By Whose Hands Was Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali Robbed of a Second Term?

This is not investigative reporting. These are legal forensics revealing the hands that robbed him of a second term. And these hands are not what is publicly peddled. Not by the Clintonites. But by a UN Charter full of gaps and contradictions.

Looking at the Charter, you discover that it is not what we teach at law schools. At Fordham Law (New York) I focus on the words. Analyzing not the provisions. But why those provisions drafted in 1945 belong to a museum. Not to the world of 21st Century. Since 1965, Boutros-Ghali and I discussed this at length.

First, the term "peace-keeping" does not appear in the Charter, a Second World War document. In San Francisco, the allies of the war were believed to maintain their cooperation in the post-war years. They did not. The cold war inherited that world. Completely nullifying Article 47 which provides for "a Military Staff Committee." You cannot pool your military expertise with your adversary.

That vacuum was provisionally filled by Dag Hammarskjold. That was his response to the tripartite aggression on Egypt by Israel, France and Great Britain in 1956. The "Blue Helmets" were born not in the Security Council Chamber, but in Port Said. The helmets were painted blue, the UN color, in Italy.

Expanded in the Congo of 1960, "the Blue Helmets" was a huge flop. Across one of the rivers, an Italian contingent was massacred by Lumumba supporters. Calling for help by an Irish contingent a few miles across that river, the Irish did not respond. Not because of cowardice. But because the Italian signal could not be understood. Why? No pre-planned training in peace-keeping, including signal unification, could be held. Until today.

That chaos resulting from Charter dysfunction reached the shores of Yugoslavia as it was breaking up. It also engulfed Rwanda. The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were ethnically cleansed. A million Tutsis were massacred. Security Council resolutions, as expected, proved to be hollow moralizing.

Second: Not only was the Security Council failing in its Charter-outlined duties. It was ironically expanding its jurisdiction in areas prevented to it by other Charter provisions. Article 2, para. 7 prohibits intervention in "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." Fine. Although each State decides those matters as it pleases.

Now here comes the kicker!! Later the same provision regarding respect for sovereignty takes a turn to a dead end street. It says: "But this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (i.e. on sanctions)."

Guess who decides on sanctions?! A no veto by any of the Big Five (US/UK/France/Russia/China) plus 4 non permanents (total non-permanents is 10). So you now have a system where the 5 permanents agree on selecting a State to be sanctioned (couldn't be one of their proteges). World justice disappears when you have selectivity. Inequality before the law. Easy to sanction an Iraq or a Libya, or an Iran or a Sudan. No Big Power umbrella. No powerful uncle or Godfather.

With no hope in reforming the Security Council, the Council turned its gaze to individuals within sovereign States. Came up with "the travel ban" on individuals without serving advance notices. Also without hopes of reviewing the list of banned individuals. Creating islands of Guantanamo-style preserves without the torture additive.

So you now have two UN systems in one: the General Assembly (akin to a House of Commons), and a Security Council (akin to a House of Lords - the Permanents). But the GA resolutions are a mere wish list -no enforcement mechanism. And the House of Five Lords is the only body which can take decisions. But selectively. Pick and choose. If there is a tie, say an Afghanistan, then a new non-Charter mechanism called "a Presidential statement" has been put in place. Does not even have the teeth of an executive order.

In the thick of this mess, stands the Secretary-General. The most neutral body in the world organization is the UN Secretariat. I have served there for 32 years. The Secretariat is on duty 24/7, serves all UN Member States on an equal footing, and provides data and mission reports for guidance of the SG and, through him, to the entire membership.

But speaking of the Secretary-General, you have to be careful which SG you mean. There are two of them in the same body: An executive SG and a political SG. The former is covered by Article 98; the latter by Article 99.

And within Article 99, I find the problems faced by Boutros-Ghali. That article is the real separator between the League of Nations, and its presumed continuity in the UN of the San Francisco Charter. Better to quote here its text:

"The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."

Thus the political Secretary-General is born through the mid-wifery of Article 99. Armed with the big word "MAY" -meaning "discretion." Theoretically this is a form of power-sharing. A power sharing expressed by Boutros-Ghali in what he inadvertently called "The Sixth Veto." You see, Boutros-Ghali was not a politician; he was a lecturer in international law. Ministering to a collection of rowdy States which, especially the U.S. resented his threatened intrusion into their power preserve.

He was conscious of the political pitfalls. But deeply felt that the Charter, though deficient, could be reformed through "political ijtihad" -interpreting broadly, through common sense, the existing text which cannot be easily revised.

