Time for a simulation exercise in the art of dialogue between the Islamists and the secularists in the new Egypt. The January 25, 2011 Revolution is broken. Its only hope for repair, which is the only road to a successful transition to democracy, is through reaching an important understanding. That is an understanding of what the word "dialogue" means.
So here we go with an imaginary setting. We prepare a conference room with a long table and several comfortable chairs lined up on the two sides of that table. Please do not forget to place the same number of seats for each side. We think that 12 seats for the Islamists and the same number of seats for the secularists would suffice. Oh!! Don't forget to place bottled water and flowers and pads and pens for the participants. No recording please. Only one flag, the flag of Egypt, shall be placed behind the moderator of this imaginary dialogue.
The participants enter the conference room. Instinctively the Islamists, in long robes and overgrown beards, seat themselves on the right; the secularists, equally divided in number between men and women in various attires, are now seated to the left. Whispers amongst each group abound until the moderator gavels the conference to order, then begins:
Moderator: "In the Name of God, the Merciful and the Compassionate!! Brothers and sisters: we are here today to help the new Egypt move forward. I wish to thank the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis for calling for this dialogue with their opponents, whom I also thank for agreeing to attend. I now call on the Islamists to briefly state their case."
Islamist: "Our country, Egypt, is beloved by all of us. We won the parliamentary elections and also the presidential elections. The goal of the Egyptian Revolution is to attain democracy and development. We did not stage a coup. We now govern Egypt under a new Constitution approved by a majority. Our brothers and sisters across the table from us do not like the results of the ballot box. They are trying to prevent Egypt from going forward."
Secularist: "The Islamists are trying to steal our Revolution. They were not at the frontlines in Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011. They only came in from the cold when they found us, both Muslims and Copts, men and women, young and old, rich and poor, winning..."
Another Islamist (interrupting): "This is nonsense!! These are blatant lies. They..."
Moderator: "You are interrupting her. Let her make her case. Let her..."
A third Islamist: "They have no case, we are the majority which..."
Moderator: "Excuse me. You want a dialogue? Yet you are turning it into a monologue. You either stop or I shall adjourn this meeting." (Turning to the secularist speaker, a non-veiled young woman in a pant suit) "Please continue..."
Secularist: "What has taken place right now makes our case. The Islamists say they want a dialogue. But in essence, they lack the understanding of how to deal with those like us who oppose an Islamist regime. Egypt is too cosmopolitan and too diverse to be governed by the rule of numbers."
Moderator: "What do you mean? But democracy is primarily the rule by the majority!!"
Another Secularist: "We are not sure that the results of the elections, whether parliamentary or presidential, have reflected the popular will."
A fourth Islamist: "There they go again!! The secularists, who do not even speak with one voice, want Egypt to scrap the results of all elections and referenda, including those approving our New Constitution. They are demonizing us for having won. They are resorting to civil disobedience, strikes and work stoppages in order to prevent President Morsi and Prime Minister Qandeel from getting Egypt back on track."
A third Secularist: "As a Copt, I feel threatened by the Salafis who look upon the great Coptic Church as a strange object in Egyptian society. While Islam calls for tolerance and the acceptance of the other, the Islamists go on describing those who do not see things their way as being against Islam."
Moderator: (Seeing a Salafi focused on shaping pieces of paper into little paper boats) "Sir!! Aren't you interested in what the opposition is saying? Why did you join us today? Please show some respect for your opponents." [The Salafis protest: "This is democracy!"]
Moderator again to the Salafi: "This is a disgusting abuse of your newly-found freedom." [The Salafi ignores the Moderator] {This has actually happened and was on the air.}
A fifth Islamist: "We know that the street is with us. And we know that there is no way that the results of the ballot box are going to be nullified by the judiciary. That judiciary has come about through dictatorial manipulations by Mubarak and his National Democratic Party (DNC). The secularists are now joining hands with the DNC in their common cause of scuttling our newly-found democracy."
A fourth Secularist: "What he has just said proves our point. We demonstrate peacefully, and the Salafis besiege the Information Production City to prevent the new Egypt from free expression. They use the Police and the security forces to club us into submission. We are not against Islam, but we are against the Islamization of governance in Egypt. We..."
Moderator (pointing to his watch): I am sorry that the time for this conversation is up. Neither side has reconciled with the other. Frankly, I am startled by the chasm dividing Egypt into two currents: Islamism and secularism. For the sake of Egypt, let us try to meet again. Otherwise, all shall be lost. This meeting stands adjourned."
[Blogger's Note: Some of the material in this blog has been inspired by a brilliant article dated December 22, 2012 by Essam Abdel-Aziz, Editor-in-Chief of ROSAELYOUSSEF, an Egyptian political magazine established in 1935 by Mrs. Fatima El-Youssef. The interpretation of that material and the flow of this imaginary dialogue is the sole responsibility of this blogger].
Friday, March 1, 2013
Friday, February 22, 2013
Soliloquy of a Dictator: "Whenever I thought of relinquishing power?!"
This blog deals with something different. It is a poem by the famous Syrian poet and songwriter, Nizar Qabbani. The original is in Arabic, translated into English by this blogger. It is intended to focus on the magic of folklore in the Arab Spring, and on why people revolt.
It shall be read by this blogger at an event in Toronto, Canada, which is co-sponsored by SUNSGLOW - Global Training in the Rule of Law and the Toronto University Club. The date of this event is February 27; the topic is: "The Arab Spring and Human Rights." The format is a panel to be chaired by William Horton, Esq., who heads SUNSGLOW's Regional Liaison Center in Toronto, the most recent addition to our ensemble of regional liaison centers around the world.
