A Possible Mutiny on the Nile

Is a mutiny against President Morsi possible?  Events in Egypt seem to answer this question in the positive.  The reasons are many, but the central causes are: deteriorating economy; unattainable dialogue between the Islamists and the secularists; confrontations between Morsi and the Judiciary; absence of confidence in the ability of the civilian government to manage its relationships with either the police or the military.

Is that mutiny imminent?  No one can tell.  What might it lead to?  Possible intervention by the armed forces.  What form of military intervention?  Either a military coup or, alternatively, a larger role for the military in the governance of Egypt.  If this happens, what would be the impact on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt?  Cutting its influence down to size.

Now to the indicators and the triggering events:

• Six Egyptian soldiers and policemen were abducted in Sinai by Egyptian bedouins who later released them unharmed.  It was a first, even in lawless Sinai: Egyptians on Egyptians.  The abductors had demanded release of fellow bedouins who are incarcerated by the Government.  Morsi refused to negotiate with the abductors, and the Minister of Defense, General El-Sisi, faced with a huge storm of anger by the Egyptian masses, counselled patience.  While military intelligence was securing the intermediacy of tribal chiefs, the armed forces, in a show of unprecedented military muscle, poured into northeast Sinai for a robust response.
• The episode generated public media reactions which reflected both the animosity between the Islamists and the secularists, as well as the dearth of informed analysis by the pundits, a dearth verging upon hallucination.  Those opposed to the Government and the Islamists opined that that act of abduction was pre-arranged by the Government which they accused of focusing on the islamization of the State, rather than on internal and external security.
• It was galling to both the armed forces and the secularists that President Morsi, at a meeting with the Ministers of Defense and Interior, and the Chief of National Intelligence, read out the demands of the abductors.  The list reflected what seemed to be a governmental sympathy for Hamas, as it was reported to read as follows: (1) stoppage of the destruction by the armed forces of the tunnels dug illicitly between the Egyptian town of Rafah and Gaza; (2) Removal of all military checkpoints; (3) evacuation by both the army and the police of certain Sinai locations; (4) release from jail of 65 "jihadis" who had been implicated in terrorist acts at Taba, Sharm El-Sheik (both Red Sea locations) and Al-Azhar; and (5) Presidential amnesty for some of those convicted in absentia and sentenced to capital punishment.

The public and the armed forces were stunned by what appeared to be the placement by the government of  Hamas and its Sinai supporters ahead of the dignity of the State.

• On Friday, May 17, General El-Sisi summoned Hamas leaders who are posted to Cairo.  He is reported to have told them in no uncertain terms that they were playing with fire, and that the destruction of the tunnels would proceed in spite of Hamas unhappiness with those measures.  "Egypt's security is a priority above all else," he warned Hamas.  
• On the following day, at a meeting with the Ministers of Defense and Interior, and with the Chief of National Intelligence, President Morsi seemed to chide General El-Sisi for his upbraiding of Hamas.  Morsi is reported to have told El-Sisi that the Government was very keen on its strategic relationships with Hamas.  The General was not to be intimidated by the President.  His response is reported to be: "We have irrefutable evidence that terrorist elements in Sinai have been receiving logistical support from inside Gaza.  We cannot allow this to continue under any circumstances."
• In response to that cleavage, leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to shift the blame for the abduction of the soldiers and policeman to El-Sisi.  One such leader, Hamza Zobaa, declared sarcastically that terrorism showed the ineptness of the leadership of the armed forces.  The clear aim was to float a veiled threat by the Islamists that El-Sisi might be relieved of his post by President Morsi.
• In the meantime, the movement called TAMARROD (mutiny) aiming at the removal of the elected President went on collecting signatures from all parts of Egypt.  TAMARROD described its actions as an open exercise of the popular will.  The movement was pointing up the failure of the Morsi government to reverse Egypt's economic collapse, and indirectly to the need for the army to step in and secure for the country both development and internal security.

