Why Did Egypt Revolt?: The Facts Through the Fact Finders (Part I)

On Tuesday, January 1, 2013, the Egyptian Fact Finding Commission announced at a press conference in Cairo, its findings into the events which led to the Egyptian Revolution of January 25, 2011.

This blue ribbon commission, which was set up by a decision taken by Egypt's Prime Minister (Decision 294, 2011), was headed by Egypt's past Chief Justice, Dr. Adel Qura.  Its work which covered 400 pages in Arabic dealt with the events from January 25 until Mubarak's fall from power on February 11, 2011.

In this series, beginning with Part I, this blog will highlight the facts as seen by the fact-finders and neutrally reported nearly 2 years later.

The Qura Commission, while analyzing the events as testified to by hundreds of witnesses and backed up by documented of all types of visual, audio and printed material, has in effect produced a unique document. This report should be studied on a world-wide basis.  Reason: It contains a careful and judicious cause and effect of why people, anywhere, revolt.

We begin with the findings into the role of social media in that historic revolution whose course is still undetermined.

The Commission analyzed the ways and means whereby the Mubarak regime, during its dying days, attempted to shut down the Internet.  It said that the three cellular phone servers operating in Egypt have simultaneously cut off their service to certain provinces.  That blackout was in response to orders to them from the Mubarak security services.

Social media, including Facebook and Twitter, have played a crucial role in bringing hundreds of thousands of protesters to Tahrir Square and to other public squares all over that country of nearly 90 million people.  As those means of communication were cut off by governmental design, the blackout also impacted negatively on the means of communication used by the police and other components of the huge security apparatus in Mubarak's Egypt.

The result of that cut-off, while temporarily affecting the means of galvanizing the millions of Egyptians streaming into the public squares, was more devastating to the forces of the so-called "law and order."  This was manifest in severing the links between various chains of command of police and Ministry of Interior chains.  With the chain of hierarchy command disrupted, large police units fled from the streets, decision-making became personalized, police conduct descended into hit and miss, and responsibility for those uncoordinated actions became impossible to determine.

Testifying before the fact-finding Commission, Dr. Amre Badawi Mahmoud, the Executive Head of the National Organization for Communication Coordination, stated in Arabic:

"On January 23, 2011, the top representatives of National Security called the heads of the 3 cellular phone servers to a meeting with them.  An Emergency Operations Headquarters was set up.  Its role was to issue special instructions with regard to both operation and interruption of communications in accordance with the provisions of Article 67 of the Law on Communications.  The reason was given as being the developing of a severe state of emergency in Egypt, affecting the core of national security.  Thus service was ordered to be cut off on January 27, 2011 at 10:00 AM, and was instructed to be resumed on January 29, 2011 around 9:30 AM.  As to the Internet, it was ordered to be suspended on Friday, January 28, 2011 and was resumed on February 5, 2011.

However in the case of the Internet, that interruption did not affect the special frequencies used by the Police.  With public pressure mounting on the Mubarak regime to depart, the blackout was finally ended.  But the fact that it was put into effect has harmed Egypt's world wide reputation as a civilized State.  That is not to mention the negative effects suffered by the cellular phone servers."

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This series shall be continued subject to the exigencies of the fast developing news from Tahrir.

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Under the Sails of Its New Constitution: The New Egypt is Launched

On December 26, 2012, the New Egypt was launched under its democratically-adopted constitution.  Some called it "the Second Egyptian Republic."  Wrong.  The Nasser Coup of 1952 did not launch a First Egyptian Republic.  It inaugurated a dictatorship which coopted the name of "republic" to clothe it with legitimacy.

It is also wrong to call the new Constitution "flawed."  No constitution is born perfect.  It is amendable.

It is also wrong to call it "an Islamist constitution."  We in the U.S. do not call our constitution "Judeo-Christian."  It is an American constitution.

It is also wrong to conjure whether Egypt is going to be a "Pakistan" or an "India."  This is blatant ignorance.  Countries and their systems  have to be evaluated on their own terms.  No two countries are ever alike.

