above. The Committee is required to submit to President Morsi its findings within 2 weeks dating from July 4, 2012.
In a further assertion of his presidential powers, Morsi, in a bold move whose consequences are not yet clear, decreed the convening of the Parliament dissolved by SCAF prior to its retirement on June 30. The move does not seem to be a challenge to the Supreme Constitutional Court which ruled that one-third of Parliamentary seats was bereft of a legal basis. Morsi is now challenging the SCAF interpretation of that judicial decision whereby the entire lower chamber was dissolved.
Commenting on the general trend of the Islamists accommodation of secularism in the new Egypt, Dr. Abdel-Monim Abo-Elfotouh, one of the presidential candidates prior to Morsi's selection, and a former leader within the Muslim Brotherhood declared: "In Egypt, there is now no religious State nor a military State."
It also seems that Tahrir Square is gradually losing its magnetism to the demonstrators following Morsi's taking the oath of office for the first time in the Square. On that occasion, he declared that "Tahrir Square is the source of popular sovereignty, and that sovereignty resides in the Egyptian people."
Now those who want to voice their grievances do not go to Tahrir. They congregate before the Qubba Palace in Cairo, Morsi's official residence, which is the equivalent of the White House in Washington D.C.
From the three flavors of Islamism, emerges a democratic value - FREEDOM OF CHOICE!!
Second, there is the Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by a charismatic school teacher, Hassan El-Banna, in 1928 in Ismailia on the Suez Canal. Born as a reform movement, it soon spread from Egypt to other Arab countries east of Suez and west of Alexandria. As of 1947, its suppression became a tool by the pre-Nasser and the post-Nasser governments for the maintenance of Egypt as a secular State. Its ideology fluctuated between militancy and moderateness in accommodation of the complex nature of cosmopolitan Egypt.
Third, there is Islamism of the Salafis, who are to the extreme right of the Islamic spectrum in Egypt. For inspiration, they look to Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. Their rise to notoriety in Egypt could be dated to the early years of the Mubarak regime in the early 1980's. That defunct dictatorship, wishing to keep the Muslim Brotherhood under check, encouraged the rise of the Salafi movement as a counterpoise to the vastly bigger and more articulate Brotherhood.
Thus it could be said that the Salafis constitute the extreme right of Islamism in Egypt, with the Brotherhood occupying a centrist position, and Al-Azhar constituting the most liberal, the most neutral, and the most influential in matters of faith interpretation, as compared to the other two types of Islamism in post-Mubarak Egypt.
When it comes to decision-making in Egypt after the January 25, 2011 Revolution, it could be said that Al-Azhar provided quiet guidance through its Rector, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Taiyeb.
But the Brotherhood, through its recently-formed political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, was able to gain 50% of the seats in the lower house of Parliament. Subsequently it gained the upperhand in the presidential run-off of late May 2012. As a result, its candidate, Dr. Mohamed Morsi became Egypt's President. The Salafis were able to muster enough votes in the Parliamentary election of March 2012 to gain 20% of the seats in the lower house. Now Parliament has been dissolved as a result of a judicial decision enforced by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (SCAF).
As of June 30, 2012, the SCAF turned to President Morsi the reigns of government, if not the reigns of actual power. Yet there are indications of gradually clothing President Morsi with specific prerogatives and other symbols of presidential powers. Examples on this trend are multiplying.
The SCAF invited Morsi this month to hand the new graduates of the Naval Academy and the Air Force Academy their commissions upon graduation. Morsi has been left free to select his Prime Minister who is expected not to be from the Brotherhood. He has been able to declare that he intended to have a Copt (Christian) and a woman as two VPs. The Salafi opposition in this regard was to no avail. Even prior to the drafting of a new Constitution, he has decreed the formation of a high commission to investigate and hold accountable those who might be charged with causing the death of nearly 1000 Egyptian demonstrators in various parts of Egypt, as of January 25, 2011.
And if beards have become ID cards for Islamists in Egypt as well as elsewhere, the Court of Administrative Justice has disallowed the freedom of members of the Police force to grow beards as being against regulations.