Now to the Nizar Qabbani poem:
Poem about dictatorship and liberty
By Nizar Qabbani (in Arabic)
Translation into English
By Yassin El-Ayouty
It shall be read by this blogger at an event in Toronto, Canada, which is co-sponsored by SUNSGLOW - Global Training in the Rule of Law and the Toronto University Club. The date of this event is February 27; the topic is: "The Arab Spring and Human Rights." The format is a panel to be chaired by William Horton, Esq., who heads SUNSGLOW's Regional Liaison Center in Toronto, the most recent addition to our ensemble of regional liaison centers around the world.
Now to the Nizar Qabbani poem:
WHENEVER I THOUGHT OF RELINQUISHING POWER?
Whenever I thought of relinquishing power
My conscience stood in the way
After I am gone
who will rule these good people?
After me
who will cure the limp
the leper
the blind?
who will raise the dead?
And from whose overcoat
will the light of the moon shine?
And who will bestow on
the people the gift of rain?
And who will whip them
ninety lashings?
And who will hang them
from the limbs of trees?
And who will force them
to live like herds of cows?
And perish as cows perish?
Whenever I think of
relinquishing power?
My eyes fill out with tears
as if they were a rain cloud.
So let my fate to rule stand, for it is
my destiny
And it shall be from now until
the end of time.
Poem about dictatorship and liberty
By Nizar Qabbani (in Arabic)
Translation into English
By Yassin El-Ayouty
Friday, February 15, 2013
The Muslim Brotherhood Versus The Salafis: Divided They Stand at the Helm of Power In Egypt
Together they won 70% of the seats in Parliament. Though the Parliament (the lower chamber) has been dissolved by the Supreme Constitutional Court on a technicality, the forthcoming parliamentary elections promise the same results. Through the highway of democracy, an era of Islamist rule has begun in Egypt .
What does this mean for Egypt? Though nothing can be certain in any revolutionary setting anywhere in the world, there are a few road signs.
First: The Brotherhood and the Salafis say that they are friends, but they are not united. The former are largely moderate, the latter are definitely extremist. There respective political parties (the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, and the Salafis' Al-Nour Party) are at loggerheads with one another. Divided they both stand for the term "Islamists." That division has so far not been bridged even by the fact that Morsi, with his roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, is now the popularly-elected president of Egypt.
Second: If healed, the division within the ranks of the Islamists could lead to a functional rapprochement with the secularists. Without that, the Egyptian street could remain chaotic for a long period. And with chaos, the new Egypt shall not be able to shake off its economic misery. It is the economic decline that has been propelling the young and unemployed to the streets to cause destruction and mayhem.
Third: Thrown in the mix of the endless cycle of violence are two main factors. The Egyptian police and the security forces, who are traditionally distrusted, are hated by the masses since the Mubarak days. Their task in quelling mob action has been made more complicated by the recently-acquired capability of the demonstrators to fight tear gas with tear gas, and bird shots with home-made Molotov cocktails. The other factor in that deadly mix is the understandable reluctance of the armed forces to get dragged in those street battles.
By staying above the fray, the armed forces have remained the darling of the masses, and the only cohesive force in the largest Arab country whose population has now surpassed 90 millions.
From the reality of political division within Egypt, to the ideological thinking which is now taking hold in the land of the pharaohs, we see the Arab Spring's inability to fulfill its promise: dignity, democracy, and development.
The Brotherhood espouses the mantra of "Islam is the solution," while the Salafis adhere to the necessity for "the return to the practices of early Islam." (Salaf means ancestor, in this case in the spiritual sense). On the surface, the two ideological principles may look the same. In reality, they are not. For the Brotherhood, Islamism accommodates evolution in interpretation; for the Salafis, literalism of the text defines Islamism. Thus one can visualize the Muslim Brotherhood as standing for evolution, and the Salafis as the party for creationism. In governance, the gulf becomes even larger as it impacts on the daily life of a cosmopolitan country like Egypt.
At least for now, the Brotherhood and the Salafis look more like the most durable political forces in Egypt. Both groups have emerged from the street and have remained the closest of the entire political spectrum in Egypt to the street. They, especially the Muslim Brotherhood since its inception in 1928, have known what makes the street tick, what basic services does it need, what language does it understand. Al-Azhar, for the last 1040 years, has always been the fount of Islamic learning and the Mecca of interfaith, especially in regard to the great Coptic church. But Al-Azhar has always remained an educational institution and a lightening rod for patriotism, but not a vehicle for street organization.
Thus, the Egyptian revolutionary experience in the post-Mubarak era, may eventually parallel the Turkish experience: Islamist rule which tolerates diversity, with the armed forces keeping watch over internal and external security.
Within this framework, the call for a dialogue between the various political forces in Egypt, whose only organized element is the Islamist, remains elusive. The secularists are calling for the return to square one of the Egyptian Revolution. This in effect means the delegitimation of the previous popular votes including the referendum on the new Constitution. The Islamist, comfortable at the helm of legislative and executive power, are calling for respect of the popular will, the status quo.
Neither the Islamists nor the secularists shall be able to make the daily demonstrations go away. In the meantime, the Egyptian street, though weary of the split within the ranks of the Islamists, is more weary of the altercation amongst the seventy political parties and movements. But progressively, the voice of the secularists is losing its resonance with the millions who are hungry for stability, and a better life.
The only strong thread which is holding the ship of the Egyptian State Egypt, together, regardless of affiliations is the slogans."WE ALL LOVE EGYPT"
What does this mean for Egypt? Though nothing can be certain in any revolutionary setting anywhere in the world, there are a few road signs.
First: The Brotherhood and the Salafis say that they are friends, but they are not united. The former are largely moderate, the latter are definitely extremist. There respective political parties (the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, and the Salafis' Al-Nour Party) are at loggerheads with one another. Divided they both stand for the term "Islamists." That division has so far not been bridged even by the fact that Morsi, with his roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, is now the popularly-elected president of Egypt.