It is also wrong to say that the Egyptian Constituent Assembly lost its legitimacy because one third of its members walked out.  If you are absent, you have no vote.

It is also wrong to say that the new constitution lacks credibility, because only about one-third of the eligible voters participated in the plebiscites of Dec. 15 and Dec. 22.  In legal terms, we only count those who are "present and voting."

It is also wrong for the opposition in Egypt to call for a restart from square one.  This means disfranchising all those millions who voted for going forward.

It is also wrong for some of the elite (Al-Nokhbah) to describe the voting majority as "illiterate."  It is the Nokhbah which needs to be schooled in the art of democracy.

It is also wrong to characterize President Morsi as totally beholden to the Muslim Brotherhood.  He, in June 2012, emerged as the winner in free and fair elections, regardless of the genre of his political roots.  He was not the first choice of the Brotherhood.  El-Shatter was.  But he was disqualified, and Morsi was put forward by the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood as their alternative choice.

It is also wrong for the opposition to continue its campaign of nullification after the results of the plebiscite were announced.  Enough is enough.  If you are unhappy with Morsi, or with the Brotherhood, and or with the Constitution, you nonetheless should allow the country to go back to work.  Then reorganize and challenge them in 2016.  But, please get out of the way, and go back to rebuild that collapsed security and economic system.

It is also wrong for the opposition to theorize about certain articles in the Constitution or to say that the document should have "a societal consensus."  In a democracy, you take decisions by a majority vote.  There is no precise definition for "a societal consensus."  Even in Islamic Law, Ijmaa (or consensus) does not mean a total meeting of the minds of all Muslim scholars in a given geographical area.

It is also wrong to say that the Constitution is too detailed.  Refining a constitution is through application and, if necessary, an amendment.  Now that the Shura Council (the upper Chamber of Parliament) is in place, it has all legislative authority and could propose amendments to the lower Chamber when elected in two months.

It is also wrong to claim that Morsi is waging war on the judicial system.  On the contrary.  The Supreme Constitutional Court fired the first shots.  It dissolved the lower chamber of Parliament on a technicality, and manifested interest in also dissolving the Constituent Assembly for the second time in a row.  Now the Constitution governs the principle of separation of powers.

There are other blatant wrongs which the fragmented opposition is committing: Calling on the armed forces to intervene after the people had approved the Constitution; unfurling the banner of a possible civil war;  scaring off the Copts that under the new Constitution their position in Egypt shall be precarious; and calling on outside powers and international institutions either to intervene or to withhold their economic and moral support for the New Egypt.

These wrongs are not only seditious. They are proving that the political thought of the so-called liberals about democracy in Egypt is nearly a black hole.  One does not advocate democracy through the stifling or denigration of the popular will.

Thus it was right for Morsi to declare to the nation on Dec. 26, 2012 that the Constitution "reflects the spirit of the January 25, 2011 revolution; that is based on respect of the rights of citizenship regardless of religion; that the polemics which preceded the adoption of the Constitution by nearly two-thirds of the voters were a healthy democratic sign; that he, prior to that adoption, committed errors (an allusion to his November 22, 2012 constitutional declaration putting him temporarily above the law); and that
"Egypt and the Egyptians now have a constitution which is freely accepted, and which was not a grant from a king nor an imposition by a president, nor a dictation from an occupier."

As I sat in my seat in Egypt Air returning from Cairo to New York City on Dec. 23, a fellow traveller to my right, asked me anxiously about my opinion of the new Constitution.  I provided the above analysis.  Yet I was joyed by that critical question coming from a beautiful young Egyptian woman who was dressed in an Egypt Air uniform.  "What do you do for Egypt Air?," I asked.  "I am a pilot on a brief vacation!!" 

Now this is the new face of Egypt, young, professional, confident and concerned about her country which she sees from above as she flies, as well as from below as she navigates the Cairo crowded streets.


Thus under the sails of its new Constitution, the New Egypt is launched, hopefully towards a destiny of national unity.