A presidential decree was also promulgated by Morsi on July 4, 2012 constituting a committee to scrutinize all judgements issued by the military from January 25, 2011 until the SCAF retirement on June 30, 2012 against civilian detainees. The jurisdiction of the Committee, under that presidential decree (Decree No. 5, 2012) also extends to judgments issued by civilian courts against detainees during the same period indicated above. The Committee is required to submit to President Morsi its findings within 2 weeks dating from July 4, 2012.
In a further assertion of his presidential powers, Morsi, in a bold move whose consequences are not yet clear, decreed the convening of the Parliament dissolved by SCAF prior to its retirement on June 30. The move does not seem to be a challenge to the Supreme Constitutional Court which ruled that one-third of Parliamentary seats was bereft of a legal basis. Morsi is now challenging the SCAF interpretation of that judicial decision whereby the entire lower chamber was dissolved.
Commenting on the general trend of the Islamists accommodation of secularism in the new Egypt, Dr. Abdel-Monim Abo-Elfotouh, one of the presidential candidates prior to Morsi's selection, and a former leader within the Muslim Brotherhood declared: "In Egypt, there is now no religious State nor a military State."
It also seems that Tahrir Square is gradually losing its magnetism to the demonstrators following Morsi's taking the oath of office for the first time in the Square. On that occasion, he declared that "Tahrir Square is the source of popular sovereignty, and that sovereignty resides in the Egyptian people."
Now those who want to voice their grievances do not go to Tahrir. They congregate before the Qubba Palace in Cairo, Morsi's official residence, which is the equivalent of the White House in Washington D.C.
From the three flavors of Islamism, emerges a democratic value - FREEDOM OF CHOICE!!
The MORSI CODE: Reading the Tea Leaves of the MORSI Presidency
He is a historic figure. Not because of charisma, but because in him Egypt found its first-ever elected President. You may not call him "Abu-Ahmed" (Ahmed's father). Only his wife may be called "Umm Ahmed" (Ahmed's Mother). Their oldest son is called Ahmed.
President Muhammad Morsi hails from the Sharkia Province (Governerate). I know the Province well, having myself hailed from there. In Zagazig, its capital, located about 175 miles northeast of Cairo, I was educated till graduation from high school. The large El-Ayouty clan is sprawled over there, especially in a town near Zagazig called Kanayat. Known to all Egyptians for its extreme generosity, it is rumored that when the railroad from Cairo to Ismailia and Suez was built, the villagers of one hamlet invited all the passengers of one train to a meal.
Already there are indications that Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and an engineer who received his Ph.D. from California (two of his sons are Americans by birth), will try to assert his presidential powers against the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). SCAF has symbolically, on June 30, turned power over to him, but retained residual powers causing the Arab press to call him "fat-free President."
From his early pronouncements, one can read an early Morsi Code. His priorities are the needs of the masses: alleviating traffic congestion in Cairo; subsidizing the price of bread, sugar and cooking oil; alleviating the burdens of life in the slums which have over years of neglect by 60 years of military dictatorship smothered the access points to once beautiful Cairo.
His first meetings as President were with the families of those who lost their lives during the January 25, 2011 revolution; with the Coptic leadership; with the young revolutionaries; with women groups; and with nearly all the leaders of the active political and religious spectrum which has sprung to existence from Tahrir Square. In Tahrir, he took his first oath of office, calling that historic Square the birthplace of legitimacy of people's power.
Morsi is stressing Egypt's respect for international agreements, obviously including the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel. He is showing strong inclinations toward selecting an independent personality (meaning outside the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood) for Prime Minister. Two of the Deputies to the President might be a Copt and a woman. The main thrust is towards a government of national unity.
Huge gaps remain unfilled in Egypt's governance. Parliament has been dissolved by a judicial decision enforced by SCAF prior to June 30; the constituent assembly of 100 members has not yet begun its drafting of a constitution for the new Egypt; and elections for the lower chamber of Parliament have not yet been decided upon. It is still unclear whether the dissolution of Parliament applied to both the lower and upper Chambers. President Morsi's powers and prerogatives in this period of constitutional no-man's land are undefined.