Second: If healed, the division within the ranks of the Islamists could lead to a functional rapprochement with the secularists. Without that, the Egyptian street could remain chaotic for a long period. And with chaos, the new Egypt shall not be able to shake off its economic misery. It is the economic decline that has been propelling the young and unemployed to the streets to cause destruction and mayhem.
Third: Thrown in the mix of the endless cycle of violence are two main factors. The Egyptian police and the security forces, who are traditionally distrusted, are hated by the masses since the Mubarak days. Their task in quelling mob action has been made more complicated by the recently-acquired capability of the demonstrators to fight tear gas with tear gas, and bird shots with home-made Molotov cocktails. The other factor in that deadly mix is the understandable reluctance of the armed forces to get dragged in those street battles.
By staying above the fray, the armed forces have remained the darling of the masses, and the only cohesive force in the largest Arab country whose population has now surpassed 90 millions.
From the reality of political division within Egypt, to the ideological thinking which is now taking hold in the land of the pharaohs, we see the Arab Spring's inability to fulfill its promise: dignity, democracy, and development.
The Brotherhood espouses the mantra of "Islam is the solution," while the Salafis adhere to the necessity for "the return to the practices of early Islam." (Salaf means ancestor, in this case in the spiritual sense). On the surface, the two ideological principles may look the same. In reality, they are not. For the Brotherhood, Islamism accommodates evolution in interpretation; for the Salafis, literalism of the text defines Islamism. Thus one can visualize the Muslim Brotherhood as standing for evolution, and the Salafis as the party for creationism. In governance, the gulf becomes even larger as it impacts on the daily life of a cosmopolitan country like Egypt.
At least for now, the Brotherhood and the Salafis look more like the most durable political forces in Egypt. Both groups have emerged from the street and have remained the closest of the entire political spectrum in Egypt to the street. They, especially the Muslim Brotherhood since its inception in 1928, have known what makes the street tick, what basic services does it need, what language does it understand. Al-Azhar, for the last 1040 years, has always been the fount of Islamic learning and the Mecca of interfaith, especially in regard to the great Coptic church. But Al-Azhar has always remained an educational institution and a lightening rod for patriotism, but not a vehicle for street organization.
Thus, the Egyptian revolutionary experience in the post-Mubarak era, may eventually parallel the Turkish experience: Islamist rule which tolerates diversity, with the armed forces keeping watch over internal and external security.
Within this framework, the call for a dialogue between the various political forces in Egypt, whose only organized element is the Islamist, remains elusive. The secularists are calling for the return to square one of the Egyptian Revolution. This in effect means the delegitimation of the previous popular votes including the referendum on the new Constitution. The Islamist, comfortable at the helm of legislative and executive power, are calling for respect of the popular will, the status quo.
Neither the Islamists nor the secularists shall be able to make the daily demonstrations go away. In the meantime, the Egyptian street, though weary of the split within the ranks of the Islamists, is more weary of the altercation amongst the seventy political parties and movements. But progressively, the voice of the secularists is losing its resonance with the millions who are hungry for stability, and a better life.
The only strong thread which is holding the ship of the Egyptian State Egypt, together, regardless of affiliations is the slogans."WE ALL LOVE EGYPT"
Thursday, February 14, 2013
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION, AHMADINEJAD OF IRAN CALLS FOR PAN-ISLAMISM
International conferences serve also bilateral ends. So is with the 12th Summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) which took place in Cairo on February 5 and 6. Nearly 50% of the membership of 57 States attended. But the only Head of State whose presence eclipsed all others was Ahmadinejad of Iran.
This is significant in the context of the Egyptian Revolution. No Iranian Head of Sate had set foot in the largest Arab State, Egypt, since the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. That treaty caused Tehran to sever its diplomatic relations with Cairo. And when President Sadat, who had taken that bold step, was assassinated in 1981, a main thoroughfare in Tehran was renamed after the killer (Al-Islambolly). Mubarak, who succeeded Sadat, never forgave the mullahs in Iran for those transgressions.
With Mubarak now in jail, and Morsi, who came from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, in the Presidential palace, the new Egypt felt it was necessary to break with the past. Egyptian diplomacy in the post January 25, 2011 revolution lost no opportunity to assert Egypt's divorce from the era of military dictatorship. Thus Iran was one of those priority areas where Cairo could declare from the top of its hundreds of mingrets its independence from the old quiet alliances.
There is another layer to the cultural archeology of Egypt. Though largely a Sunni State, Egypt remains warm to the Shiis. Cairo was established in the 10th century by a great Shii regime, the Fatimides. (Their name came from Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad; the wife of Aly, Muhammad's cousin and protege; and the mother of two of the shining lights of Shiism, Hassan and Al-Hussein).
The historic mosque and university, Al-Azhar, was also built by the Fatimides in Cairo about the same time. (It teaches the Shii main school of thought side by side with the four main Sunni schools. It is no accident that Al-Azhar and the great mosque of Al-Hussein, where Egyptian tradition holds that Al-Hussein's head is buried there, stand next to one another. Millions of Sunni Egyptians flock to that magnificent shrine to pray and invoke the glorified name of Muhammad's grandson who was martyred in Iraq. Next to those great edifices, one finds a section of old Cairo called "Fatimide Cairo."
Now back to Ahmadinejad in Cairo. After being welcomed on February 5 by President Morsi, his first two steps were, predictably, to pray at Al-Hussein shrine, meet with Dr. Ahmed Al-Taiyeb, the Al-Azhar Rector, and hold a press conference to extol the historic relationships between Iran and Egypt.
It was Al-Azhar's Rector, El-Taiyeb, a graduate of the Sorbonne, who articulated a framework for a new relationship between Cairo and Tehran. Though Ahmadinejad flashed the V sign to the media prior to the Taiyeb-Ahmadinejad mini-summit, Al-Azhar called upon Iran to act on the following issues:
This is significant in the context of the Egyptian Revolution. No Iranian Head of Sate had set foot in the largest Arab State, Egypt, since the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. That treaty caused Tehran to sever its diplomatic relations with Cairo. And when President Sadat, who had taken that bold step, was assassinated in 1981, a main thoroughfare in Tehran was renamed after the killer (Al-Islambolly). Mubarak, who succeeded Sadat, never forgave the mullahs in Iran for those transgressions.