In Egypt: A Catastrophe May Be On The Way

On Thursday, November 22, President Morsi issued a decree.  That was no ordinary decree.  He called it "a constitutional decree" which, in effect, put him above the law.  In the absence of a constitution, Morsi declared that until the new constitution is drafted and ratified, his writ is law.  With that, the first popularly elected President of Egypt, a historic byproduct of the January 25, 2011 revolution, in effect, became both the executive and legislative branches of Government.  As to the third branch, the judiciary, it was neutralized -no judicial review of his decrees.

Guess who got angry, in fact very angry, without the benefit of anger-management -the judges.  They declared a strike.  Courts were closed, except for chambers dealing with issues which cannot wait.  With that, nearly all other professional associations, including the medical, press, and Bar Associations, went also on strike.  Millions poured in Tahrir and similar public squares to denounce their new President whose roots lie deep in the Muslim Brotherhood.  Some of the demonstrators went as far as calling him "Mussolini."  Others called him "the new Pharaoh."

What is this all about? Prime Minister Qandeel warns "Either we build.  Or we shed blood."  President Morsi addresses the nation soothingly saying: "I am the President of all Egyptians.  My decree is only for 2 to 4 months.  It will end with the adoption of the new constitution."  Dr. El-Baradei, the oracle for democracy in Egypt announces "A constitution which is rushed out from the Constituent Assembly will be worth the refuse basket."  Farouk Gouida, the great intellectual posits that "the Egyptian public shall never again condone any form of the old authoritarianism."  And the Chief Editor of Al-Ahram, the official newspaper of the Egyptian government, Abdel-Nasser Salamah, headlines on November 30: "The Egyptian situation may be decided by the intervention of the armed forces."  This means a military coup against the New Egypt.

A catastrophe may be on its way.  A possible civil war threat hangs over the blue skies of Egypt.

It all began with the Islamists winning 70% of the seats in the post-Mubarak freely-elected Parliament.  Of those, 50% for the Muslim Brotherhood -a middle of the road Islamist movement, and 20% for the Salafis, an extreme Islamist group which is heavily influenced by Saudi Arabia's wahabbism.  The rest of the seats were won by the liberal parties which include the Copts.

Enters the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), towards which the Islamists, including President Morsi, harbor deep mistrust.  These venerable judges were not only Mubarak appointees.  Their rulings were like high bumps on the Islamists' road to pre-eminence in the governance of the new Egypt.  The SCC, finding a technical fault in the elections of the lower house of Parliament, (seats which were to be filled by individuals were grabbed by political parities) dissolved Parliament, except for the upper house (the Shoura).

But with Morsi now at the Presidential Palace in Cairo, he refused to accept that judicial activism.  So he called the dissolved Chamber into a 20 minute session for one purpose: to have it vote a transfer of legislative power to him temporarily pending: drafting of the new constitution; voting on it in a referendum; the re-constitution of a new parliament; the definition of the role of the judiciary as a third branch of a democratic system of government.

These moves were not immediately challenged by Egypt's judiciary which, in the new Egypt, has begun to flex its muscles, the muscles of a truly independent judiciary.  But the judiciary was not yet done with the Islamists in the new Egypt.  The judges had the Constituent Assembly (CA) in their cross-hairs.  The battle between the Islamists and the secularists was being waged by the convenient proxy of the judiciary.  The CA was dissolved by the SCC before, but its successor CA was handpicked by the Islamists.

The secularists in the new CA (the committee of 100) were the auxiliaries of the SCC.  Their lower number on the CA was magnified by a greater clout in Tahrir Square.  Thus while the battles of drafting raged on within the confines of the CA, the secularists decided to try to paralyze its rush to the production of a pro-Islamist constitution.  They walked out of the meetings of the CA, depriving it at one point, of 25% of its membership.

