President Morsi now has it all: Executive, legislative and ... not judiciary, but something else called "absence of judicial review." It happened on Thursday, Nov. 22, a day when the whole world was grateful for that Gaza cease fire. Morsi, the engineer and the first elected president of Egypt since the birth of ancient Egypt, has, with the US managed to stop, at least for now, the senseless carnage between Gazans and Israelis. During those anxious hours of negotiations, the world looked at Morsi as the voice of reason. President Obama spoke to him at length concluding: that man with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood was indeed a pragmatist. The accolades from all over the world rained on Morsi once the fighting stopped.
Then came Thursday, Nov. 22, a fateful day in Egypt's halting march towards democracy: Morsi promulgating a decree granting himself broad powers. Before that decree was issued, the sign reading "To All Directions" signaled a deadlock in the efforts to draft a new constitution. After the issuance of that decree, the sign reading "To All Other Directions" signaled the unknown.
The dilemma is rooted in the following facts: a split between the Islamists who control the majority of parliamentary seats and the secularists; the haggling in the constituent assembly (the Assembly of 100) over the few yet-to-be-drafted articles of the constitution, resulting in the withdrawal of most of the secularists, including the Copts, from those deliberations (about 25% of the membership); and the fear that the Supreme Constitutional Court, whose judges are hold-over Mubarak appointees, was poised to dissolve that constitutional assembly. Members of that Assembly were chosen by the Islamists-dominated and now dissolved parliament.
Was Morsi correct in issuing that decree? "Correct" is a subjective term which is subject to all kinds of interpretations. Those who support Morsi say: that decree is an emergency enactment of limited duration ending with the plebiscite on a new constitution and the setting up of a new parliament vested with full legislative powers.
Morsi opponents claim that Morsi, using his accolades for his role in the Gaza crisis, is assassinating democracy, tipping the delicate scales in favor of the Islamists in whose ideology his roots run deep, and is anointing himself as the new Pharaoh.
Perhaps the reality is buried under a ton of rhetoric and counter-rhetoric. In spite of that situation, a central fact emerges: the two sides of that schism fear a return to the past leading to an early abortion of the January 25 Revolution. However, each side wants to own that revolution, interpreting its progress on the basis of its ideological perspective.
There is another central fact in the battle of reading the signs at that historic Egyptian crossroads. There is no love lost between Morsi and the Supreme Constitutional Court. That Court had dissolved Parliament, only to have Morsi reconvene it for 20 minutes to have it grant him "temporary" legislative powers. Ancillary to the suspected powers of the Supreme Constitutional Court was the suspicion towards the Public Prosecutor, Abdel Meguid Mahmoud, for failing to win stronger sentences against Mubarak and his associates.
So now, President Morsi, who had returned the army to its barracks, has, through the November 23 decree, freed himself, his decrees and the constituent assembly from judicial oversight. Free at last? Not so fast. The battle between the Islamists and the secularists, signalling an open wound in the Egyptian body politic has begun to intensify. Tahrir Square is again the huge podium from which arguments and counter arguments, as well as rocks, tear gas canisters, and more dangerous projectiles, are exchanged.
In response to those who say that Morsi abhors judicial independence, we find Morsi appointing a new Public Prosecutor, Talaat Ibrahim Abdullah, a former leader of the movement for judicial independence under Mubarak.
To those in Egypt who say that Morsi now represents a continuation of the 60 years of dictatorship under which Egypt has suffered, Morsi has addressed his nation on Nov. 23 saying "my actions are for the protection of that revolution."
As the counter-Morsi protesters burned down Muslim Brotherhood offices in Alexandria and elsewhere, in response to the frightening amassing of powers in the hands of one man, Morsi, he responds that he was "the President of all Egyptians."
The masses, while pleased with Morsi's plans to retry Mubarak and his cohorts (against the principles of "res judicata" -the thing has been decided), the opponents still scream that "Morsi wants to make of himself a God."
Al-Sharkawi of Cairo University, an advisor to Morsi says: "This is mainly a political conflict. Egypt needs to move forward. The life of that decree is from 2 to 4 months. Egypt cannot wait anymore. The judiciary did no reflect the will of the people."
For now, I tend to agree. But I was educated in Egypt until the age of 24. There I learnt from my Scottish professors at Zagazig High School in the Province of Sharkiah, a British adage: "Nothing is more permanent that the temporary."
Friday, November 23, 2012
Friday, November 16, 2012
From the Pharmacy to the Papacy: Pope Theodoros II of Alexandria
His sure medicine is a dose of love and an equal measure of unity. That is the prescription of His Holiness Pope Theodoros, the 118th Pope of the venerable Orthodox Church of Egypt. He comes to the headship of a very historic Church in the annals of Christendom the first church after Christ. Elevated to that exalted position by a unique election system which goes back 2000 years (a process of selection followed by drawing a lot among four clergymen), the new Pope inherits the mantle of the great Pope Shenouda III.
The date of his elevation to the Papacy was November 4, 2012, his 60th birthday. His Egypt has changed since the revolution of January 25, 2011. A historic change has come to his land, the land of the Copts (Egypt), and so his message is a mixture of love, the creed of that Church which boasts of having the hiding place of the Holy family in Old Cairo, and unity, which has become quite elusive in this age of rage.
Theodoros II has a 1975 baccalaureate in pharmacy from the University of Alexandria. This was followed, ten years later, by a World Health Fellowship from the UK. For His Holiness, it was an 1985 double graduation. In that year, he was also able to graduate from the Coptic Clerical College in Egypt. After a period of seclusion as a monk at the Anba Bishoy Convent in Wadi Al-Natroun in 1986 in the western desert, he was ordained a Coptic priest in 1989. Within 8 years thereafter, he became a Bishop.