With Mubarak now in jail, and Morsi, who came from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, in the Presidential palace, the new Egypt felt it was necessary to break with the past. Egyptian diplomacy in the post January 25, 2011 revolution lost no opportunity to assert Egypt's divorce from the era of military dictatorship. Thus Iran was one of those priority areas where Cairo could declare from the top of its hundreds of mingrets its independence from the old quiet alliances.
There is another layer to the cultural archeology of Egypt. Though largely a Sunni State, Egypt remains warm to the Shiis. Cairo was established in the 10th century by a great Shii regime, the Fatimides. (Their name came from Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad; the wife of Aly, Muhammad's cousin and protege; and the mother of two of the shining lights of Shiism, Hassan and Al-Hussein).
The historic mosque and university, Al-Azhar, was also built by the Fatimides in Cairo about the same time. (It teaches the Shii main school of thought side by side with the four main Sunni schools. It is no accident that Al-Azhar and the great mosque of Al-Hussein, where Egyptian tradition holds that Al-Hussein's head is buried there, stand next to one another. Millions of Sunni Egyptians flock to that magnificent shrine to pray and invoke the glorified name of Muhammad's grandson who was martyred in Iraq. Next to those great edifices, one finds a section of old Cairo called "Fatimide Cairo."
Now back to Ahmadinejad in Cairo. After being welcomed on February 5 by President Morsi, his first two steps were, predictably, to pray at Al-Hussein shrine, meet with Dr. Ahmed Al-Taiyeb, the Al-Azhar Rector, and hold a press conference to extol the historic relationships between Iran and Egypt.
It was Al-Azhar's Rector, El-Taiyeb, a graduate of the Sorbonne, who articulated a framework for a new relationship between Cairo and Tehran. Though Ahmadinejad flashed the V sign to the media prior to the Taiyeb-Ahmadinejad mini-summit, Al-Azhar called upon Iran to act on the following issues:
- to respect the Sunni veneration of the three Caliphs who preceded Imam Aly (Shii means Partisans of Aly) in leading he then emerging Muslim nation after the passing of Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam;
- to accord equal rights to the Sunnis in Al-Ahwaz, the Iranian western province populated largely by Arabs and overlooking the Gulf;
- to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the Gulf States, especially the State of Bahrain, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council of six States; and
- to fully cooperate in stopping the blood bath in Syria where the present civil war has left more than 60,000 Syrians dead and 2.5 million refugees displaced either internally or externally.
For his part, the Iranian President declared at a press conference that "I came to Al-Azhar to advocate unity between Sunnis and Shiis. We want to fix together what divides us. This is our solemn duty at present. Like riders in a bus, they can differ in their views, but the bus is moving towards one destination."
Meanwhile, Egypt's Foreign Minister, Muhammad Kamel Amr, hurried to calm down the nerves of the Gulf States. The new Egypt, in its external relationships, he declared, shall not act at the expense of the security of other States. Then pointedly he added, "For Egypt, the security of the Gulf States is a red line. Their security is integral to the security of Egypt."
Accentuating that call for keeping the Gulf States safe from Iranian interference, the Egyptian Salafis (Sunni extremists) declared that Egypt, the largest Sunni state, has the duty and obligation to protect "the Arab Gulf" from any undue influence from outside, being it political, cultural, or military.
Beyond all those declarations lies a factual certainty: The relationship between Iran and Egypt are inching ever closer to one another. Morsi of Egypt began the process of warming up to that relationship. He was the first Egyptian Head of State to visit Iran since the Khemeini Islamic revolution of 1979. That took place when he attended the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Tehran in August, 2012.
With Iran now being the object of severe western sanctions because of its present nuclear program, Tehran needed to show its public and the world that its foreign affairs outside that wall of sanctions were not impaired.
Reflecting that dynamic was a significant interview granted by Ahmadinejad in Tehran, prior to his Cairo visit, to Al-Ahram newspaper which speaks for the Egyptian Government. In that interview, he made the following declarations in order to frame his global outlook:
- Iran has now become a nuclear power. And soon it shall be a State with advanced outer space capabilities;
- Sanctions have "affected somewhat our economy." But through Iranian productivity, Iran shall make up for any deficit;
- Egypt and Iran, the two States with civilizational depth, should unite their effects to ensure regional and world peace;
- Islam is "our path to unity"
Friday, February 1, 2013
The State of the Egyptian State: Collapse, Never; Change of Regime, Not Unthinkable
Chaos, chaos, everywhere!! Official reports are the equivalent of the writing on the wall. Just compare the statistics of 2012 to those of 2011: Homicide: up by 130%; armed burglary up by 350%. Crime, overall was at a record of 5814 in 2012, compared to 2778 in 2011; felonies doubled to 40,220; kidnapping accounted for 258; rape for 109; arson: 632; burglaries: 9284; car theft: 20,375. Those ominous statistics were culled from all provinces. This is not to mention 20,000 recorded criminals who took advantage of this security collapse and fled from jail.
The managing editor of Al-Ahram newspaper, the official newspaper of the regime, Ahdel-Nasser Salameh, headlined on January 25, 2013: "Our Revolution is in the Balance!!" That was the date of the Revolution's second anniversary. Collaboration turned into a day of mourning, especially at the major cities of the Suez Canal (Port Said, Ismailia and Suez). Mr. Salameh summed up Egypt's dilemma in few sub-headings: "We are confronting a huge disappointment. The Revolution failed to be convincing to large sectors of our population. The people are now asking whether January 25 ushered in a revolution. History may shame us all. The ruling authorities cannot govern alone by themselves."
