From the study of global conflicts, a valuable conclusion emerges: the indigenous population rising to confront a foreign invader always wins. It may take years for the Taliban in Afghanistan to overcome the American formidable military hardware, technology, and reliance on foreign and local intelligence. However such American assets can never compensate for the Taliban knowledge of their mountains, valleys, tribal affiliation, and a long history of ceaseless combat.
I am not evaluating the Taliban cause. I am assessing their assets, which are best expressed in Kipling's 19th century words about why Great Britain had suffered humiliating defeats in Afghanistan. This is not a question of valor. It is a question of the superior impact of a tribalized society forcing the Soviets to flee in the late 1980's.
Osama Bin Laden claimed that Soviet defeat was due to Al-Qaeda's combative resourcefulness. Bin Laden lied. He and his fighters were only a part of that tribal resistance effort. A supplementation, egged on by training by the Americans, the Pakistanis, the Saudis, and other actors. The spinal cord of combat and sacrifice was the Taliban.
As a term, Al-Taliban means "two students." A protest movement which capitalized on devotion to Islam, to hate for structure and institutions, to instant readiness to pick up arms. There was also involvement by female units as back-up reserves.
Their's is an economy based on opium production. Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic scene, versed in using the resources of India, Pakistan and Iran to great advantage. Tribal affiliation is the glue which keeps alliances forming and, when weakened, dissolving. To all of these human formations, Kabul, the capital, is where corruption resides. Afghan is a complex fabric which is dedicated to the sword which is forever ready to slice through invaders.
Afghanism is a blend of nativism, faith (mostly Sunnis; the west is Shii), and an outlook on life as a mere passage through an existence of intrigue. The only durable loyalty is to the core tribe.
It is the embodiment of what an Arab poet had once said about tribalism. "They never ask their brother, who calls for help in adversity; How was he wronged, by his enemy?"
There are historic icons, like Jamalu-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897). His sole life, together with his companion, Sheikh Muhammad Abduh (a distinguished Egyptian Azhar scholar, 1849-1905), was devoted to combating foreign intrusion in the lands of Islam.
From this struggle, nurtured by these two reformers, grew the notion of total unity of Muslim countries. Unity in purpose, not in structure. For Islam did not create a State. It created a Nation.
From Muhamad Abduh and Al-Afghani, the central idea of Islam, namely the "One-ness of God" (Tawheed) became deeply ingrained. All faiths are one, because God is one. But don't step over boundaries through aggression. That would be a fight that shall end in the invader's exit, sooner or later. This is the only unshakable pillar in the Taliban movement.
Against this formidable background of tribal loyalties, combat resilience, and indigenous presence, American military planning, surges, and war technology make America in Afghanistan the non-announced underdog. Taliban casualties are quickly replaced; Trump's exhortation of Pakistan to do more in the Afghan struggle is a useless call. For it keeps the influence of New Delhi in Kabul at a minimum. Pakistan is a beneficiary of the Taliban movement.
9/11 was an understandable casus belli for American entry upon the invasion of Afghanistan in 2002. But after 16 years of American losses in blood and treasure, without a clear strategy except "the defeat of the Taliban," there is no end in sight for America.
Yes, Bin Laden is dead (and good-riddance). But he was an Arab, a foreign element in an Afghani demographic landscape. They protected him as a Muslim who helped them defeat the Soviets and usher in the collapse of Soviet communism. They were living up to a tribal code, not to an Al-Qaida affiliation. Eventually Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan, not in Afghanistan.
From all indications, the effectiveness of the government in Kabul in fighting the Taliban is not greater than the effectiveness of government in Somalia in fighting Al-Shabab. The only difference between the dilemmas in Kabul and Mogadishu is that in Somalia, a terrorist gang, Al-Shabab, causes mayhem in the surrounding area. But in Afghanistan, the overwhelming sentiment is to rid the country of America's presence.
The war on the Taliban shall eventually lead to an American exit. Such an exit, ala Vietnam, shall also signify a clear recognition of the failure of "nation-building." The concept of "nation-building" when introduced from beyond national boundaries, as in the case of Afghanistan, is ultimately a losing proposition. The importance of the indigenous factor in all war-like situations, cannot be over-exaggerated. That factor is the elixir which keeps the Taliban to never contemplate falling within the sphere of America's influence. That is regardless of how many roads or schools America builds in Afghani ancestral lands.
The recent clear examples in the Arab world of the unvanquished resilience of the local populace confronting outside invasions are numerous. They may be found in the Algerian struggle for independence (1954-1962); the October war of 1973 (Egypt v. Israel); and the second Gulf War of 1990 (Kuwait v. Saddam of Iraq).
Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936), through poetry, has sung the praises of British colonialism. But even he, in regard to Afghanistan, lamented the prowess of Afghani women preying on the hapless British soldiers as they lay motionless on the open fields of Afghanistan. So did Arab women in Algeria during the war for independence. There I was an eye witness as UN spokesman in the early years of my UN career.
Scrutinizing the above statements, you might also have to conclude that America cannot win in Afghanistan. That is even when America uses non-military means which are known as "sanctions." For the ultimate goal of such methods is "regime change." A false coin.
If you want to do nation-building, do it within your own borders. For nation-building has never been a matter for export. Otherwise it becomes imperialism.
Americans love fantasies. In films, theatre, novels, and even in foreign policy such as in the Middle East and the Pacific. Winning the war in Afghanistan is an American fantasy. Benjamin De Mott has noted that America was experiencing "a universal descent into unreality."
For his op ed column in the New York Times of May 25, 2018, David Brooks chose an apt title: "Trump's Magical Fantasy World."
Facts are difficult things to challenge. Their challenger is a fake peddler of falsities. Following history and tribal dynamics, it is impossible to see how America can win in Afghanistan.
Has anyone ever won a war in Afghanstan?
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