This new spiritual leader, whose original name was Wagih Sobhi Baqi Soliman, had a father who was a land surveyor. The family kept on moving in Egypt from east (Mansourah), to south (Souhag), to west (Damanhour). It was as if fate was offering the future Pope a broad look at his beloved Egypt.
On this Pope's shoulders lie the new burdens of remelding the Coptic community into one community with their Muslim brethren. It is not by numbers or a ratio of one Copt to 10 Muslims, forming the demography of 90 millions, the largest Arab State. It is by the shared history which began in the 8th Century since the time of Amre lbn Elass led the Muslims westward from Palestine into the Nile Valley. The new arrivals were under strict instructions from Khaliph Omar who, from Medina in what is now Saudi Arabia, ordered them in no uncertain terms: "No forced conversion. And learn from your brothers, the Copts."
This eventuated into Egypt becoming a model for the Islamic Law persistent call for diversity and respect for the other. But the ill wind of extremism, which cloaked itself in an Islamic garb, began as of the Khomeni revolution in Iran to blow westward blanketing Egypt in its path. Those ominous developments ignored the great patriotic stance of the Coptic church in regard to Egypt's gradual liberation from Great Britain in 1919, 1936, 1946, and in 1954 when the British troops evacuated Egypt.
With incidents of conflict between the Copts and the Muslims multiplying in Egypt, the call of the new Pope for national unity acquires added significance. After all, his great predecessor, Pope Shenouda III, was described as "Egypt's safety valve." In the same vein, Pope Theodoros sees in Egypt's Coptic heritage an avenue for preserving, through his medicine of love, a great antidote to Egypt's inter-religious anxieties.
"The Egyptian Coptic Church, "the new Pope declared," is a model for all churches, and for the Egyptian Community, in regard to the separation between State and Church."
The date of his elevation to the Papacy was November 4, 2012, his 60th birthday. His Egypt has changed since the revolution of January 25, 2011. A historic change has come to his land, the land of the Copts (Egypt), and so his message is a mixture of love, the creed of that Church which boasts of having the hiding place of the Holy family in Old Cairo, and unity, which has become quite elusive in this age of rage.
Theodoros II has a 1975 baccalaureate in pharmacy from the University of Alexandria. This was followed, ten years later, by a World Health Fellowship from the UK. For His Holiness, it was an 1985 double graduation. In that year, he was also able to graduate from the Coptic Clerical College in Egypt. After a period of seclusion as a monk at the Anba Bishoy Convent in Wadi Al-Natroun in 1986 in the western desert, he was ordained a Coptic priest in 1989. Within 8 years thereafter, he became a Bishop.
This new spiritual leader, whose original name was Wagih Sobhi Baqi Soliman, had a father who was a land surveyor. The family kept on moving in Egypt from east (Mansourah), to south (Souhag), to west (Damanhour). It was as if fate was offering the future Pope a broad look at his beloved Egypt.
On this Pope's shoulders lie the new burdens of remelding the Coptic community into one community with their Muslim brethren. It is not by numbers or a ratio of one Copt to 10 Muslims, forming the demography of 90 millions, the largest Arab State. It is by the shared history which began in the 8th Century since the time of Amre lbn Elass led the Muslims westward from Palestine into the Nile Valley. The new arrivals were under strict instructions from Khaliph Omar who, from Medina in what is now Saudi Arabia, ordered them in no uncertain terms: "No forced conversion. And learn from your brothers, the Copts."
This eventuated into Egypt becoming a model for the Islamic Law persistent call for diversity and respect for the other. But the ill wind of extremism, which cloaked itself in an Islamic garb, began as of the Khomeni revolution in Iran to blow westward blanketing Egypt in its path. Those ominous developments ignored the great patriotic stance of the Coptic church in regard to Egypt's gradual liberation from Great Britain in 1919, 1936, 1946, and in 1954 when the British troops evacuated Egypt.
With incidents of conflict between the Copts and the Muslims multiplying in Egypt, the call of the new Pope for national unity acquires added significance. After all, his great predecessor, Pope Shenouda III, was described as "Egypt's safety valve." In the same vein, Pope Theodoros sees in Egypt's Coptic heritage an avenue for preserving, through his medicine of love, a great antidote to Egypt's inter-religious anxieties.
"The Egyptian Coptic Church, "the new Pope declared," is a model for all churches, and for the Egyptian Community, in regard to the separation between State and Church."
Friday, November 9, 2012
Obama's Four More Years: The New Egypt Reacts
They proudly call him "the black American President." They devote to his success miles and miles of print. They attend in droves the celebrations held at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. They openly show great relief for Romney's exist. Why?
Interest in America and its ways has never been more palpable. This phenomenon is fully shared by both the Islamists and the secularists. It is an interest which reflects general hope in a reinvigorated American involvement in the New Egypt, economically, educationally, technologically and in selected areas of foreign policy, especially in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. "Hope and Change," borrowed from Obama, has become an Egyptian mantra. Egyptian resentment toward America's support for Mubarak has practically dissipated.
Cairo's attitude toward Russia has sunk to a new low. The New Egypt feels abhorrence toward Moscow's support for the Assad regime in Syria. In this regard, Egypt, historically, has always looked west, not east. Contemporary Egypt was first developed by the French as of the early 19th century.
Egypt, taking a brief holiday from the woes of its transition from dictatorship to democracy, celebrated the onset of Obama's second term in adulatory terms. They highlighted Obama's call for healing the wounds of the bitter presidential campaign. "Tahrir" wishes that a similar reconciliation would be possible with the remnants of the Mubarak regime.
