Through Divisions, Egypt is Threatened with Becoming an Orphan

The Muslim Brothers claim Egypt as Islamist.  Their Salafi opponents regard Egypt, without the application of the traditions of early Islam, as only a work in progress.  The secular opposition sees in Islamism as a threat to the cosmopolitanism of Egypt.  The ultra-Salafis look upon the the ancient Egyptian civilization as pagan and on its great monuments as mere idols.  The great community of artists, singers, dancers, opera goers, and film makers see in these cultural buffeting winds the early warnings of a devastating storm.

Within this division, which constitutes cultural chasms, stand three institutions which may ultimately save Egypt from being orphaned.  An orphan status is a status where either there are no existing parents, or that parentage is claimed by many parties to the point that the child has no identification of specific parents.

The three institutions which today stand for one identifiable, unified and discernible Egypt which the June 30 uprising (TAMMARODD) threatens to tear asunder, are: The armed forces, Al-Azhar, and the Coptic Church.  Each of them has a specific historic role in aborting the cultural orphaning of Egypt.  The Coptic Church is more than 2000 years old; the Al-Azhar mosque and Islamic university is more than 1000 years old; and the contemporary Egyptian armed forces are more than 200 years old.

The roles of these three institutions are not only anchored in hundreds of years of national Egyptian traditions.  They are also proud of their standing up for Egypt at its hours of peril.  The Copts have always stood for the country's independence, and have fought the country's attackers, standing side by side with their Muslim brethren. Al-Azhar was, historically, the launching pad of great national resistance movements, especially as regards western encroachments in the 19th century.  And the Egyptian armed forces, in spite of chronic deficiency in armament, have valiantly battled the country's external adversaries, since the dying days of the Ottoman empire.

Here we are talking about tangible institutions.  But these institutions are also bolstered by intangible cultural factors.  Foremost among these are the nationalist songs which we sang out in formation as primary school students, boys and girls, all over Egypt.  In my days at that private school in my hometown of Zagazig, Sharkia Province, called at that time "King Fouad Al-Awwal School," we sang, prior to marching to our classrooms: "Bilady Bilady Fidaki Dammi" (My country, my country, I shed my blood for thee).

Egyptians, rank and file, never tire of repeating what their sages have often repeated.  Two religious scholars of the 19th century, have taught them that Islam was a way of life not particular to a geographic area.  Sheikh Rifaa Al-Tahtawi and Sheikh Muhammad Abdoh, educated at both Al-Azhar and France, had proclaimed that the practice of morality under Islamic traditions of tolerance is more observed in the non-Islamic west than in the Islamic east.  The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 is attributed, in part, to the traditional Muslim scholars in Istanbul opposing the training of the Ottoman troops by non-Muslim trainers.  And most of the Egyptian banners raised in Tahrir Square during the formative years of the Egyptian Revolution of January 25, 2011 did not proclaim Islamic sayings.  On the Egyptian flags, they declared: "I Love Egypt" (Baahibb Massr).

Such built-in safeguards, both institutional and cultural, against the orphaning of Egypt through divisions and fractures, are real protective barriers.  Ignoring them might result in an historic infanticide -the death and burial of an infant called "Democracy" in the most populous Arab country -Egypt.  Diversity (the elixir of historic Egypt) is all for one.  Division (the curse of post-revolutionary Egypt) is one without all.

The Broader Arab Civil War For Which Egypt Should Be An Improbable Party

In their international relationships, the Arab States are better at attacking one another than at reconciling peacefully their differences.  The late American Professor Malcolm Kerr of UCLA wrote in 1958 a distinguished treatise entitled "The Arab Cold War."  If he were still alive today he would have been the author of a book on a much devastating inter-Arab ware.  The coming Sunni-Shii war, for which Egypt should be an improbable party.  Such conflict is expected to have cataclysmic consequences for regional stability and world peace.

This broader civil war is ironically one of the consequences of the Arab Spring, on which this blog has focused in regard to its Egyptian sector.  Triggered by the Syrian civil war, the Sunni majority of that troubled country has seen the ruling Alawite (Shii) minority, led by the killer regime of Bashar Al-Assad, drawing its fighting strength  from Shii troops from outside Syria. From Iran and Shii-majority Iraq to the east, to the Lebanese Hezbollah to the west, the Syrian bloody landscape witnessed militarized Shiism pinning the Sunnis down.