From a beautiful dream to an ugly nightmare. And on January 26, 2013, President Morsi declared a state of emergency from 9:00 PM to 5:00 AM in the Suez Canal area. Then when the public defied the curfew hours, the president blinked. He left the management and the duration of the curfew to the local authorities in the Suez Canal area. Wild and uncontrollable demonstrations had erupted in Port Said and Suez. The chaos in Egypt took various forms: thousands of protesters were against sentencing those accused of killing soccer fans a year ago in Port Said; celebrating the second anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution by major riots in support of the Morsi regime and in rebellion against it; denunciation of the Muslim Brotherhood by the secularists and counter-denunciation of the secularists by the Islamists; continuation of the conflict between the judiciary and the executive authorities; and the economic collapse of the largest Arab country, namely Egypt.
Where did the beautiful dream of a transition to democracy in Egypt go? The country of 90 millions was thought to be preparing for parliamentary elections shortly under its new Constitution. The upper chamber, the Shura Council, is now reconstituted and is wielding legislative powers pending the results of those elections. President Morsi is thought to have had wrestled power from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and the military position in the power structure of the new Egypt is now defined by the Constitution. So has been the judicial authority whose independence was detailed in that Constitution.
Events on the ground is proving that sovereign power cannot be solely guaranteed on paper. Not even on the parchment of the new Constitution. Nobody seems to be happy with their share of power. Morsi is accused of being subservient to the Islamists; the National Salvation Front (NSF), representing the opposition and coordinated by Dr. El-Baradei, is hopelessly fragmented; the security on the Egyptian street remains unattainable; the infrastructure is in dire straits; the young remain unemployed; and the Copts are doubtful about their future security and their freedom of practice in the new Egypt.
How about a dialogue amongst the antagonistic factions? President Morsi has been calling for such a dialogue. The NSF had rejected these calls declaring that they were intended to buy time for a regime they abhor.
Then came a dire warning on January 29. 2013, issued by General Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, Egypt's Minister of defense. In a speech at the Cairo Military Academy (Egypt's equivalent of West Point in the U.S.) he said, "The political, economic, social and security challenges which face Egypt today represent a veritable threat to its security and cohesiveness. The persistence of conflict among the various political forces and their disagreement regarding administering the country may lead to Egypt's collapse."
Then in pointed remarks to the basic mission of the Egyptian armed forces, the General said: "The Egyptian army will remain the solid and cohesive rock and the strong pillar on which Egypt rests. It is the army of all Egyptians, regardless of their group affiliations."
One does not have to be a mind reader to decipher what El-Sisi was hinting at: The possibility of a military intervention which would suspend Egypt's march toward democratic rule. Now it was the turn of the opposition to blink. The National Salvation Front agreed to sit with the Islamists and the other forces to sort out their differences in order to save Egypt's transition to democracy.
Summing up the state of the Egyptian State, one has to conclude that with regard to Egypt of 10,000 years:
COLLAPSE NEVER!! CHANGE OF REGIME NOT UNTHINKABLE!!
The managing editor of Al-Ahram newspaper, the official newspaper of the regime, Ahdel-Nasser Salameh, headlined on January 25, 2013: "Our Revolution is in the Balance!!" That was the date of the Revolution's second anniversary. Collaboration turned into a day of mourning, especially at the major cities of the Suez Canal (Port Said, Ismailia and Suez). Mr. Salameh summed up Egypt's dilemma in few sub-headings: "We are confronting a huge disappointment. The Revolution failed to be convincing to large sectors of our population. The people are now asking whether January 25 ushered in a revolution. History may shame us all. The ruling authorities cannot govern alone by themselves."
From a beautiful dream to an ugly nightmare. And on January 26, 2013, President Morsi declared a state of emergency from 9:00 PM to 5:00 AM in the Suez Canal area. Then when the public defied the curfew hours, the president blinked. He left the management and the duration of the curfew to the local authorities in the Suez Canal area. Wild and uncontrollable demonstrations had erupted in Port Said and Suez. The chaos in Egypt took various forms: thousands of protesters were against sentencing those accused of killing soccer fans a year ago in Port Said; celebrating the second anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution by major riots in support of the Morsi regime and in rebellion against it; denunciation of the Muslim Brotherhood by the secularists and counter-denunciation of the secularists by the Islamists; continuation of the conflict between the judiciary and the executive authorities; and the economic collapse of the largest Arab country, namely Egypt.
Where did the beautiful dream of a transition to democracy in Egypt go? The country of 90 millions was thought to be preparing for parliamentary elections shortly under its new Constitution. The upper chamber, the Shura Council, is now reconstituted and is wielding legislative powers pending the results of those elections. President Morsi is thought to have had wrestled power from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and the military position in the power structure of the new Egypt is now defined by the Constitution. So has been the judicial authority whose independence was detailed in that Constitution.
Events on the ground is proving that sovereign power cannot be solely guaranteed on paper. Not even on the parchment of the new Constitution. Nobody seems to be happy with their share of power. Morsi is accused of being subservient to the Islamists; the National Salvation Front (NSF), representing the opposition and coordinated by Dr. El-Baradei, is hopelessly fragmented; the security on the Egyptian street remains unattainable; the infrastructure is in dire straits; the young remain unemployed; and the Copts are doubtful about their future security and their freedom of practice in the new Egypt.
How about a dialogue amongst the antagonistic factions? President Morsi has been calling for such a dialogue. The NSF had rejected these calls declaring that they were intended to buy time for a regime they abhor.
Then came a dire warning on January 29. 2013, issued by General Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, Egypt's Minister of defense. In a speech at the Cairo Military Academy (Egypt's equivalent of West Point in the U.S.) he said, "The political, economic, social and security challenges which face Egypt today represent a veritable threat to its security and cohesiveness. The persistence of conflict among the various political forces and their disagreement regarding administering the country may lead to Egypt's collapse."