Cairo saw humility in Obama's declaration in his victory speech in Chicago that he had become "a better President." It wishes that its leaders would show the same strength of character. Though the challenges facing Washington, D.C. and Cairo may not be the same, but the Egyptians perceive in Obama's reference to "the challenges ahead" a reflection of what their new leaders keep on repeating.
Even Romney's speech conceding defeat and wishing Obama's success in the coming four years was a reminder to Egypt that it does not yet posses this tradition of congratulating your adversary.
There is also in Cairo that sense of quick pride in the enhanced importance of the minorities in America. The Egyptians also saw in the small margin of victory for Obama a reflection of what happened in the competition between Morsi and Shafik in June for the post of the presidency.
As to the expected "gridlock" in U.S. governance, well, that is nothing new to Cairo. This is although the Egyptian gridlock has different poles. In Cairo, it is between the judiciary and the other branches of government.
What did the New Egypt fear in Romney? First, they do not know Romney. Romney did not even define himself. Romney was defined by his adversaries. Second, they were hostile to his references to the rise of the Islamists to power as "chaos in the Middle East." The Egyptians also saw in Romney a man of war. In Obama, they saw a man of peace, especially as regards Iran.
It also greatly helps that Obama's middle name is "Hussein."
Interest in America and its ways has never been more palpable. This phenomenon is fully shared by both the Islamists and the secularists. It is an interest which reflects general hope in a reinvigorated American involvement in the New Egypt, economically, educationally, technologically and in selected areas of foreign policy, especially in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. "Hope and Change," borrowed from Obama, has become an Egyptian mantra. Egyptian resentment toward America's support for Mubarak has practically dissipated.
Cairo's attitude toward Russia has sunk to a new low. The New Egypt feels abhorrence toward Moscow's support for the Assad regime in Syria. In this regard, Egypt, historically, has always looked west, not east. Contemporary Egypt was first developed by the French as of the early 19th century.
Egypt, taking a brief holiday from the woes of its transition from dictatorship to democracy, celebrated the onset of Obama's second term in adulatory terms. They highlighted Obama's call for healing the wounds of the bitter presidential campaign. "Tahrir" wishes that a similar reconciliation would be possible with the remnants of the Mubarak regime.
Cairo saw humility in Obama's declaration in his victory speech in Chicago that he had become "a better President." It wishes that its leaders would show the same strength of character. Though the challenges facing Washington, D.C. and Cairo may not be the same, but the Egyptians perceive in Obama's reference to "the challenges ahead" a reflection of what their new leaders keep on repeating.
Even Romney's speech conceding defeat and wishing Obama's success in the coming four years was a reminder to Egypt that it does not yet posses this tradition of congratulating your adversary.
There is also in Cairo that sense of quick pride in the enhanced importance of the minorities in America. The Egyptians also saw in the small margin of victory for Obama a reflection of what happened in the competition between Morsi and Shafik in June for the post of the presidency.
As to the expected "gridlock" in U.S. governance, well, that is nothing new to Cairo. This is although the Egyptian gridlock has different poles. In Cairo, it is between the judiciary and the other branches of government.
What did the New Egypt fear in Romney? First, they do not know Romney. Romney did not even define himself. Romney was defined by his adversaries. Second, they were hostile to his references to the rise of the Islamists to power as "chaos in the Middle East." The Egyptians also saw in Romney a man of war. In Obama, they saw a man of peace, especially as regards Iran.
It also greatly helps that Obama's middle name is "Hussein."
Friday, October 26, 2012
The Difficult Birth of the Egyptian Constitution: Will a Caesarian Be Necessary?
The noise inside the meetings of the Constituent Assembly and outside goes on. It is truly a difficult birth for the new Constitution of post-dictatorship Egypt. It is a struggle for the soul of the January 25 Revolution. That soul is basically whether Egypt shall be secular, Islamist or a combination of both. I am betting on the third alternative. And nearly 90 million Egyptians are watching very closely. So is the rest of the Arab world and beyond.
What is the problem? Who are the actors? Which articles have emerged from the Assembly's Drafting Committee only to be opposed by the Governance Committee? And who will arbitrate between the factions and under what authority? Could the judiciary step in?
These questions would have never arisen if the popular parliamentary elections in which 70% of the huge electorate of 53 million did not produce an Islamist majority of 70%. But they did, and 70% of the parliamentary seats were gobbled up by the Islamist parties with 50% for the Muslim Brotherhood, and 20% for the Salafis.
The heart of the battle is Article 2 which is being copied from the old Constitution of 1971. It refers to "the principals" of Sharia being the principle source of legislation. The Islamists, especially the Salafis, are opposed, since the term "principles" is ill defined. Dr. Issam Dirbalah, the President of The Shura of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamia expressed on October 25 his opposition in these words: "It is obligatory to provide a clear definition of that term and then place it in a separate article."
Confronting that call of Dr. Dirbalah, the independent Cairo daily "Al-Sabah," delegitimated the entire Constituent Assembly. Its executive editor, Wael Lotfi said: "History shall remember that that Assembly has no legitimacy, either constitutionally, or politically, or morally...It consists of a small group of Muslim Brothers and their allies."
In response, the Editor-in-Chief of "Freedom and Justice," the mouthpiece of the Muslim Brotherhood party countered: "Our national duty enjoins us to urge our brothers who constitute the liberal and leftist currents to apologize to the Egyptian people for their attempts to impede the building of the State's institutions."
In spite of its centrality to the warring factions, Article 2 is not the only subject of contention. There are of course the articles dealing with the President's powers and prerogatives, the rights of minorities especially the Copts, gender equality, the independence of the judiciary and broad civic and individual rights. All these articles are now thrown for a historic public debate in the streets of the new Egypt, before the final text is brought before the entire electorate for approval in a referendum.