The embers of conflict between Shii Islam and Sunni Islam which have simmered east of Suez for the past 14 centuries have now been allowed to shoot up its flames.  The intense Arabism of Syria which made Damascus boast of its continuous resistance to western influences and to Israeli claims to the entirety of historic Palestine has become, under Bashar dictatorship, largely a Shiism on the defensive.  The stalemate in the largely Sunni fight for an Assad-less Syria prompted a realignment of Islamic sectarianism.  Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Gulf States have been pouring in armament and volunteers -in aid of the Free Syrian opposition.  Their ideological conviction is that a Shii triumph in Syria would be a net Sunni loss to all these Sunni States.

The complications leading to that religious/Arab versus Arab/Muslim versus Muslim broad civil war do not stop at that.  Religion in armed conflicts has always meant the prolongation of these conflicts as each side sees itself fighting on behalf of God. These complications in the present Syrian civil war can be discerned in the entry of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates like Al-Nassra into the field of battle.  These latter groups, with agendas of their own which have become more pronounced after the liquidation of Bin Laden are, as to be expected after 9/11, labelled terrorist organizations.

Thus the so-called "war on terror," having become intertwined with "regime change" saw a Russia assisting Bashar; a China on the sidelines; an America hesitant to provide lethal arms to the "free Syrians"; a Britain and a France reluctantly drawn into the conflict without a clear sanction from the European Union; and a United Nations which, in civil wars, can contribute no more than a limited humanitarian assistance and a heap of toothless resolutions condemning blood-letting.

Into this unholy mess, post-Mubarak Egypt has found itself in the unenviable situation of doing nothing except to kick the Syrian embassy out of Egypt.  In mid-June, President Morsi declared that rupture with Syria's Bashar before throngs of his Muslim Brothers.

The Morsi declaration at the Cairo stadium quickly galvanized the secular opposition which so far found no unifying theme amongst its components except to try to force Morsi and the Islamists out of power.  Both El-Baradie and Amr Musa, the two most prominent leaders of the secular opposition which is now getting ready for massive demonstrations against "the Islamization of the State" on June 30, condemned the severing of relations with Syria.

More importantly, the spokesman for the Egyptian armed forces made it clear that "we shall not be used for war outside of our boundaries particularly in combat against a sister State" (meaning Syria).

As for Bashar, he taunted Morsi by saying in response to that speech: "You do not know where to set your feet, because you have no political experience.  You need to grow up."

So where is Egypt now from the looming Sunni-Shii civil war?  In all probability, the new Egypt shall largely stand aside.  It has its own internal problems.  It also is now looking west of Suez to forge an alliance with Libya and the Sudan.

However this assessment does not rule out an Egyptian involvement.  The Salafis are trying to push Egypt into that unholy confrontation.  In this regard, let it not be ever forgotten that neither the Quran, nor Al-Sunna of the Prophet Muhmmad has denied the existence of a variety of Muslim sects.  In teaching Islamic jurisprudence at Fordham University School of Law, New York City, I have not come upon a shred of evidence justifying the demonization by Sunnis of Shiis.  Al-Azhar University, established in Cairo by the Fatimides(Shiis) more than a thousand years ago, teaches both Sunni and Shii schools of thought.  The expansion of the scope and modernity of sharia has been largely due to Shii ijtihad(the application of reason to the written texts).  The great Shii scholar, Sheikh Al-Sistani, observing in quiet anguish the looming Sunni-Shii conflagration, uttered recently in Baghdad the following electrifying words in Arabic (my translation):

"Al-Sunna are not our brothers.  They are ourselves.  Even if they kill half of us, we shall never condone killing them!!"

Let the demons of sectarian conflict in Egypt, as well as elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim world beware.  The fires which they ignite may destroy the hopes of the 1.5 billion Muslims for becoming fully integrated in the world community.

In Egypt, Islamists Versus Secularists: The Process of Reciprocal Nullification

He, President Morsi, entered the big hall where his supporters, the Islamists, have congregated.  Thunderous applause; a standing ovation; and a deep throated chant: "We All Love You,!!!" (Kollena Binhibbak!!!)  That was in Cairo on June 10.  Morsi's response to his cheering supporters, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, was: "I call on all political parties and groups to national reconciliation.  The process should be based on a unified vision for the new Egypt.  No more sloganeering!!  No more auctioneering!!"  At that point, the beards and worry beads shook with shouts of approval.