His honeymoon with the Clinton administration was brief. And Afghanistan, not ex-Yugoslavia or Rwanda, was the issue that unleashed the venom of Albright, the then America's UN Permanent Representative. Those were the early 1990's. With both Clinton and his rivals, the Republican Robert Dole, finding in the UN an easy target to prove a nationalist point. That America shall not be legislated to by an UN where anti-American feelings ran high.

French support for Boutros-Ghali could not match a Clinton administration that saw in Boutros-Ghali an advocate of a UN which is not subservient to Washington's diktat.

The great theoretician Boutros-Ghali who was a close friend of mine for 50 years, lost. Through its fossilized nature, the Charter favored the Clintonite politics. That iconic thinker lost the battle for a second term. And was succeeded by a politician, Kofi Annan, who had no problem staying for two terms.

Kofi Annan was chosen to appease African UN membership for jettisoning an African -Boutros-Ghali. From the Big Powers point of view, an appeaser, Annan, instead of a confrontationist Boutros-Ghali. A manager in the place of a thinker. A typical play within the play!!

In Boutros-Ghali's failure to gain a second term, I find a strong echo of Dag Hammarskjold. Their commonality of approaching the Charter is clear. Hammarskjold stood his ground in 1960; had Khrushchev bang his shoe on the table at the General Assembly. Shouting to the S.G. "IRHAL" (Leave). And a year later, in 1961, the white regime of Rhodesia was suspected of causing his plane to fall from the sky.

Boutros-Ghali also stood the same grounds. Advocated reform of the Security Council and ran afoul of Washington. But he kept his promise to his own convictions: idealism not reflected in the political world of rough and tumble in the world of the Glass House by the East River, in New York.

In 1992, in his office on the 38th floor, he privately asked me: "Do you wish to return to serve? Haven't you enjoyed 6 years of retirement?" "No, Boutros," I said. "I have left this cage. Now breathing freedom on the outside. Lots of options."

His silent but approving smile guided me to the exit. It is difficult, in fact impossible, to forget neither his ideas and ideals. Nor that quiet but knowing smile and innate wisdom. A second term was a passing episode in a life which shall always enrich the world he left behind.

And there is more. More to the Boutros-Ghali saga. The media say that he lobbied for the post. Dead wrong. Africa lobbied him for the post at an African summit. Mobutu, then Congo (Zaire) President, motioned to him and whispered: "The Anglo-phone Africans want to nominate one of them. You are our Franco-phone candidate." 

Taken aback, Boutros-Ghali responded: "What would President Mubarak say?" Mobuto winked and said: "I shall call Mubarak!!" And he did. Then the game was on. How do I know that? From the lips of Boutros-Ghali in Mexico City. He had invited me to join him there for personal and confidential consultations. That was before Mitterand, as President of France threw in his heavy political weight, tipping the scales for Boutros-Ghali as UN SG.

Yet through the debacle of the Clinton animosity, forged in the crucible of an old and tattered UN Charter, the process of nominating a UN Secretary-General is at long last about to change. The effort is aiming at breaking the strangle hold of the Big Five on that closed medieval method of nomination. A method whereby the General Assembly is a mere rubber stamp for what the Big Five agree upon in private consultations.

That is the process which sank the ship of nominating Tanzania's Ahmed Salem, in the early 1980's, to replace Kurt Waldheim of Austria. Waldheim, later found to be a former Nazi operative in Greece, was running for an unheard of third term. Salem was his opponent.

America vetoed the Salem nomination. His sin? Dancing in the GA aisles upon the the admission of mainland China to its rightful seat at the UN.

China vetoed Waldheim. And the deadlock continued. For 16 ballots. Salem, in our frequent meetings, would laughingly say "Waldheim has no chance. The process is broken." Finally De Cuellar of Peru was called from a beach resort to occupy the post as a final compromise. Boutros-Ghali followed, in spite of early American misgivings.

In his book "Unvanquished," Boutros-Ghali stressed what the Charter could not accommodate: dedication for being a Secretary-General who dared defy a big power armed with a veto. And no meaningful reform of the council is at present possible.

If I were to write an epitaph for Boutros-Ghali, I would say: "HERE LIES A LEADER WHO SACRIFICED A WORLDLY POSITION FOR WORLD'S PRINCIPLES." Rest in peace, my friend.

May his soul rest in peace. His Egypt bade him farewell in the most celebrating manner -A military/State funeral. For he was a true combatant for his motherland, and for the cause of a universal Rule of Law.