The Dangerous Sport of Pre-Judging an El-Sisi Presidency

Thomas Friedman, in an article in the New York Times of March 2, 2014 says "Putin and El-Sisi both rose to power on that longing for stability after so much revolutionary ferment."  I could not see the face of a factual comparison between the two personalities, except for Friedman's anticipation of rulership with a strong hand by El-Sisi in Egypt.

Pre-judging of events in an Egypt presided over by El-Sisi is a dangerous sport.  In effect it harbors triple anticipations: that El-Sisi shall be a presidential candidate; that he will win; and that he shall rule democratically.  To my mind, this is a reflection of either panic or deception.  It could be both even if we overlook the awkwardness of a journalist whistling in the wind like Mr. Friedman.

I do not expect media presentations to be akin to a classroom lecture.  The reason is that in a classroom, a well trained instructor is supposed to train his or her charges not in what to think, but in how to think.  A classroom should not be a pulpit for the propagation of the private thoughts and convictions of the professor.  I personally have not tried it even once since I began my teaching career in Cairo in 1948.  Not even when I taught a graduate course on the Arab/Israeli question, from 1966 to 1972 at St. John's University, New York City, then from 1972 to 1997 at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.

It is of course naive to expect media opinion-makers to sanitize their material from their preconceived ideas.  But at least in the case of a Mr. Friedman, the distinguished author of Beirut to Jerusalem, one expects a measure of healthy detachment.  Even at the pragmatic level, his abhorrence of a predictable El-Sisi presiding in Egypt shall not change the situation on the ground.  It is nothing more than a ventilation of personal preferences.

The naysayers say that the Revolution of June 30, 2014 resulting in the ouster of Morsi was a coup.  We say it was a revolution ignited by 35 millions citizens against the Brotherhoodization of Egypt.  The naysayers say that Field Marshal Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi ended the Islamic rule of one year using military muscle.  We say the armed forces led by El-Sisi acted on the basis of the popular will in the absence of any other institutional mechanism to have Morsi recalled.  The naysayers say that Islamic rule from June 30, 2012 to July 3, 2013 came through the ballot box.  We say that this a half truth as the ballot box produced a Brotherhood iron-fisted rule which threatened to tear Egypt apart.

The primary issue here is what shape and content would the Egyptian revolutions of 2011 and 2013 produce?  The majority of Egyptians as attested to by the millions in the street respond: "A secular not a religious State."  This has been the rock bottom position adopted by the January 25, 2011 Revolution in which the Muslim Brotherhood participated, though belatedly.  From January 25, 2011 to the presidential elections of June 2012, Egypt reflected inclusiveness of all currents of opinion, and covered both Muslims and Christmas.  So it was no wonder that Al-Azhar reflected that broad national consensus which carried the stamp of approval of the great Coptic Church and community, in its Declaration of August 19, 2011.

The first of those 11 principles of that Declaration entitled "Al-Azhar Document on Egypt's Future," provided as follows:

"Egypt as a State is based upon a constitutional democracy with separation of powers, of which the legislative power is to be exercised by the people's representatives.  Islam, in its legislation, civilization, and history does not recognize a "religiously-based" State.  The overall arching principle of Islam (Sharia) are the primary source of legislation, providing that the adherents of other religions are guaranteed, in their personal status cases, resort to their own religious laws."

The reaction to that declaration on the part of the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which ruled the country prior to the election of Morsi to the presidency in June 2012, was confirmatory.  SCAF's Deputy Chairman, General Sami Anan who was Egypt's point man in US-Egyptian military relationship stated: "The secularity of the State is a matter of national security which is non-negotiable."  The nexus placed by Egypt's military between secularity and security could not be more organically emphasized.

With the rise of terrorism within Egyptian borders, security has become the number one issue.  It has become the national portal to secularity.  And the more police and army officers and innocent civilians including tourists are killed or injured by the acts of the so-called jihadis, the more attachment to the army and security forces is manifested by the public.  Thus the new Prime Minister, Ibrahim Mihleb, at his first press conference held on February 25 summed up his cabinet's priorities in these few words: "Restoration of security and defeat of terrorism."

In a phone conversation I had earlier today with one of my nieces who resides in Cairo, I asked her about her expectations for the forthcoming presidential elections to be held later this Spring.  I asked her: "For whom would you vote?"  Her immediate and non-varnished response was: "For El-Sisi, if he runs."  My follow-up question was: "Why?"  Her long response included the following: "Where in Egypt of today do we find the most stable, the most inclusive, the most nationalistic, and the most cohesive institution outside of our armed forces?!"

Theoreticians like Tom Friedman and Fareed Zakaria can keep on attempting to create the myth of an Egyptian Revolution hijacked by the military.  It is the Egyptian Revolution which is being hoisted aloft by the military, regardless of whether or not El-Sisi becomes the next president of Egypt.  Such voices are reading Tahrir from the narrow windows of faulty measurements applied from a distance of 7000 miles.  This is the distance between the Nile river to the east, and the Hudson river to the west.