President Morsi is keenly aware of the approaching ominous date of June 30.  Millions of Egyptian secularists are expected to converge on every public square calling for his recall.  They are demonstrating under the banner of "Millions for the Red Card," meaning: You are out of the game.  Legally there is no basis in Egypt for recalling an elected president.  Of course, there is Article 152 of the new Egyptian Constitution promulgated in December 15, 2012.  It reads, in part:

"A charge of felony of treason against the President of the Republic is to be based on a motion signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives.  An impeachment is to be issued only by a two-thirds majority of the members of the House of Representatives."

No reference to a recall.  And, at present,  there is no House of Representatives, pending elections later this year, with no specific date set as yet.  Recall is a process of relief from the continued rule of a malfeasant.  It is a form of a no-confidence vote to be taken indirectly by the people via their elected representatives.  The days of Athenian democracy where the entire populace gathered to vote in an amphitheatre are long gone.

Such legal facts are overlooked by the movement "TAMMARROD" (Mutiny) which claims to have  already gathered ten million signatures for recalling President Morsi.  They seem to forget that the street is for electioneering.  The ballot box is for elections through which they can vote Morsi out of power if they win in the next election, even by a simple majority.

Other legal hurdles face the June 30 uprising: (a) signing a petition, a non-verifiable process, cannot and should not disenfranchise the 51.5% majority who voted for Morsi, (b) Morsi may have not delivered on his campaign promises.  So have many heads of State around the world who find themselves in the same position.  Election promises constitute no contract.  At best, these are "illusory contracts," aspirational in nature, vacuous in legal merit.  A wish list which is subject to all types of frustration, including "acts of God."  Morsi committed neither a felony nor a treason.

Now the secularists, though divided and fragmented, have come up with what I call "the new doctrine of rejectionism."  In turning down Morsi's repeated calls for a dialogue with the "Front for National Salvation" headed by Dr. Mohamed El-Baradei, they now have what appears to be a set of beliefs expounded recently by the "General Secretary of the Egyptian Socialist Party."  He is an engineer by the name of Ahmed Baha El-Din who, on Tuesday, June 11, defined that "doctrine of rejectionism" in an interview with the United Press International in Cairo.

What are the elements of the doctrine, if one might call it a doctrine?
(1) The Egyptian masses should regain their revolution on June 30, which marks the passing of one year of Morsi's presidency, through massive demonstrations;
(2) Their objective should be to secure their liberty, social justice, and human dignity, which the Islamist rule of Morsi has failed in attaining;
(3) The Muslim Brotherhood has totally failed in ruling the country, and have manifested hunger for more intrusive powers. That hunger is being satisfied through repressive measures which are now leading the populace to call for the fall of the Morsi regime;
(4) The downfall of Morsi has become an urgent necessity which also calls for early presidential elections to replace Morsi;
(5) The phenomenon of using Islam for political ends must be vanquished as it reflects a continuation of Egyptian policies during Mubarak;
(6) The veil of Islamist governance is a pretext for ignoring the needs of the poor; and
(7) Any governmental opposition or suppression of the June 30 demonstrations shall be confronted by a robust response

While the secularists are busy drawing their lines of battle against the Islamists, the latter were getting their forces ready.  The head of what is called "The Sharia Organization," Dr. Ahmed Al-Saloos, has called for the various Islamist parties to unite.  The goal is to defeat the secularists who are less organized than the Islamists in the forthcoming parliamentary elections for the lower chamber.  Al-Saloos whose organization is considered a political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, and an umbrella for a broad Islamist alliance, called for unified support for any Islamist candidate in any electoral district in order to defeat the secularists in the upcoming elections.

June 30 is looming as a possible turning point in the troubled history of the Egyptian Revolution.  Let us hope that democracy in Egypt shall survive this process of reciprocal nullification.  Diversity and zero-sum games are anti-thetical to one another.  Here I pose one question that has always troubled me for lack of a clear answer: How could Egypt of old have given the world so much, whereas Egypt of today is still searching for itself?!!  Amazing!!

Has Egypt's Foreign Policy Changed?

This blog draws for its material from various sources in Egypt.  For this issue we quote the full text of an article by Ambassador Dr. El-Sayed Amin Shalaby on the impact of the Egyptian Revolution on Cairo's foreign policy.  A diplomat and a scholar, Dr. Shalaby occupies an important niche within the spectrum of information on Egypt's international relations.  He is the Executive Director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs which I have the privilege of representing before the U.N. Economic and Social Council.  The title of the article is "Has Egypt's Foreign Policy Changed?"