But a quorum stayed on the job: Article 2 provided that "the principles" of Islamic Law (Sharia) were a principal source of legislation.  The Salafis grumbled.  "The principles" is a term that does not provide for textual adherence to Islamic law.  But the Muslim Brothers in the CA, supported by the secularists including the copts and women, ignored that militant fringe.  And Al-Azhar which is represented on the CA gave the secularist wing in the CA a big boost.  After all, Al-Azhar stand is that "Islam does not recognize a state based solely on religion."

Now the Supreme Constitutional Court was getting ready to stop the Constituent Assembly in its tracks.  By now, the defections from the CA have reached 30%, and the SCC was aiming at dissolving that body, in order to clear the way for the selection by the Shoura (the only Chamber of Parliament which was left standing) of a new body to draft the new constitution.

In that chaotic inter-institutional environment, Morsi, fearful of the void (no Lower Parliamentary Chamber; no constitution) went for an over-reach- a "constitutional declaration." And Egypt exploded, in spite of Morsi's explanation that he only intended to bring the transition to a close.  Poetically, he intoned, that it was "a difficult birth from the womb of an ancient nation."

He and the Islamists felt that rushing the draft of the new constitution by the existing CA was the only dam to forestall the mighty waves for the soul of Egypt.  On November 30, the battle lines were more than lines in the sand.  The judiciary, faced with that grand play for power by Morsi and the Constituent Assembly, decided to close down the courts.  Millions poured out on the streets screaming "IRHAL" (Leave) to Morsi, and the violent competition for the soul of Egypt, either secularist or Islamist, was on. "The Great Explosion" was already happening.  The millions, from the two opposing forces, were back in Tahrir and in many other squares all over that historic land.  And soon flames enveloped many centers of the Muslim Brotherhood.

"The rapacious appropriation of power," the anti-Morsi forces declared, "shall not be allowed to stand."

At Crossroads in Egypt: One Sign Reads: "To All Directions;" The Other Sign Reads: "To All Other Directions"

President Morsi now has it all: Executive, legislative and ... not judiciary, but something else called "absence of judicial review."  It happened on Thursday, Nov. 22, a day when the whole world was grateful for that Gaza cease fire.  Morsi, the engineer and the first elected president of Egypt since the birth of ancient Egypt, has, with the US managed to stop, at least for now, the senseless carnage between Gazans and Israelis.  During those anxious hours of negotiations, the world looked at Morsi as the voice of reason.  President Obama spoke to him at length concluding: that man with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood was indeed a pragmatist.  The accolades from all over the world rained on Morsi once the fighting stopped.

Then came Thursday, Nov. 22, a fateful day in Egypt's halting march towards democracy: Morsi promulgating a decree granting himself broad powers.  Before that decree was issued, the sign reading "To All Directions" signaled a deadlock in the efforts to draft a new constitution.  After the issuance of that decree, the sign reading "To All Other Directions" signaled the unknown.

The dilemma is rooted in the following facts: a split between the Islamists who control the majority of parliamentary seats and the secularists; the haggling in the constituent assembly (the Assembly of 100) over the few yet-to-be-drafted articles of the constitution, resulting in the withdrawal of most of the secularists, including the Copts, from those deliberations (about 25% of the membership); and the fear that the Supreme Constitutional Court, whose judges are hold-over Mubarak appointees, was poised to dissolve that constitutional assembly. Members of that Assembly were chosen by the Islamists-dominated and now dissolved parliament.

Was Morsi correct in issuing that decree?  "Correct" is a subjective term which is subject to all kinds of interpretations.  Those who support Morsi say: that decree is an emergency enactment of limited duration ending with the plebiscite on a new constitution and the setting up of a new parliament vested with full legislative powers.

Morsi opponents claim that Morsi, using his accolades for his role in the Gaza crisis, is assassinating democracy, tipping the delicate scales in favor of the Islamists in whose ideology his roots run deep, and is anointing himself as the new Pharaoh.

Perhaps the reality is buried under a ton of rhetoric and counter-rhetoric.  In spite of that situation, a central fact emerges: the two sides of that schism fear a return to the past leading to an early abortion of the January 25 Revolution.  However, each side wants to own that revolution, interpreting its progress on the basis of its ideological perspective.