This is the first time ever in the very long history of Egypt to have the public at large debate its national charter, its Constitution. It is also the first time that one hundred and one civic society organizations call for the incorporation into the yet-to-be approved Constitution of an article dealing with the role of civil society in the drafting of the new Constitution. Athenian form of democracy being practiced in Egypt across the Mediterranean from Greece!!
But the secularists resorted to what amounts to an overreach. They instituted a case before the Administrative Law court challenging the legality of the institution and composition of the Constituent Assembly. The court issued a ruling referring the case to a higher court, the Supreme Constitutional Court. Well, this is the very court whose judges were hand-picked by Mubarak. But strange things happens in any revolution or transitional period in any State in post World War II.
The referral of that case to a higher court was seen by the Islamists as a victory - a victory through delay. The Assembly now could rush its work towards completion before the Supreme Constitutional Court would be ready to dispose of that historic case. This is although the Constituent Assembly is still grappling with the draft articles dealing with several important issues, such as Article 36 which guarantees gender equality. This formulation is inherited from the Sadat-era Constitution of 1971. Even the Salafis are content with that Constitutional inheritance because the article ends with words to the effect that equality should be observed in a way not contradicting to Islamic Law. The secularists want these words removed.
The issues do not just end there. There are supplementary articles dealing with the rights of women, the child and the family - the family being the core of society. Emphasis is made on mutual observance of the rights and obligations of a husband and a wife towards one another.
These are matters of crucial importance to the new Egypt and beyond. Problems surrounding that birth abound. Perhaps a Caeserian might be needed!! One thing is certain: In about two months from now, the Egyptians will see the birth of a new dawn through a new text of their new Constitution.
What is the problem? Who are the actors? Which articles have emerged from the Assembly's Drafting Committee only to be opposed by the Governance Committee? And who will arbitrate between the factions and under what authority? Could the judiciary step in?
These questions would have never arisen if the popular parliamentary elections in which 70% of the huge electorate of 53 million did not produce an Islamist majority of 70%. But they did, and 70% of the parliamentary seats were gobbled up by the Islamist parties with 50% for the Muslim Brotherhood, and 20% for the Salafis.
The heart of the battle is Article 2 which is being copied from the old Constitution of 1971. It refers to "the principals" of Sharia being the principle source of legislation. The Islamists, especially the Salafis, are opposed, since the term "principles" is ill defined. Dr. Issam Dirbalah, the President of The Shura of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamia expressed on October 25 his opposition in these words: "It is obligatory to provide a clear definition of that term and then place it in a separate article."
Confronting that call of Dr. Dirbalah, the independent Cairo daily "Al-Sabah," delegitimated the entire Constituent Assembly. Its executive editor, Wael Lotfi said: "History shall remember that that Assembly has no legitimacy, either constitutionally, or politically, or morally...It consists of a small group of Muslim Brothers and their allies."
In response, the Editor-in-Chief of "Freedom and Justice," the mouthpiece of the Muslim Brotherhood party countered: "Our national duty enjoins us to urge our brothers who constitute the liberal and leftist currents to apologize to the Egyptian people for their attempts to impede the building of the State's institutions."
In spite of its centrality to the warring factions, Article 2 is not the only subject of contention. There are of course the articles dealing with the President's powers and prerogatives, the rights of minorities especially the Copts, gender equality, the independence of the judiciary and broad civic and individual rights. All these articles are now thrown for a historic public debate in the streets of the new Egypt, before the final text is brought before the entire electorate for approval in a referendum.
This is the first time ever in the very long history of Egypt to have the public at large debate its national charter, its Constitution. It is also the first time that one hundred and one civic society organizations call for the incorporation into the yet-to-be approved Constitution of an article dealing with the role of civil society in the drafting of the new Constitution. Athenian form of democracy being practiced in Egypt across the Mediterranean from Greece!!
But the secularists resorted to what amounts to an overreach. They instituted a case before the Administrative Law court challenging the legality of the institution and composition of the Constituent Assembly. The court issued a ruling referring the case to a higher court, the Supreme Constitutional Court. Well, this is the very court whose judges were hand-picked by Mubarak. But strange things happens in any revolution or transitional period in any State in post World War II.
The referral of that case to a higher court was seen by the Islamists as a victory - a victory through delay. The Assembly now could rush its work towards completion before the Supreme Constitutional Court would be ready to dispose of that historic case. This is although the Constituent Assembly is still grappling with the draft articles dealing with several important issues, such as Article 36 which guarantees gender equality. This formulation is inherited from the Sadat-era Constitution of 1971. Even the Salafis are content with that Constitutional inheritance because the article ends with words to the effect that equality should be observed in a way not contradicting to Islamic Law. The secularists want these words removed.
The issues do not just end there. There are supplementary articles dealing with the rights of women, the child and the family - the family being the core of society. Emphasis is made on mutual observance of the rights and obligations of a husband and a wife towards one another.
These are matters of crucial importance to the new Egypt and beyond. Problems surrounding that birth abound. Perhaps a Caeserian might be needed!! One thing is certain: In about two months from now, the Egyptians will see the birth of a new dawn through a new text of their new Constitution.
Monday, October 22, 2012
Democracy and Faith: Not for Foreign Exportation, Dictation or Reinterpretation
Look it up in any dictionary!! I did, in English, French, Spanish and Arabic. No precise definition, except for the generic terms: "by the people." So please stay away from imposing any definition, except "by the people" on that term. Your yardstick should not be one measuring various shapes, forms and practices which, by historic necessity, change from one environment to another.