"So far, in regards to foreign policy, geopolitical constants are transcending any differences between Egypt’s prior and new regime. But this may not always hold, writes Al-Sayed Amin Shalabi

During the 18 days of the 25 January Revolution, demands for overthrowing the regime and ending all types of domestic grievances were constant. But foreign policy seemed to recede into the background, at least until protesters gathered in front of the Israeli embassy and demanded the ambassador’s expulsion.

Soon afterwards, researchers and experts fired off a barrage of criticism against Egyptian foreign policy under Hosni Mubarak, noting that Egypt forfeited its regional status, that it took its cue from the US, and that it was too chummy with Israel.

At which point, it became clear that the revolution had another goal, which was to set Egypt’s foreign policy straight. Accordingly, Egypt’s first post-revolution foreign minister, Nabil Al-Arabi, began criticising Egypt’s closure of the Rafah Crossing, considering it a breach of international law. He also pointed out that Egypt would remain committed to the peace treaty with Israel, but only on the condition that Israel does the same. Al-Arabi called for opening a “new page” on Iran and wanted the country to sign several outstanding international agreements, including that of the International Criminal Court.

The ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), by nature averse to major changes, took a cautious attitude to foreign policy. It asserted Egypt’s commitment to all its international obligations, including the Israel peace treaty, a position it conveyed to various US delegations that came to Cairo after the revolution, which suggested that post-revolutionary Egypt may not be much different from pre-revolutionary Egypt after all.

After the election of Egypt’s first civilian — and Islamist — president, the question of foreign policy surfaced once more. In the first months of his term, President Mohamed Morsi visited Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Brazil. 

In all his talks with foreign officials, the president underlined Egypt’s commitment to the Israel peace treaty. He offered to ease tensions in relations between Israel and Hamas, and successfully brokered a deal between the two. Israeli sources say that Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation has improved under the current regime.

America was a top priority. It was clear from the start that President Morsi’s administration aspired for positive and cooperative ties with Washington. Several presidential delegations made trips to the US to discuss “strategic partnership” and “common values”.

When it comes to Iran, several attempts at rapprochement took place after the revolution. But it is hard to speak of a breakthrough, since the US, Gulf countries, Egyptian security services, and the (ultra-Sunni) Salafis are all opposed to improved ties with the Iranians.

Surveying the scope of Egypt’s foreign interests, one can identify similarities with the 1952 Revolution. In both cases the country’s diplomacy centred on the Arab, African, Islamic and non-aligned planes.

Today’s Egypt, just as the 1952 Revolution once was, is eager to establish a balanced and diversified set of international friendships, generally geared to meeting the domestic needs of the country.

One can also glimpse similarities with the early phase of Mubarak’s presidency, when the quest for balance and diversification was paramount. Mubarak was fully committed to the Israel peace treaty, but he strove to restore Egypt’s ties with the Arab world, something that Egyptian diplomacy managed to achieve after persistent efforts.

Mubarak was eager to maintain the close ties with the US that Anwar Al-Sadat managed to build. But he also sought to rehabilitate ties with the Soviet Union. Early in his presidency, Mubarak invited the Russians to resume working in various industrial projects in Egypt, especially those in which they had been involved in the past, such as aluminium and steel. 

Mubarak, it is to be recalled, visited China nine times, and repeatedly asserted Egypt’s belief in the principles of the non-aligned movement.

Mubarak’s rule may have ended in clear bias toward the US and its plans in the region. After all, he tried to placate the Americans by forging close ties with Israel (the QIZ agreement and the natural gas deal). But he made sure that Egyptian diplomacy remained active in various regional and international forums, albeit not as assertive as some would have liked it to be. Still, the last foreign minister in Mubarak’s time, Ahmed Abul-Gheit, criticised Egyptian foreign policy for lacking focus, and for neglecting Africa.

One must keep in mind that some aspects of Egypt’s foreign policy are immutable. For example, the country’s geostrategic position, its historical legacy, and its demographic weight, all of these are basically the same. Egypt cannot but take account of the international order and the shifting balance of power in the region and the world. This has always been the case, and nothing is going to change in this regard.

One development, however, is new. Since the 25 January Revolution, public opinion has begun to exercise considerable influence on the country’s policies. So, from now on, expect foreign policy makers to pay close attention to public perceptions and demands."