There is another central fact in the battle of reading the signs at that historic Egyptian crossroads.  There is no love lost between Morsi and the Supreme Constitutional Court.  That Court had dissolved Parliament, only to have Morsi reconvene it for 20 minutes to have it grant him "temporary" legislative powers.  Ancillary to the suspected powers of the Supreme Constitutional Court was the suspicion towards the Public Prosecutor, Abdel Meguid Mahmoud, for failing to win stronger sentences against Mubarak and his associates.

So now, President Morsi, who had returned the army to its barracks, has, through the November 23 decree, freed himself, his decrees and the constituent assembly from judicial oversight.  Free at last?  Not so fast.  The battle between the Islamists and the secularists, signalling an open wound in the Egyptian body politic has begun to intensify.  Tahrir Square is again the huge podium from which arguments and counter arguments, as well as rocks, tear gas canisters, and more dangerous projectiles, are exchanged.

In response to those who say that Morsi abhors judicial independence, we find Morsi appointing a new Public Prosecutor, Talaat Ibrahim Abdullah, a former leader of the movement for judicial independence under Mubarak.

To those in Egypt who say that Morsi now represents a continuation of the 60 years of dictatorship under which Egypt has suffered, Morsi has addressed his nation on Nov. 23 saying "my actions are for the protection of that revolution."

As the counter-Morsi protesters burned down Muslim Brotherhood offices in Alexandria and elsewhere, in response to the frightening amassing of powers in the hands of one man, Morsi, he responds that he was "the President of all Egyptians."

The masses, while pleased with Morsi's plans to retry Mubarak and his cohorts (against the principles of "res judicata" -the thing has been decided), the opponents still scream that "Morsi wants to make of himself a God."

Al-Sharkawi of Cairo University, an advisor to Morsi says: "This is mainly a political conflict.  Egypt needs to move forward.  The life of that decree is from 2 to 4 months.  Egypt cannot wait anymore.  The judiciary did no reflect the will of the people."

For now, I tend to agree.  But I was educated in Egypt until the age of 24.  There I learnt from my Scottish professors at Zagazig High School in the Province of Sharkiah, a British adage: "Nothing is more permanent that the temporary."

From the Pharmacy to the Papacy: Pope Theodoros II of Alexandria

His sure medicine is a dose of love and an equal measure of unity.  That is the prescription of His Holiness Pope Theodoros, the 118th Pope of the venerable Orthodox Church of Egypt.  He comes to the headship of a very historic Church in the annals of Christendom the first church after Christ.  Elevated to that exalted position by a unique election system which goes back 2000 years (a process of selection followed by drawing a lot among four clergymen), the new Pope inherits the mantle of the great Pope Shenouda III.

The date of his elevation to the Papacy  was November 4, 2012, his 60th birthday.  His Egypt has changed since the revolution of January 25, 2011.  A historic change has come to his land, the land of the Copts (Egypt), and so his message is a mixture of love, the creed of that Church which boasts of having the hiding place of the Holy family in Old Cairo, and unity, which has become quite elusive in this age of rage.

Theodoros II has a 1975 baccalaureate in pharmacy from the University of Alexandria.  This was followed, ten years later, by a World Health Fellowship from the UK.  For His Holiness, it was an 1985 double graduation.  In that year, he was also able to graduate from the Coptic Clerical College in Egypt.  After a period of seclusion as a monk at the Anba Bishoy Convent in Wadi Al-Natroun in 1986 in the western desert, he was ordained a Coptic priest in 1989.  Within 8 years thereafter, he became a Bishop.

This new spiritual leader, whose original name was Wagih Sobhi Baqi Soliman, had a father who was a land surveyor.  The family kept on moving in Egypt from east (Mansourah), to south (Souhag), to west (Damanhour).  It was as if fate was offering the future Pope a broad look at his beloved Egypt.