In the meantime, there is plenty of symbolism to fill some of these gaps: Moving from a modest apartment to the opulence of Mubarak's palace was jarring, especially for Umm Ahmed; having the Presidential guard standing in the hot summer's sun was ended by Morsi; praying in the palace for security reasons on Fridays, was negated by Morsi in favor of praying at Al-Azhar; taking his second oath of office before the Supreme Constitutional Court was effected, following much debate against it. Those who were against that venue cited that all the judges were Mubarak's appointees. Those who were for it insisted that taking the oath before that Court manifested respect for the law.
The Morsi administration seems to be searching for identity which would not be characterized by Islamism. So far, it seems to be free from the urge for revenge for past oppression. In fact nothing has been said so far in regard to the trials of Mubarak and sons. But a famous Arab poem says: "The coming days shall reveal to you what your knowledge did not encompass."
President Muhammad Morsi hails from the Sharkia Province (Governerate). I know the Province well, having myself hailed from there. In Zagazig, its capital, located about 175 miles northeast of Cairo, I was educated till graduation from high school. The large El-Ayouty clan is sprawled over there, especially in a town near Zagazig called Kanayat. Known to all Egyptians for its extreme generosity, it is rumored that when the railroad from Cairo to Ismailia and Suez was built, the villagers of one hamlet invited all the passengers of one train to a meal.
Already there are indications that Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and an engineer who received his Ph.D. from California (two of his sons are Americans by birth), will try to assert his presidential powers against the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). SCAF has symbolically, on June 30, turned power over to him, but retained residual powers causing the Arab press to call him "fat-free President."
From his early pronouncements, one can read an early Morsi Code. His priorities are the needs of the masses: alleviating traffic congestion in Cairo; subsidizing the price of bread, sugar and cooking oil; alleviating the burdens of life in the slums which have over years of neglect by 60 years of military dictatorship smothered the access points to once beautiful Cairo.
His first meetings as President were with the families of those who lost their lives during the January 25, 2011 revolution; with the Coptic leadership; with the young revolutionaries; with women groups; and with nearly all the leaders of the active political and religious spectrum which has sprung to existence from Tahrir Square. In Tahrir, he took his first oath of office, calling that historic Square the birthplace of legitimacy of people's power.
Morsi is stressing Egypt's respect for international agreements, obviously including the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel. He is showing strong inclinations toward selecting an independent personality (meaning outside the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood) for Prime Minister. Two of the Deputies to the President might be a Copt and a woman. The main thrust is towards a government of national unity.
Huge gaps remain unfilled in Egypt's governance. Parliament has been dissolved by a judicial decision enforced by SCAF prior to June 30; the constituent assembly of 100 members has not yet begun its drafting of a constitution for the new Egypt; and elections for the lower chamber of Parliament have not yet been decided upon. It is still unclear whether the dissolution of Parliament applied to both the lower and upper Chambers. President Morsi's powers and prerogatives in this period of constitutional no-man's land are undefined.
In the meantime, there is plenty of symbolism to fill some of these gaps: Moving from a modest apartment to the opulence of Mubarak's palace was jarring, especially for Umm Ahmed; having the Presidential guard standing in the hot summer's sun was ended by Morsi; praying in the palace for security reasons on Fridays, was negated by Morsi in favor of praying at Al-Azhar; taking his second oath of office before the Supreme Constitutional Court was effected, following much debate against it. Those who were against that venue cited that all the judges were Mubarak's appointees. Those who were for it insisted that taking the oath before that Court manifested respect for the law.
The Morsi administration seems to be searching for identity which would not be characterized by Islamism. So far, it seems to be free from the urge for revenge for past oppression. In fact nothing has been said so far in regard to the trials of Mubarak and sons. But a famous Arab poem says: "The coming days shall reveal to you what your knowledge did not encompass."
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