The Arab Spring is giving birth to democracies; that is to say again "government by the people" at various stages of maturation. Take Egypt, for example, demographically at least, the center of the Arab world. Democracy is moving by baby steps. Messy steps, yes. Backward to the old bad days of dictatorship, the phenomenon of absolute rule, no.
Therefore, if you believe that absolute rule is oppressive due to its suppression of human rights, as in the days of the Nasser/Sadat/Mubarak, whom would you prefer: Mubarak, the secularist dictator, or Morsi, the so-called Islamist, the democratically-elected President of Egypt? Before you answer this question, use your "rule by the people" yardstick.
If you throw "stability" in the mix, you, as some commentators are prone to do, might say: "Mubarak was an age of stability." Really? What kind of stability, and for whom, and through whom? If you mean by stability, tranquility and predictability, so is the nearest cemetery. The people of Egypt voted for Morsi.
They have never voted in a fair and open election, not run by "the Ruling Party" since 1950. After 62 years, they, through the chaos of Tahrir Square, toppled Mubarak, put him judicially in jail for his abuse of power and elected Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood. You may then argue that only 50% of the Egyptian electorate of 53 million men and women voted. And I would say: In any democratic practice, the result is decided by those who are "present and voting." There is no vote for the so-called silent 50%. They chose not to have a voice. And that was a run-off, preceded by 70% + participation which narrowed the field to two candidates: Shafik, the military man (a holdover from Mubarak days -rule by the Air Force pilots), and the Islamist, Morsi. Shafik lost; Morsi won.
Was that a victory for Islamism in Egypt? Yes it was. Is this good or bad? It was good for the principle of democracy. This is providing that: (a) secularity in Egypt is not smothered; (b) minority rights pertaining to the Copts, women, bedouins of Sinai, and Nubians of upper (southern) Egypt are respected; (c) all forms of freedoms of expression in dress, art, film, songs, dance and theater are protected; (d) international treaties are respected; (e) opposition parties, whose number exceed 30, exercise the freedom to organize and to voice their views of the conduct of their government (the heart of "by the people"); (f) rebuild the economy, through investment, indigenous and foreign, trade and tourism; (g) keep the Salafis away from trying to impose their nearly 1500 years of interpretation of Sharia, which has never stopped to evolve, towards accommodating "the public good" at any given time; (h) maintaining the principle of sovereignty by not being subservient to special interests, domestic or foreign; and last but not least (i) safeguarding the core of democratic rule through respecting the Constitution which is now being drafted by the Constituent Assembly, especially the peaceful rotation of power through the voice of the people, freely expressed in open and fair elections.
Have I exhausted all criteria? No. The list is open and can go on and on, without forgetting the principles of "judicial independence," of the dictum issued by Al-Azhar, namely that "Islam does not recognize a State based solely on religion." And this is where Sharia and the US Constitution converge (the First Amendment on the separation between State and religion). I had the opportunity of stating that convergence at a panel organized in New York City at the Waldorf Astoria hotel in 2006 by the American Bar Association which dealt with "Law and Religion."
The two values, the State, underpinned by democracy, and religion, are not mutually antagonistic. For each of them serves the people within its own domain. Mixing between the two is not only confusing. It is also combustible as it leads to a sinister form of racism, discrimination, hate, and unchannelled rage. Yet they both share one common characteristic: they issue from their own environment, and defy dictation and/or definition from the outside.
The Arab Spring is giving birth to democracies; that is to say again "government by the people" at various stages of maturation. Take Egypt, for example, demographically at least, the center of the Arab world. Democracy is moving by baby steps. Messy steps, yes. Backward to the old bad days of dictatorship, the phenomenon of absolute rule, no.
Therefore, if you believe that absolute rule is oppressive due to its suppression of human rights, as in the days of the Nasser/Sadat/Mubarak, whom would you prefer: Mubarak, the secularist dictator, or Morsi, the so-called Islamist, the democratically-elected President of Egypt? Before you answer this question, use your "rule by the people" yardstick.
If you throw "stability" in the mix, you, as some commentators are prone to do, might say: "Mubarak was an age of stability." Really? What kind of stability, and for whom, and through whom? If you mean by stability, tranquility and predictability, so is the nearest cemetery. The people of Egypt voted for Morsi.
They have never voted in a fair and open election, not run by "the Ruling Party" since 1950. After 62 years, they, through the chaos of Tahrir Square, toppled Mubarak, put him judicially in jail for his abuse of power and elected Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood. You may then argue that only 50% of the Egyptian electorate of 53 million men and women voted. And I would say: In any democratic practice, the result is decided by those who are "present and voting." There is no vote for the so-called silent 50%. They chose not to have a voice. And that was a run-off, preceded by 70% + participation which narrowed the field to two candidates: Shafik, the military man (a holdover from Mubarak days -rule by the Air Force pilots), and the Islamist, Morsi. Shafik lost; Morsi won.
Was that a victory for Islamism in Egypt? Yes it was. Is this good or bad? It was good for the principle of democracy. This is providing that: (a) secularity in Egypt is not smothered; (b) minority rights pertaining to the Copts, women, bedouins of Sinai, and Nubians of upper (southern) Egypt are respected; (c) all forms of freedoms of expression in dress, art, film, songs, dance and theater are protected; (d) international treaties are respected; (e) opposition parties, whose number exceed 30, exercise the freedom to organize and to voice their views of the conduct of their government (the heart of "by the people"); (f) rebuild the economy, through investment, indigenous and foreign, trade and tourism; (g) keep the Salafis away from trying to impose their nearly 1500 years of interpretation of Sharia, which has never stopped to evolve, towards accommodating "the public good" at any given time; (h) maintaining the principle of sovereignty by not being subservient to special interests, domestic or foreign; and last but not least (i) safeguarding the core of democratic rule through respecting the Constitution which is now being drafted by the Constituent Assembly, especially the peaceful rotation of power through the voice of the people, freely expressed in open and fair elections.