On this Pope's shoulders lie the new burdens of remelding the Coptic community into one community with their Muslim brethren.  It is not by numbers or a ratio of one Copt to 10 Muslims, forming the demography of 90 millions, the largest Arab State.  It is by the shared history which began in the 8th Century since the time of Amre lbn Elass led the Muslims westward from Palestine into the Nile Valley.  The new arrivals were under strict instructions from Khaliph Omar who, from Medina in what is now Saudi Arabia, ordered them in no uncertain terms: "No forced conversion.  And learn from your brothers, the Copts."

This eventuated into Egypt becoming a model for the Islamic Law persistent call for diversity and respect for the other.  But the ill wind of extremism, which cloaked itself in an Islamic garb, began as of the Khomeni revolution in Iran to blow westward blanketing Egypt in its path.  Those ominous developments ignored the great patriotic stance of the Coptic church in regard to Egypt's gradual liberation from Great Britain in 1919, 1936, 1946, and in 1954 when the British troops evacuated Egypt.

With incidents of conflict between the Copts and the Muslims multiplying in Egypt, the call of the new Pope for national unity acquires added significance.  After all, his great predecessor, Pope Shenouda III, was described as "Egypt's safety valve."  In the same vein, Pope Theodoros sees in Egypt's Coptic heritage an avenue for preserving, through his medicine of love, a great antidote to Egypt's inter-religious anxieties.

"The Egyptian Coptic Church, "the new Pope declared," is a model for all churches, and for the Egyptian Community, in regard to the separation between State and Church."

Obama's Four More Years: The New Egypt Reacts

They proudly call him "the black American President."  They devote to his success miles and miles of print.  They attend in droves the celebrations held at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.  They openly show great relief for Romney's exist.  Why?

Interest in America and its ways has never been more palpable.  This phenomenon is fully shared by both the Islamists and the secularists.  It is an interest which reflects general hope in a reinvigorated American involvement in the New Egypt, economically, educationally, technologically and in selected areas of foreign policy, especially in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  "Hope and Change," borrowed from Obama, has become an Egyptian mantra.  Egyptian resentment toward America's support for Mubarak has practically dissipated.

Cairo's attitude toward Russia has sunk to a new low.  The New Egypt feels abhorrence toward Moscow's support for the Assad regime in Syria.  In this regard, Egypt, historically, has always looked west, not east.  Contemporary Egypt was first developed by the French as of the early 19th century.

Egypt, taking a brief holiday from the woes of its transition from dictatorship to democracy, celebrated the onset of Obama's second term in adulatory terms.  They highlighted Obama's call for healing the wounds of the bitter presidential campaign.  "Tahrir" wishes that a similar reconciliation would be possible with the remnants of the Mubarak regime.

Cairo saw humility in Obama's declaration in his victory speech in Chicago that he had become "a better President."  It wishes that its leaders would show the same strength of character.  Though the challenges facing Washington, D.C. and Cairo may not be the same, but the Egyptians perceive in Obama's reference to "the challenges ahead" a reflection of what their new leaders keep on repeating.

Even Romney's speech conceding defeat and wishing Obama's success in the coming four years was a reminder to Egypt that it does not yet posses this tradition of congratulating your adversary.

There is also in Cairo that sense of quick pride in the enhanced importance of the minorities in America.  The Egyptians also saw in the small margin of victory for Obama a reflection of what happened in the competition between Morsi and Shafik in June for the post of the presidency.

As to the expected "gridlock" in U.S. governance, well, that is nothing new to Cairo.  This is although the Egyptian gridlock has different poles.  In Cairo, it is between the judiciary and the other branches of government.

What did the New Egypt fear in Romney?  First, they do not know Romney.  Romney did not even define himself.  Romney was defined by his adversaries.  Second, they were hostile to his references to the rise of the Islamists to power as "chaos in the Middle East."  The Egyptians also saw in Romney a man of war.  In Obama, they saw a man of peace, especially as regards Iran.

It also greatly helps that Obama's middle name is "Hussein."

The Difficult Birth of the Egyptian Constitution: Will a Caesarian Be Necessary?