Islamic Law and Global Security Course Syllabus

Sordid Name-Calling in Egypt Is a Malpractice of Democracy

We can understand!!  After 60 years of brutal dictatorship which imposed silence on the masses, the heavy lid on free speech is now off.  The steam in the boiling pot has been gushing forth all over Egypt: demonstrations; disruption of public life; hate for the police; crime, including car theft and sexual harassment; calls by every labor syndicate and association for immediate raises in salaries; disruption of rail and motor travel.

With all that noise, a deafening noise, came also confrontations between the presidency and the judiciary; the executive and freedom of the press including artistic expression; the secularists, including the Coptic Church, and the Islamists; the street and the Ministry of Interior.  The economy is down; public anger is up.  What also occurred was the ability of 53 million Egyptian voters, now including members of the armed forces and the police, to vote in a fair and free elections for a president.

With the wall of fear gone, up went the malpractice of unreasonable vilification and name-calling of the President and his team.  The sordid and constant name-calling of the Executive has now become an Egyptian sport.  No reasoned criticism, but unabashed frontal character assassination.  No innuendos, but frontal generalized attacks.  No alternative programs, but the heaping of scorn on proposed programs.  No reading and research, but imaginary hallucination and stupid competition for first place in the language of profanity.

This is democracy run amok!!  Samples are numerous:

• A woman journalist says in an interview in the daily "Al-Massri Al-Yom," "In the era of the Muslim Brotherhood, everything in Egypt has declined.  Producers are frightened.  Business finds no markets.  All problems are to be attributed to the Brotherhood.  Mixing of religion and politics is a nightmare which shall lead to the collapse of Egypt as a State."  She offers no statistics; no specific instances; no comparative analysis; no field research.  This is particularly so when she asserts the veracity of her general criticism when she states: "The Brotherhood is insistent on the creation of a regime paralleling that of Mubarak."
• In another interview published in the daily "Al-Wafd," another woman opinion-maker proclaims: "Egypt is now living the worst epochs of poverty -an epoch never before experienced by the Egyptians.  Since President Morsi assumed his high office, no good has come to Egypt.  Garbage is still in the streets; corruption continues as it was before; incomes have evaporated; people cannot find food to eat; the country is ruined." 
• In another article in the daily "Al-Shorooq," a male reporter is sarcastic about Morsi, who was photographed in an Egyptian field of ripened wheat.  Since the Government has trumpeted the increase in domestic wheat production, the reporter ridicules that symbolic assurance by saying, "That photo could have had more significance if it stood for the exit of Morsi from the presidential palace."  Then he goes into a trance by saying: "That wheat field suffered the loss of a part of its expanse through accommodating the erection of a platform for Morsi to give his speech."
• More from the hate speech by the same reporter: "Our grand children shall read in the history books that "Morsi has lived his tenure behind enhanced security protection.   If the Muslim Brotherhood is serious in their calls for nullifying the citizenship of any Egyptian opposed to Morsi, they should begin with Morsi who he has been the first in causing the public to lose confidence in him." Then he goes on to say: "Mubarak built his legitimacy on caring for Egypt's infra-structure.  But the Islamists wish to build their legitimacy on their preoccupation with women's infra-strucuture."
• Another journalist writes in "Al-Yom Al-Arabi," chiding President Morsi for ignoring the fate of seven Egyptian soldiers who had been kidnapped by Sinai Bedouins (now released): "The person who occupies the Presidential palace is afraid to pray in the mosques without a ring of guards around him.  But he did not make a move to free those hostages, thus hurting the dignity of Egypt and the honor of his presidency which he shall never uphold."

Thus goes the sordid name-calling under the guise of democracy which espouses free speech.  All that material has nothing to do with assessing the Morsi presidency which is only one year old.  The avalanche of criticism would have had some constructive merit if it was backed by cause and effect, objective comparison between what was Egypt like during the Mubarak dictatorship and what it is like today.  A dose of civilized patience is called for, thus allowing this fledgling democracy to take shape.  The noise of idiotic hate and name-calling is its seed of destruction.  This is not in support of Morsi.  It is in support of an enlightened opposition.

Those who wish for democracy to succeed in Egypt should remember what happened during the Mubarak regime to an editor-in-chief of the daily "Al-Destour."  He was hauled to prison for merely reporting that Mubarak was ill.  But now the wall of fear is gone.  Let the so-called opinion-makers avoid constructing in its place a solid wall of ignorance that threatens to  undermine the newly-found freedom of expression.

Those who, by their thoughtless utterances, cannot wait for the democratic process to mature and to run its normal course to future elections are the perpetrators of the possible abortion of a democracy whose birth was difficult and whose course is still being charted.