The future of that historic revolution of January 25, 2011 remains uncertain.  It is quite possible that all of the above are mere manifestations of birth bangs of a new democracy.  It is to be hoped that this is the case.

The Egyptian Army Says: "No to a Coup Against Morsi"

Petitions are being circulated by a movement called "TAMARROD" (Mutiny).  Its objective is to effect President Morsi's recall.  This seemingly democratic process aims at deposing the first-popularly elected President in the 10,000 years of Egypt's recorded history.  It does not matter that that movement is doomed to failure.  It is a secularist movement which is leaderless, and is attempting to confront a highly organized Muslim Brotherhood.

TAMARROD is the flip side of earlier petitions calling on General Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, Egypt's Defense Minister to "save the country from the present chaos."  On May 12, El-Sisi declared unequivocally that "the armed forces are far from contemplating a return to governance."

By saying no to a coup, El-Sisi was also chiding both the Islamists and their fractious opposition for not coming together to end the present stalemate in governance.  Speaking at the military exercises of the Ninth Mechanised Division, General El-Sisi addressed the various opposition factions as follows: "You should reach a consensus formula amongst yourselves.  Otherwise, the alternative is very dangerous."

Simultaneously the Minister of Defense was counter-attacking those who, through manipulation by the media, keep on spreading rumors about a breach between the armed forces and the police.  "This army is like fire with which you should not play."  Then he pointedly added: "But it is not fire to be directed against its own people."

In these utterances addressed at various constituencies, El-Sisi was also mindful of the popular affection in which the armed forces are held.  After all, it is the only remaining cohesive force in the new Egypt.  "Of course, I am respectful of those who are now calling upon the armed forces to leave the barracks and come down to the street," he said.  Then he added: "But the armed forces are not the solution.  You should not be impatient, or angry.  For standing for 10 or 15 hours in line to cast your ballots is better than going on a rampage destroying your country."

All of El-Sisi's declarations, though aiming at the internal front, were made at a time when the external front was being threatened by terrorist infiltrators.  To the east, the Sinai front was under constant security threats from bedouin marauders and rogue Gazan elements.  The gas pipeline to both Jordan and Israel has been repeatedly attacked, and elements of the army and police were constantly ambushed.  And through the western borders with Libya, arms and contraband flowed into Egypt without interruption.

In the context of that chaos, the Egyptian Minister of Interior, General Muhammad Ibrahim, announced on May 11 that a terrorist cell with links to Al-Qaeda has been discovered in Cairo. The aim of that cell, he alleged, was to attack the French Embassy (presumably for France's military thrust against terrorists in Mali) in Cairo and to sabotage the Cairo metro.

The Egyptian Revolution Adrift

The great Egyptian Revolution of January 25, which toppled Mubarak's dictatorship is adrift two and a half years later.  Democracy has not yet been established, except in form only; chaos has not yet subsided; the Egyptian street is not yet safe; the economy is in a free fall; and a bread and butter revolt of the millions who are under the poverty line, seems to be in the making.

The main features of this stalled revolution is the antagonism between the Executive and the Judicial authorities; a disorganized secular opposition; the resurgence of the backers of the defunct Mubarak regime; and the pressures on the Morsi regime to resist the stringent conditions of the International Monetary Fund for providing Egypt with a sorely needed loan.

Taking up the alienation between the Morsi regime and the Judiciary, we note that the new Justice Minister, Ahmed Soliman, has announced on May 8 that his first priority was to rebuild the bridges between the Government (a new Cabinet was sworn in by Morsi on May 7) and the Judiciary.  One of the many sticking points in this issue is a draft bill supported by the Government providing for the retirement of judges at the age of sixty instead of seventy.  If adopted, the result would be the retirement of more than 3000 Egyptian judges.


The judiciary, backed up by the opposition, suspect that retirement at 60 would aid the Morsi regime, which has sprung from the womb of the Muslim Brotherhood in appointing a new generation of judges who are in favor of the Brotherhood.  If this happens, which now seems unlikely, the Brotherhood would claim control or exercise influence on the legislature (for now, the Upper Chamber of Parliament called the Shura), the executive, and the judiciary.  A recipe for a reversion by Egypt to an unwanted autocracy.