Then in pointed remarks to the basic mission of the Egyptian armed forces, the General said: "The Egyptian army will remain the solid and cohesive rock and the strong pillar on which Egypt rests. It is the army of all Egyptians, regardless of their group affiliations."
One does not have to be a mind reader to decipher what El-Sisi was hinting at: The possibility of a military intervention which would suspend Egypt's march toward democratic rule. Now it was the turn of the opposition to blink. The National Salvation Front agreed to sit with the Islamists and the other forces to sort out their differences in order to save Egypt's transition to democracy.
Summing up the state of the Egyptian State, one has to conclude that with regard to Egypt of 10,000 years:
COLLAPSE NEVER!! CHANGE OF REGIME NOT UNTHINKABLE!!
Friday, January 25, 2013
Why Did Egypt Revolt?: The Facts Through the Fact Finders (Part III/Last Part)
The historic Report of the Fact-Finding Commission which was issued in Cairo at a press conference last month draws its importance from two factors: It is a complete analysis of why people revolt, and it is done under the leadership of one of the most prestigious judicial authorities in the Arab world, Judge Adel Qura.
Part I of this series which ends with this Part III, dealt with the role of the media, Facebook, Twitter and other means of social mobilization. This was followed by Part II which dealt with the role of the police and other security forces in regard to "Shooting with Live Ammunition and Death by Being Run-Over by Vehicles." Now this Part III deals with 3 issues: (a) Thugs (Baltagiahs) intimidating peaceful protesters; (b) Extra judicial arrests; (c) Security break-down.
Taken in its totality, the Fact-Finders have unmistakeably placed the onus on the old regime for these gross infractions of constitutional rights of the Egyptian citizen to peacefully demonstrate. The weight of evidence of all kinds, including visual evidence, is overwhelming. The direct impact of that Report could be seen in the recent court of appeals ruling to retry Mubarak, his two sons and other suspects for their alleged commission, directly or indirectly, of actions whereby nearly 900 demonstrators were killed and more than 6000 were injured in various Egyptian provinces.
The Report of the Fact-Finding Commission covers the critical period from January 25 to February 11, 2011, with the latter day signaling the fall of Mubarak from his 32-year old position as Egypt's dictatorial President.
With regard to the thugs (Baltagiahs; quasi-militias), the Report focuses on the period from February 2, to February 3, 2011. During those 24 hours, bloody confrontations took place all over Egypt. The locales were Tahrir Square and its equivalents in many of the Egyptian Provinces.
The Report calls that Wednesday "Bloody Wednesday." On that morning, the Mubarak regime supporters poured into Mustafa Mahmoud Square located at the Arab League Avenue. Other supporters came from other Cairo quarters, thus swelling the numbers of counter-protesters. As per the testimony of some leaders of the National Party (the Governing Party), those activists were instructed to prevent the anti-Mubarak demonstrators from entering Tahrir Square.
How about the throngs of anti-Mubarak demonstrators who were already camped inside Tahrir? The orders were to besiege the occupiers of Tahrir within whose ranks, elements of the secret Egyptian police were infiltrated to commit intimidation and anarchy. But since that iconic public square is surrounded by high buildings, both business and residential, the anti-democracy infiltrators also ascended to rooftops.
To the anti-Mubarak elements, rooftops became the high ground from which they threw stones, marble tiles, and molotov cocktails on the heads of the unarmed demonstrators below. Simultaneously, the Fact-Finders state, the police and thug elements within Tahrir Square used their guns, rubber bullets, and tear gas canisters in attacking the pro-democracy throngs.
The scene gets more horrific with the invasion by a group of riders of camels, horses, and mules, driving their animals at top speed into the packed crowds. The Report goes on to describe those events which it calls "The Camel Battle" as the most frightening of all the other illegal acts committed by the fallen regime. The riders of those animals, most of whom came from Nazlet El-Samman, near the Giza Pyramids, were armed with thick bamboo sticks, long knives, swords and iron bars. They breached the iron barriers which were erected to protect the Tahrir occupiers, and proceeded to cause indiscriminate death and injury.
In self defence, the demonstrators ripped up street pavements and hurled their broken stones at their attackers. During that melee, the demonstrators detained some of the camel riders and other infiltrators. From their IDs they found that they were either police forces dressed in civilian clothes or were members of the National Democratic Party, the then-ruling party of former President Mubarak. The detainees were delivered by their civilian captors to the armed forces with whom the Fact-Finders were in communication to document that important report.
The Fact-Finders also documented what was beamed by bullhorns. The leaders of those anti-deomcracy throngs described the peaceful demonstrators as mercenaries, turncoats, traitors and non-thinking hordes who were misled by Dr. El-Baradei, Ayman Nour and other anti-dictatorship icons. The anti-democracy throngs were urged, the Fact-Finders pointed out, to "liberate Tahrir Square from the traitors who want for Egypt only destruction."
The Report contained a copy of a document carrying the logo of the Interior Ministry under the heading: "Secret and Very Important." The document, which is not yet authenticated, is said to contain orders "to hire Baltagiahs (thugs) to create chaos and to be generously paid." That document was referred to Egypt's Attorney General for further investigation.
Dealing with the remaining issues, namely extra judicial arrests and the security breakdown in Egypt, the Fact-Finding Commission declared in its Report the following:
January 25, 2013 marks the 2nd anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution. Two years have already gone by. Yet the revolutionary cataclysm and its reverberations are not yet over. When would they be over? Nobody knows!! But barring interference by the army, the march towards freedom and democratic rule shall eventually be impossible to reverse.
Part I of this series which ends with this Part III, dealt with the role of the media, Facebook, Twitter and other means of social mobilization. This was followed by Part II which dealt with the role of the police and other security forces in regard to "Shooting with Live Ammunition and Death by Being Run-Over by Vehicles." Now this Part III deals with 3 issues: (a) Thugs (Baltagiahs) intimidating peaceful protesters; (b) Extra judicial arrests; (c) Security break-down.