Have I exhausted all criteria? No. The list is open and can go on and on, without forgetting the principles of "judicial independence," of the dictum issued by Al-Azhar, namely that "Islam does not recognize a State based solely on religion." And this is where Sharia and the US Constitution converge (the First Amendment on the separation between State and religion). I had the opportunity of stating that convergence at a panel organized in New York City at the Waldorf Astoria hotel in 2006 by the American Bar Association which dealt with "Law and Religion."
The two values, the State, underpinned by democracy, and religion, are not mutually antagonistic. For each of them serves the people within its own domain. Mixing between the two is not only confusing. It is also combustible as it leads to a sinister form of racism, discrimination, hate, and unchannelled rage. Yet they both share one common characteristic: they issue from their own environment, and defy dictation and/or definition from the outside.
Friday, October 12, 2012
Mahmoud v. Morsi: "The Battle of the Camels"
Mahmoud (Egypt's Chief Prosecutor, Abdel-Meguid Mahmoud) and Morsi (Egypt's President Mohamed Morsi) are battling it out. Morsi has ordered Mahmoud out of his job and to the Vatican, as Egypt's Ambassador. Mahmoud is refusing on the grounds of judicial independence, and Morsi is sticking to his authority, as the democratically-elected President who has been on the job for a little more than 100 days.
Now Tahrir has again been engulfed in demonstrations, led by the two factions: pro-Morsi and anti-Morsi. In essence, the Mahmoud v. Morsi is the straw which broke the camel's (Morsi's) back. The Chief Prosecutor has just exonerated the symbols of the defunct Mubarak regime from any wrong-doing in early February 2011 in what has entered the annals of the Egyptian Revolution of January 25, 2011 as the "Battle of the Camels."
In that engagement, as the Mubarak regime was fighting for its life of 32 years of outright dictatorship, the Tahrir demonstrators were suddenly and brutally attacked by Mubarak thugs. The attackers descended upon the pro-democracy demonstrators, riding camels, horses, and horse-driven carts. The attackers brandished swords, knives, and long bamboo sticks in a hopeless last-minute gasp to enable Mubarak to hold on to his dictatorial power.
The Battle of the Camels of February 2011 was quickly and decisively settled in favor of the pro-democracy movement, though after suffering fatalities and injuries. There was no assistance from the security forces which have fled Tahrir. When I was in Cairo shortly afterwards, I was told by some eyewitnesses that the role of the Muslim Brothers in vanquishing the pro-Mubarak mounted attackers was crucial. They were experts in street combat, tightly organized, highly motivated, and fearless as they brought horses and camels down with their mercenary riders.
Confessions documented that "the Battle of the Camels" was ordered by the former Presidents of the two Chambers of the then-Parliament: Fathi Sorour, of the People's Assembly, and Safwat El-Sherif, of the upper Chamber, the Shura Council. Both men are now in the Tora jail, south of Cairo, having been inculpated on charges of corruption. Their alleged roles in "the Battle of the Camels" were still pending investigations on the more serious charges of killing and maiming peaceful demonstrators.
Out of a sudden, the Chief Prosecutor, Abdel-Meguid Mahmoud, declared those prominent figures innocent of wrong-doing in "the Battle of the Camels," a development which caused popular uproar and precipitated the attempted dismissal by President Morsi of the Chief Prosecutor.
While the highly secular Egyptian judiciary sided with Mahmoud, the President's supporters, especially the Islamists, saw in that verdict the continuing influence of the "foloul" -the remnants of the Mubarak regime who were already pre-maturely celebrating that verdict in the Tora prison.
In reality, Mahmoud v. Morsi, is a larger battle between the Islamists and most of the secularists. The majority of the occupants of the senior ranks of the judiciary and the Prosecutor's Office are holdovers from the Mubarak regime. Confronted by the Morsi presidential decision of terminating his high profile position, Mahmoud cited a law barring the President from firing him. To many Egyptian observers, the struggle which is now taking place between Mahmoud and the President is highly politicized. During the Mubarak era, the judiciary was Mubarak's cat's paw in subduing the Muslim Brotherhood from whose ranks Morsi has emerged to win the presidency of Egypt last June.
Dr. Essam Al-Erian, who heads the "Freedom and Justice" Party of the Muslim Brotherhood called Mahmoud's ruling "very dangerous." He also called upon Morsi to convene the Presidential Council (advisors to Morsi) to examine the political implications of declaring the wrong-doers innocent.
The Salafis also called on the President to order "the retrial of the killers of the demonstrators." They, together with the Muslim Brotherhood, are accusing the investigators of not examining the totality of the evidence.
In this campaign of attacking the Chief Prosecutor, they were joined by a large segment of the secularists, especially "The Popular Current." (P.C.) The P.C. claimed that not all evidence inculpating those who ordered the mounted attackers in "the Battle of the Camels" into battle was presented. They went as far as describing that episode as "a massacre." The P.C., together with "the Youth of April 6," called for parliamentary intervention to overturn Mahmoud's ruling.
More importantly, a prominent member of the Constituent Assembly which is still drafting the new Egyptian Constitution, Mahmoud El-Said, declared, "The blood of the martyrs shall not be spelled in vain." Contributing to this argument, the spokesman for "The General Union for the Revolution," Mustafa Younes El-Nagmi, called upon Morsi to prevent those accused of fomenting "the Battle of the Camels," from leaving Egypt pending a retrial.
In the meantime, Tahrir is witnessing clashes between the pre-Morsi and the anti-Morsi forces (the latter campaigning against the rise of Islamism in Egypt). The sad result so far has been nearly a 100 demonstrators being injured.
