Has Egypt's Foreign Policy Changed?

This blog draws for its material from various sources in Egypt.  For this issue we quote the full text of an article by Ambassador Dr. El-Sayed Amin Shalaby on the impact of the Egyptian Revolution on Cairo's foreign policy.  A diplomat and a scholar, Dr. Shalaby occupies an important niche within the spectrum of information on Egypt's international relations.  He is the Executive Director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs which I have the privilege of representing before the U.N. Economic and Social Council.  The title of the article is "Has Egypt's Foreign Policy Changed?"

"So far, in regards to foreign policy, geopolitical constants are transcending any differences between Egypt’s prior and new regime. But this may not always hold, writes Al-Sayed Amin Shalabi

During the 18 days of the 25 January Revolution, demands for overthrowing the regime and ending all types of domestic grievances were constant. But foreign policy seemed to recede into the background, at least until protesters gathered in front of the Israeli embassy and demanded the ambassador’s expulsion.

Soon afterwards, researchers and experts fired off a barrage of criticism against Egyptian foreign policy under Hosni Mubarak, noting that Egypt forfeited its regional status, that it took its cue from the US, and that it was too chummy with Israel.

At which point, it became clear that the revolution had another goal, which was to set Egypt’s foreign policy straight. Accordingly, Egypt’s first post-revolution foreign minister, Nabil Al-Arabi, began criticising Egypt’s closure of the Rafah Crossing, considering it a breach of international law. He also pointed out that Egypt would remain committed to the peace treaty with Israel, but only on the condition that Israel does the same. Al-Arabi called for opening a “new page” on Iran and wanted the country to sign several outstanding international agreements, including that of the International Criminal Court.

The ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), by nature averse to major changes, took a cautious attitude to foreign policy. It asserted Egypt’s commitment to all its international obligations, including the Israel peace treaty, a position it conveyed to various US delegations that came to Cairo after the revolution, which suggested that post-revolutionary Egypt may not be much different from pre-revolutionary Egypt after all.

After the election of Egypt’s first civilian — and Islamist — president, the question of foreign policy surfaced once more. In the first months of his term, President Mohamed Morsi visited Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Brazil. 

In all his talks with foreign officials, the president underlined Egypt’s commitment to the Israel peace treaty. He offered to ease tensions in relations between Israel and Hamas, and successfully brokered a deal between the two. Israeli sources say that Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation has improved under the current regime.

America was a top priority. It was clear from the start that President Morsi’s administration aspired for positive and cooperative ties with Washington. Several presidential delegations made trips to the US to discuss “strategic partnership” and “common values”.

When it comes to Iran, several attempts at rapprochement took place after the revolution. But it is hard to speak of a breakthrough, since the US, Gulf countries, Egyptian security services, and the (ultra-Sunni) Salafis are all opposed to improved ties with the Iranians.

Surveying the scope of Egypt’s foreign interests, one can identify similarities with the 1952 Revolution. In both cases the country’s diplomacy centred on the Arab, African, Islamic and non-aligned planes.

Today’s Egypt, just as the 1952 Revolution once was, is eager to establish a balanced and diversified set of international friendships, generally geared to meeting the domestic needs of the country.

One can also glimpse similarities with the early phase of Mubarak’s presidency, when the quest for balance and diversification was paramount. Mubarak was fully committed to the Israel peace treaty, but he strove to restore Egypt’s ties with the Arab world, something that Egyptian diplomacy managed to achieve after persistent efforts.

Mubarak was eager to maintain the close ties with the US that Anwar Al-Sadat managed to build. But he also sought to rehabilitate ties with the Soviet Union. Early in his presidency, Mubarak invited the Russians to resume working in various industrial projects in Egypt, especially those in which they had been involved in the past, such as aluminium and steel. 

Mubarak, it is to be recalled, visited China nine times, and repeatedly asserted Egypt’s belief in the principles of the non-aligned movement.

Mubarak’s rule may have ended in clear bias toward the US and its plans in the region. After all, he tried to placate the Americans by forging close ties with Israel (the QIZ agreement and the natural gas deal). But he made sure that Egyptian diplomacy remained active in various regional and international forums, albeit not as assertive as some would have liked it to be. Still, the last foreign minister in Mubarak’s time, Ahmed Abul-Gheit, criticised Egyptian foreign policy for lacking focus, and for neglecting Africa.

One must keep in mind that some aspects of Egypt’s foreign policy are immutable. For example, the country’s geostrategic position, its historical legacy, and its demographic weight, all of these are basically the same. Egypt cannot but take account of the international order and the shifting balance of power in the region and the world. This has always been the case, and nothing is going to change in this regard.

One development, however, is new. Since the 25 January Revolution, public opinion has begun to exercise considerable influence on the country’s policies. So, from now on, expect foreign policy makers to pay close attention to public perceptions and demands."