Taken in its totality, the Fact-Finders have unmistakeably placed the onus on the old regime for these gross infractions of constitutional rights of the Egyptian citizen to peacefully demonstrate. The weight of evidence of all kinds, including visual evidence, is overwhelming. The direct impact of that Report could be seen in the recent court of appeals ruling to retry Mubarak, his two sons and other suspects for their alleged commission, directly or indirectly, of actions whereby nearly 900 demonstrators were killed and more than 6000 were injured in various Egyptian provinces.
The Report of the Fact-Finding Commission covers the critical period from January 25 to February 11, 2011, with the latter day signaling the fall of Mubarak from his 32-year old position as Egypt's dictatorial President.
With regard to the thugs (Baltagiahs; quasi-militias), the Report focuses on the period from February 2, to February 3, 2011. During those 24 hours, bloody confrontations took place all over Egypt. The locales were Tahrir Square and its equivalents in many of the Egyptian Provinces.
The Report calls that Wednesday "Bloody Wednesday." On that morning, the Mubarak regime supporters poured into Mustafa Mahmoud Square located at the Arab League Avenue. Other supporters came from other Cairo quarters, thus swelling the numbers of counter-protesters. As per the testimony of some leaders of the National Party (the Governing Party), those activists were instructed to prevent the anti-Mubarak demonstrators from entering Tahrir Square.
How about the throngs of anti-Mubarak demonstrators who were already camped inside Tahrir? The orders were to besiege the occupiers of Tahrir within whose ranks, elements of the secret Egyptian police were infiltrated to commit intimidation and anarchy. But since that iconic public square is surrounded by high buildings, both business and residential, the anti-democracy infiltrators also ascended to rooftops.
To the anti-Mubarak elements, rooftops became the high ground from which they threw stones, marble tiles, and molotov cocktails on the heads of the unarmed demonstrators below. Simultaneously, the Fact-Finders state, the police and thug elements within Tahrir Square used their guns, rubber bullets, and tear gas canisters in attacking the pro-democracy throngs.
The scene gets more horrific with the invasion by a group of riders of camels, horses, and mules, driving their animals at top speed into the packed crowds. The Report goes on to describe those events which it calls "The Camel Battle" as the most frightening of all the other illegal acts committed by the fallen regime. The riders of those animals, most of whom came from Nazlet El-Samman, near the Giza Pyramids, were armed with thick bamboo sticks, long knives, swords and iron bars. They breached the iron barriers which were erected to protect the Tahrir occupiers, and proceeded to cause indiscriminate death and injury.
In self defence, the demonstrators ripped up street pavements and hurled their broken stones at their attackers. During that melee, the demonstrators detained some of the camel riders and other infiltrators. From their IDs they found that they were either police forces dressed in civilian clothes or were members of the National Democratic Party, the then-ruling party of former President Mubarak. The detainees were delivered by their civilian captors to the armed forces with whom the Fact-Finders were in communication to document that important report.
The Fact-Finders also documented what was beamed by bullhorns. The leaders of those anti-deomcracy throngs described the peaceful demonstrators as mercenaries, turncoats, traitors and non-thinking hordes who were misled by Dr. El-Baradei, Ayman Nour and other anti-dictatorship icons. The anti-democracy throngs were urged, the Fact-Finders pointed out, to "liberate Tahrir Square from the traitors who want for Egypt only destruction."
The Report contained a copy of a document carrying the logo of the Interior Ministry under the heading: "Secret and Very Important." The document, which is not yet authenticated, is said to contain orders "to hire Baltagiahs (thugs) to create chaos and to be generously paid." That document was referred to Egypt's Attorney General for further investigation.
Dealing with the remaining issues, namely extra judicial arrests and the security breakdown in Egypt, the Fact-Finding Commission declared in its Report the following:
- The Police placed under arrest without legal cause many of the demonstrators and media personnel who were reporting on the events of those history-changing 18 days in early 2011. Those detainees were kept for varying periods at various detention centers.
- The security breakdown was brought about through the use by the Ministry of Interior of Baltagiahs who were activated in various areas of Cairo and Giza. The regular police forces have left the scenes of these clashes between the thugs and the pro-democracy protesters Thus the Baltagiahs were enabled to destroy public and private property, after committing acts of pillage. Some of the police stations were reported to have been burnt by arsonists from within the ranks of those hired thugs.
January 25, 2013 marks the 2nd anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution. Two years have already gone by. Yet the revolutionary cataclysm and its reverberations are not yet over. When would they be over? Nobody knows!! But barring interference by the army, the march towards freedom and democratic rule shall eventually be impossible to reverse.
Saturday, January 19, 2013
Why Did Egypt Revolt?: The Facts Through the Fact Finders (Part II)
Mubarak and his crew are going to be retried again. Either acquittal, which is not likely, or a stiffer sentence, which could be capital punishment. The decision is a legal anomaly. It subjects the defendant(s) to retrial for the same charges in which a legal decision was already rendered. But revolutions are not known for adhering to recognizable legal procedures.
Mubarak, his two sons, his former interior minister and others associated with the fallen regime, are still facing charges including allowing their security forces and "baltagiahs" (thugs) to kill peaceful protestors.
The recent Report of the Fact-Finding Commission of the prestigious Egyptian jurist, Adel Qura, has found those charges to be credible. The order of an Egyptian appeals court, issued on January 13, 2013, for a retrial reflects the seriousness in which the Qura report is held.
In Part I of this series on that report, this blog dealt with the role of the social media and public information in influencing the events of the first 18 days of the Egyptian Revolution (January 25 to February 11, 2011). Now Part II deals with the issue of what the Commission describes as "Shooting with Live Ammunition and Death by Being Run-Over by Vehicles."