The saga of "The Battle of the Camels" of February 2 and 3, 2011 is not over yet. The mass exoneration of 24 suspects accused of committing those atrocities is indeed the straw which broke the camel's back. Even the Director General of the Presidential Office, Ahmed Abdel-Atti, confessed that "the general situation in Egypt is perplexing and is difficult to separate its intertwined components one from another."
Now Tahrir has again been engulfed in demonstrations, led by the two factions: pro-Morsi and anti-Morsi. In essence, the Mahmoud v. Morsi is the straw which broke the camel's (Morsi's) back. The Chief Prosecutor has just exonerated the symbols of the defunct Mubarak regime from any wrong-doing in early February 2011 in what has entered the annals of the Egyptian Revolution of January 25, 2011 as the "Battle of the Camels."
In that engagement, as the Mubarak regime was fighting for its life of 32 years of outright dictatorship, the Tahrir demonstrators were suddenly and brutally attacked by Mubarak thugs. The attackers descended upon the pro-democracy demonstrators, riding camels, horses, and horse-driven carts. The attackers brandished swords, knives, and long bamboo sticks in a hopeless last-minute gasp to enable Mubarak to hold on to his dictatorial power.
The Battle of the Camels of February 2011 was quickly and decisively settled in favor of the pro-democracy movement, though after suffering fatalities and injuries. There was no assistance from the security forces which have fled Tahrir. When I was in Cairo shortly afterwards, I was told by some eyewitnesses that the role of the Muslim Brothers in vanquishing the pro-Mubarak mounted attackers was crucial. They were experts in street combat, tightly organized, highly motivated, and fearless as they brought horses and camels down with their mercenary riders.
Confessions documented that "the Battle of the Camels" was ordered by the former Presidents of the two Chambers of the then-Parliament: Fathi Sorour, of the People's Assembly, and Safwat El-Sherif, of the upper Chamber, the Shura Council. Both men are now in the Tora jail, south of Cairo, having been inculpated on charges of corruption. Their alleged roles in "the Battle of the Camels" were still pending investigations on the more serious charges of killing and maiming peaceful demonstrators.
Out of a sudden, the Chief Prosecutor, Abdel-Meguid Mahmoud, declared those prominent figures innocent of wrong-doing in "the Battle of the Camels," a development which caused popular uproar and precipitated the attempted dismissal by President Morsi of the Chief Prosecutor.
While the highly secular Egyptian judiciary sided with Mahmoud, the President's supporters, especially the Islamists, saw in that verdict the continuing influence of the "foloul" -the remnants of the Mubarak regime who were already pre-maturely celebrating that verdict in the Tora prison.
In reality, Mahmoud v. Morsi, is a larger battle between the Islamists and most of the secularists. The majority of the occupants of the senior ranks of the judiciary and the Prosecutor's Office are holdovers from the Mubarak regime. Confronted by the Morsi presidential decision of terminating his high profile position, Mahmoud cited a law barring the President from firing him. To many Egyptian observers, the struggle which is now taking place between Mahmoud and the President is highly politicized. During the Mubarak era, the judiciary was Mubarak's cat's paw in subduing the Muslim Brotherhood from whose ranks Morsi has emerged to win the presidency of Egypt last June.
Dr. Essam Al-Erian, who heads the "Freedom and Justice" Party of the Muslim Brotherhood called Mahmoud's ruling "very dangerous." He also called upon Morsi to convene the Presidential Council (advisors to Morsi) to examine the political implications of declaring the wrong-doers innocent.
The Salafis also called on the President to order "the retrial of the killers of the demonstrators." They, together with the Muslim Brotherhood, are accusing the investigators of not examining the totality of the evidence.
In this campaign of attacking the Chief Prosecutor, they were joined by a large segment of the secularists, especially "The Popular Current." (P.C.) The P.C. claimed that not all evidence inculpating those who ordered the mounted attackers in "the Battle of the Camels" into battle was presented. They went as far as describing that episode as "a massacre." The P.C., together with "the Youth of April 6," called for parliamentary intervention to overturn Mahmoud's ruling.
More importantly, a prominent member of the Constituent Assembly which is still drafting the new Egyptian Constitution, Mahmoud El-Said, declared, "The blood of the martyrs shall not be spelled in vain." Contributing to this argument, the spokesman for "The General Union for the Revolution," Mustafa Younes El-Nagmi, called upon Morsi to prevent those accused of fomenting "the Battle of the Camels," from leaving Egypt pending a retrial.
In the meantime, Tahrir is witnessing clashes between the pre-Morsi and the anti-Morsi forces (the latter campaigning against the rise of Islamism in Egypt). The sad result so far has been nearly a 100 demonstrators being injured.
The saga of "The Battle of the Camels" of February 2 and 3, 2011 is not over yet. The mass exoneration of 24 suspects accused of committing those atrocities is indeed the straw which broke the camel's back. Even the Director General of the Presidential Office, Ahmed Abdel-Atti, confessed that "the general situation in Egypt is perplexing and is difficult to separate its intertwined components one from another."
Friday, October 5, 2012
The New Egypt "Oktoberfest": A Parade of Ills and Attempted Solutions
There is hardly an easy transition from dictatorship to the magical world of democracy. After the "Silence of the Lambs," for sixty years, the lid is off that boiling pot of discontent. So if you wish to observe a unique Oktoberfest, we suggest that you don't go to Munich. Your destination, we propose, should be Cairo. There you will find a nation of 90 million being reborn, with all the attendant noises of a difficult birth.
The parade which you shall witness is that of ills and attempted solutions.