The noise inside the meetings of the Constituent Assembly and outside goes on.  It is truly a difficult birth for the new Constitution of post-dictatorship Egypt.  It is a struggle for the soul of the January 25 Revolution.  That soul is basically whether Egypt shall be secular, Islamist or a combination of both.  I am betting on the third alternative.  And nearly 90 million Egyptians are watching very closely.  So is the rest of the Arab world and beyond.

What is the problem?  Who are the actors?  Which articles have emerged from the Assembly's Drafting Committee only to be opposed by the Governance Committee?  And who will arbitrate between the factions and under what authority?  Could the judiciary step in?

These questions would have never arisen if the popular parliamentary elections in which 70% of the huge electorate of 53 million did not produce an Islamist majority of 70%. But they did, and 70% of the parliamentary seats were gobbled up by the Islamist parties with 50% for the Muslim Brotherhood, and 20% for the Salafis.

The heart of the battle is Article 2 which is being copied from the old Constitution of 1971.  It refers to "the principals" of Sharia being the principle source of legislation.  The Islamists, especially the Salafis, are opposed, since the term "principles" is ill defined.  Dr. Issam Dirbalah, the President of The Shura of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamia expressed on October 25 his opposition in these words: "It is obligatory to provide a clear definition of that term and then place it in a separate article."

Confronting that call of Dr. Dirbalah, the independent Cairo daily "Al-Sabah," delegitimated the entire Constituent Assembly.  Its executive editor, Wael Lotfi said: "History shall remember that that Assembly has no legitimacy, either constitutionally, or politically, or morally...It consists of a small group of Muslim Brothers and their allies."

In response, the Editor-in-Chief of "Freedom and Justice," the mouthpiece of the Muslim Brotherhood party countered: "Our national duty enjoins us to urge our brothers who constitute the liberal and leftist currents to apologize to the Egyptian people for their attempts to impede the building of the State's institutions."

In spite of its centrality to the warring factions, Article 2 is not the only subject of contention.  There are of course the articles dealing with the President's powers and prerogatives, the rights of minorities especially the Copts, gender equality, the independence of the judiciary and broad civic and individual rights.  All these articles are now thrown for a historic public debate in the streets of the new Egypt, before the final text is brought before the entire electorate for approval in a referendum.

This is the first time ever in the very long history of Egypt to have the public at large debate its national charter, its Constitution.  It is also the first time that one hundred and one civic society organizations call for the incorporation into the yet-to-be approved Constitution of an article dealing with the role of civil society in the drafting of the new Constitution.  Athenian form of democracy being practiced in Egypt across the Mediterranean from Greece!!

But the secularists resorted to what amounts to an overreach.  They instituted a case before the Administrative Law court challenging the legality of the institution and composition of the Constituent Assembly.  The court issued a ruling referring the case to a higher court, the Supreme Constitutional Court.  Well, this is the very court whose judges were hand-picked by Mubarak.  But strange things happens in any revolution or transitional period in any State in post World War II.

The referral of that case to a higher court was seen by the Islamists as a victory - a victory through delay.  The Assembly now could rush its work towards completion before the Supreme Constitutional Court would be ready to dispose of that historic case.  This is although the Constituent Assembly is still grappling with the draft articles dealing with several important issues, such as Article 36 which guarantees gender equality.  This formulation is inherited from the Sadat-era Constitution of 1971.  Even the Salafis are content with that Constitutional inheritance because the article ends with words to the effect that equality should be observed in a way not contradicting to Islamic Law.  The secularists want these words removed.

The issues do not just end there.  There are supplementary articles dealing with the rights of women, the child and the family - the family being the core of society.  Emphasis is made on mutual observance of the rights and obligations of a husband and a wife towards one another.

These are matters of crucial importance to the new Egypt and beyond.  Problems surrounding that birth abound.  Perhaps a Caeserian might be needed!!  One thing is certain: In about two months from now, the Egyptians will see the birth of a new dawn through a new text of their new Constitution.