The Commission confirms that as of January 25, 2011, police forces began using live ammunition against peaceful protestors in Suez, the city for which the Suez Canal is named. It goes on to state that the illegal and inhuman practice soon spread to nearly all of the other Egyptian provinces. In particular, the Fact-Finders named Cairo, Giza, Alexandria, Ismailia, Dakahliah, Qaliubiah, Gharbiha, Sharkiah, Faiyoum, Beni Suef, Assiut, Aswan, and Sinai North. There are 27 provinces (called Governorates) in which Egypt is administratively divided.
On the matter of death-by-vehicles, the Report states that armored police vehicles were intentionally sent to run over protestors for the purpose of killing or injuring them. It presented visual evidence on these actions recorded by TV and by networks of social communication media. In one such recording, a police car is shown veering in the direction of a protestor who was flung to the ground by that vehicular action. Another similar recording shows another police vehicle backing up against another demonstrator. The victim was killed.
A third security vehicle with diplomatic license plates was shown speeding towards Tahrir Square and ploughing into throngs of demonstrators, cutting down whoever was in its way.
The Fact-Finders found two such instruments of death parked behind two police stations in the greater Cairo area. Those vehicles were discovered being dismantled in order to hide their identities. But the investigators were able to record finger-prints found on the bodies of those vehicles.
Neither the Traffic Department nor the Customs Department could verify the owners of the vehicles. But the Report referred to an emissary from the U.S. Embassy in Egypt who had filed a report on one of those vehicles as having been stolen from the Embassy.
The Fact-Finders were informed by the Ministry of Health that as of February 20, 2011, the total number of casualties resulting from those practices had reached 384 fatalities and 6467 injured citizens. Since the tally of fatalities based on reporting by all provinces had reached 846 by February 16, 2011, the Qura Report disputed the veracity of the lower figure. On that basis, it confirmed that at least 846 deaths had occurred.
The Report also confirmed that among those who met with death in the police ranks were 26 officers and police recruits during the period from January 25 to February 9, 2011.
Summing up their findings on this sector of the Report, the Fact-Finders concluded that:
Thus the grand stage for retrying Mubarak and those who had basked in the sun of his autocratic role was set, although the outcome remains unclear.
This series shall continue in future weeks with Part III.
Mubarak, his two sons, his former interior minister and others associated with the fallen regime, are still facing charges including allowing their security forces and "baltagiahs" (thugs) to kill peaceful protestors.
The recent Report of the Fact-Finding Commission of the prestigious Egyptian jurist, Adel Qura, has found those charges to be credible. The order of an Egyptian appeals court, issued on January 13, 2013, for a retrial reflects the seriousness in which the Qura report is held.
In Part I of this series on that report, this blog dealt with the role of the social media and public information in influencing the events of the first 18 days of the Egyptian Revolution (January 25 to February 11, 2011). Now Part II deals with the issue of what the Commission describes as "Shooting with Live Ammunition and Death by Being Run-Over by Vehicles."
The Commission confirms that as of January 25, 2011, police forces began using live ammunition against peaceful protestors in Suez, the city for which the Suez Canal is named. It goes on to state that the illegal and inhuman practice soon spread to nearly all of the other Egyptian provinces. In particular, the Fact-Finders named Cairo, Giza, Alexandria, Ismailia, Dakahliah, Qaliubiah, Gharbiha, Sharkiah, Faiyoum, Beni Suef, Assiut, Aswan, and Sinai North. There are 27 provinces (called Governorates) in which Egypt is administratively divided.
On the matter of death-by-vehicles, the Report states that armored police vehicles were intentionally sent to run over protestors for the purpose of killing or injuring them. It presented visual evidence on these actions recorded by TV and by networks of social communication media. In one such recording, a police car is shown veering in the direction of a protestor who was flung to the ground by that vehicular action. Another similar recording shows another police vehicle backing up against another demonstrator. The victim was killed.
A third security vehicle with diplomatic license plates was shown speeding towards Tahrir Square and ploughing into throngs of demonstrators, cutting down whoever was in its way.
The Fact-Finders found two such instruments of death parked behind two police stations in the greater Cairo area. Those vehicles were discovered being dismantled in order to hide their identities. But the investigators were able to record finger-prints found on the bodies of those vehicles.
Neither the Traffic Department nor the Customs Department could verify the owners of the vehicles. But the Report referred to an emissary from the U.S. Embassy in Egypt who had filed a report on one of those vehicles as having been stolen from the Embassy.
The Fact-Finders were informed by the Ministry of Health that as of February 20, 2011, the total number of casualties resulting from those practices had reached 384 fatalities and 6467 injured citizens. Since the tally of fatalities based on reporting by all provinces had reached 846 by February 16, 2011, the Qura Report disputed the veracity of the lower figure. On that basis, it confirmed that at least 846 deaths had occurred.
The Report also confirmed that among those who met with death in the police ranks were 26 officers and police recruits during the period from January 25 to February 9, 2011.
Summing up their findings on this sector of the Report, the Fact-Finders concluded that:
- The Police has unnecessarily used lethal force in a failed attempt to disperse the demonstrators;
- That the orders to use those methods had to be authorized by the highest level of authority as decreed by standing directives to the Ministry of Interior;
- That the right of protestors to peacefully assemble and voice their grievances is a basic human right as based on the Egyptian Constitution and laws, as well as international law including UN resolutions. The Report thus cited Egyptian Law No. 109 of 1971 which, in Article 102, provides that:
"A Police Officer should only resort to force to carryout his assigned duties if the use of force is the only method left for him to fulfill his duties."Only the Interior Minister could exercise that authority, under the Egyptian President giving the green light for such draconian measures.
Thus the grand stage for retrying Mubarak and those who had basked in the sun of his autocratic role was set, although the outcome remains unclear.
This series shall continue in future weeks with Part III.
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