Still more on the judicial crisis: the new Minister of Justice, in his commitment to supporting judicial independence, draws his strength from his former opposition to Morsi's so-called "Constitutional Declaration" of November 22, 2012 which, prior to its nullification, had virtually placed Morsi above the law.  Minister Soliman, in a balancing act, is trying to convince his judiciary brethren not to press for the removal of Attorney General (AG) Talaat Abdullah.  The appointment by Morsi of the AG has been declared unconstitutional by a court decision.

Turning now to the opposition to the Morsi regime which is viewed by them as too Islamist, one finds it plagued by factionalism and a short-sighted abstention from participation in governance.  The opposition, secular and liberal, seems to adopt the dead-end motto of "my way or the highway."  That group, fragmented as they are and headed by two men, Mohammed El-Baradei and Amr Musa, was invited by both President Morsi and Prime Minister Qandeel to nominate persons to assume some of the Cabinet posts in the newly reshuffled Cabinet.  They refused.

That refusal was short-sighted in two ways:  allowing the gaps to be filled by ministers who are allied with the Muslim Brotherhood; and impeding the march of the Revolution towards diversity and stability.  Explaining that attitude of rejectionism, Amr Musa said: "We have refused to be partners because the new Cabinet lacks vision!!"  An excuse which is worse than the wrong for which the excuse is offered.

In his statements to the Ashrak Al-Awsat, a Saudi Arabian daily, Amr Musa went on May 7 to expound on the opposition's intractable position.  "There is no consensual national program.  There are no policies which are transparently formulated.  There is nothing new about the newly-appointed Cabinet members.  That Cabinet does not reflect the urgent need of Egypt for reversing the collapse of the country's security and economy."

Abstention from participation cannot constitute constructive policy.  So the bickering goes on while the new Egypt lies prostrate.  If the opposition desires a slow down of what it calls "the Brotherization (in reference to the Muslim Brotherhood) of the State," they should practice their opposition from within the Cabinet not simply from the outside.

The stalemate has opened the door to a gradual resurgence of the former backers of the ex-Mubarak regime.  The man and woman of the Egyptian street now seem to long for that age of stability.  To them, democracy has brought about chaos and economic destitution.  They are now asking: "What price is freedom?"  The retrial of Mubarak and the other members of the "Gang of Ten" has generated sympathy for the ousted dictator which, at its roots, is sympathy for an Egypt that functions.

If the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sees in government subsidies for basic goods and services an economical strain, it is right economically but dead wrong politically.  As an international organization, the IMF is slow to learn from its disastrous lessons in Egypt of Sadat (1970-1981).  At that time, Sadat had agreed to the IMF conditions for a loan, by eliminating the subsidies for bread, sugar, and cooking oil.

The result was huge demonstrations ("the bread riots") all over Egypt in February 1977.  I was in Cairo with my wife at that time and witnessed the tumult.  Consequently, Sadat had to rescind his decree and, among other measures, began discreet consultations which led to the Camp David agreement of 1978 with Israel under the tutelage of U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

On the stage of the new Egypt, the IMF is back with the same package of strong remedies for the ailing Egyptian economy.  Morsi and his regime are acutely aware of the lessons learnt the hard way from the  Sadat era.  Egypt and the IMF are at present locked in futile negotiations.  Revolt of the masses is a continuous threat to the new Egypt.  Fear of further popular hostility to the regime and by extension to the Muslim Brotherhood is palpable.

So the continued drift of the Egypt Revolution goes on.  No present safe harbor is in sight.  It is the materialization of a theme song in a recent Egyptian soap series called "Zohra and her five husbands."  In that fictional soap story, the song goes like this:

"From the days of my entering the Sea of Life,

I have found no safe harbor;  

Every event in my life begins with a celebration and ends with a catastrophe."