First you shall observe a bunch of drummers obstructing major railway junctions demanding higher pay. Under Mubarak, security forces, backed up by a mighty military, would have been on the scene, breaking those demonstrations up, notwithstanding the number of human casualties. But in the New Egypt, democracy calls first for negotiations which may or may not be backed up by a measured level of force. The historic love for Mother Egypt - "Mother of the World" - would be invoked, and the drums, drummers, and throngs of discontented workers would eventually go home.
Next you shall hear armored personnel vehicles rumbling towards Northern Sinai in pursuit of bedouin marauders who, under Mubarak, have been marginalized. The result of 30 years of neglect is that plundering and attacks on army posts and natural gas pipelines have become a way of life. These events do not permit of negotiations, as security in Sinai is not only an internal issue; it is also a transborder headache. Thus force is applauded, including capital punishment for the loss of innocent lives. However, force only without more cannot solve an endemic problem stretched over a vast frontier. So at the end of the columns of military might, comes in the parade a big sign raised by the first Sinai dweller to be appointed Deputy-Governor for North Sinai. His name is Dr. Adel Qatamesh, who declares:
"We hope to restore Sinai to its natural place in Egypt's priorities. We shall develop its huge natural resources in accordance with well developed plans. Sinai possesses huge potentialities which have been neglected for far too long. We intend to recreate in Sinai an engine for economic development for all of Egypt. Unlimited jobs will be created."
Our parade of ills proceeds along a twisting road of hopes, struggles, expectations, and a big dose of hyperbole. This time, the parade's segment is made of representatives of more than 25 liberal and secular parties. They have been largely squeezed out of central stage by the unique device of fair elections. The Islamists, both the moderate Muslim Brotherhood, and the ultras, called the Salafis, registered majoritarian gains in Parliament. This sector of the parade is fronted by "the April 6 Movement," "the Free Egyptians," "the Popular Current," and "the Constitution Party." What do they want? Political Diversity!! What do they mean by that? The creation of an accountability lobby to keep the Islamists under secular scrutiny.
Now, with the sun setting down over the Great Pyramids of Giza west of Cairo, our parade of ills and proposed solutions accelerates its pace.
National reconciliation including President Morsi honoring the late President Sadat posthumously. It was under the military regimes of sixty years, including the Sadat era, that the Muslim Brotherhood of which President Morsi was a presidential candidate, suffered the unmitigated pain of suppression. The Mandela pattern of national reconciliation seems to accord more with the spirit of historic Egypt.
The parade which you shall witness is that of ills and attempted solutions.
First you shall observe a bunch of drummers obstructing major railway junctions demanding higher pay. Under Mubarak, security forces, backed up by a mighty military, would have been on the scene, breaking those demonstrations up, notwithstanding the number of human casualties. But in the New Egypt, democracy calls first for negotiations which may or may not be backed up by a measured level of force. The historic love for Mother Egypt - "Mother of the World" - would be invoked, and the drums, drummers, and throngs of discontented workers would eventually go home.
Next you shall hear armored personnel vehicles rumbling towards Northern Sinai in pursuit of bedouin marauders who, under Mubarak, have been marginalized. The result of 30 years of neglect is that plundering and attacks on army posts and natural gas pipelines have become a way of life. These events do not permit of negotiations, as security in Sinai is not only an internal issue; it is also a transborder headache. Thus force is applauded, including capital punishment for the loss of innocent lives. However, force only without more cannot solve an endemic problem stretched over a vast frontier. So at the end of the columns of military might, comes in the parade a big sign raised by the first Sinai dweller to be appointed Deputy-Governor for North Sinai. His name is Dr. Adel Qatamesh, who declares:
"We hope to restore Sinai to its natural place in Egypt's priorities. We shall develop its huge natural resources in accordance with well developed plans. Sinai possesses huge potentialities which have been neglected for far too long. We intend to recreate in Sinai an engine for economic development for all of Egypt. Unlimited jobs will be created."
Our parade of ills proceeds along a twisting road of hopes, struggles, expectations, and a big dose of hyperbole. This time, the parade's segment is made of representatives of more than 25 liberal and secular parties. They have been largely squeezed out of central stage by the unique device of fair elections. The Islamists, both the moderate Muslim Brotherhood, and the ultras, called the Salafis, registered majoritarian gains in Parliament. This sector of the parade is fronted by "the April 6 Movement," "the Free Egyptians," "the Popular Current," and "the Constitution Party." What do they want? Political Diversity!! What do they mean by that? The creation of an accountability lobby to keep the Islamists under secular scrutiny.
Now, with the sun setting down over the Great Pyramids of Giza west of Cairo, our parade of ills and proposed solutions accelerates its pace.
- The Constituent Assembly which is still in the midst of drafting a new Constitution is under continuous criticism. The screams mix and mingle around some of the new articles dealing with: Sharia being "a primary" (not the primary) source of legislation; Al-Azhar's restoration to its traditional independence as the main source of interpretation of questions of Islamic faith; the renaming of the upper house of Parliament "the Senate," to replace "The Shura Council" (a nod toward secularity); and the judicial mechanism for suing the State (i.e. appealing Government executive decisions).
- The journalists want to draft a code of ethics to be administered by a National Information Authority.
- The Labor Unions gushing forth with several grievances, including the quickening pace of privatization of inherited public sector establishments.
- Then comes thousands of children seeking proper school buildings for their proper education, instead of tents set up in certain localities because of lack of funds.
National reconciliation including President Morsi honoring the late President Sadat posthumously. It was under the military regimes of sixty years, including the Sadat era, that the Muslim Brotherhood of which President Morsi was a presidential candidate, suffered the unmitigated pain of suppression. The Mandela pattern of national reconciliation seems to accord more with the spirit of historic Egypt.
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