Raining on Egypt's Parade

It poured on Egypt's parade of October 6 from two cloud outbursts: One internal, that of the Muslim Brotherhood; the other external, the U.S. withholding "some" military aid to Egypt.  In the deepest psyche of Egypt, October 6, since 1973, is celebrated as "The Crossing Over Day."  Under President Sadat, the armed forces crossed the Suez Canal to liberate Sinai from Israeli occupation.  It was a 17-day war intended to undo the humiliation of the massive defeat of the 6-day war of June 1967.

A careful study of the October war (called also the Yom Kippur War by the Israelis, and the Ramadan War by most of the Arabs) reveals interesting insights into Egypt's mind.  These trends are non-changeable: the sanctity, to the average Egyptian, of Egyptian soil; the centrality of respect of the Egyptian armed forces; the ability of Egypt to disengage from regional attachment to the concept of "One Arab Nation" if the land of the Nile becomes its victim; and the role of transformative leadership in marshalling those trends.

The backdrop of October 6 is the failure of Arab Baathist ideology, espoused by the Nasser regime from 1952 to 1967.  That is the corrupt ideology of Egyptian intervention in the affairs of other Arab States.  Its primary purpose was elevating Nasserism to the level of Egyptian hegemony.  Cairo's interventionism proved too costly, caused Egyptian economic and social decline, and contributed to the suffocation of an earlier Egyptian democracy at the altar of what?  The altar of nothing.

The Sadat leadership, without disavowing Nasserism, undid that losing streak.  It used the limited war of October 6 to liberate Sinai; it reminded Egypt of its solid roots in cosmopolitan Egyptianism; it freed the economy from the shackles of the negativism of the Khartoum Summit of 1967 towards peace in the Middle East; it normalized relations with the great Arab East based on the Gulf States; and it signaled to the west that friendship with the US does not mean acceptance of a Washington dictat.

For all of these historic achievements, representing a historic bivoting from ideology to practicality, Sadat was assassinated on October 6, 1981 by the Islamists.  As he stood at the review stand on that fateful day to concretize the meaning of "The Crossing Over Day," he was gunned down as his terrorist assassins yelled at him "You are a dog."

There is an Arab proverb that says "Tonight Reminds of Last Night."  Its western equivalent is: "The More Things Change, The More They Stay The Same."  

The similarity between October 6, 1981 and October 6, 2013, is unmistakable.  The Islamists of 2013, following the ouster of Morsi of the Brotherhood are on a rampage.  Their target is Egyptian secularism and inclusiveness.

On Egypt's parade, the Muslim Brotherhood rained RPGs, and other instruments of stealth killing.  From Sinai to Suez; from Cairo to Alexandria; from southern Egypt to the Delta.  They also exposed their adherents to assured destruction, called by them "martyrdom."  They used October 6 as a day of saluting, not Egypt's armed forces, but their incarcerated ousted President.  To them, Egypt's armed forces, under the flag of Egypt, have become a hated militia.

To where will that rebellion lead?  Not to the reinstatement of Morsi who shall be tried before the Egyptian judiciary next month.  Not to the harassment of all those who do not adhere to their pan-Islamist ideology.  Not to the maniacal restrictions imposed on foreign tourists, whether in dress or in food and drink.  Not to the concept of a society which looks upon non-Muslims as infidels.

On Egypt's parade, also rained the withholding by the US of certain sectors of the US aid to Egypt.  A puzzling interruption of observing the customary practices between allies.  That suspension does not constitute "a recalibration of Egyptian-US relationship."  Let us call acts such as these by their proper names.  This is a most unfortunate reversal.  This action promises to be neither "modest nor temporary."

It shall not lead to an enhancement of the democratization of the Egyptian system.  Democracy is not exportable, and sovereignty is not for sale.  I reckon that at no time would that act of intervention in Egypt's internal affairs will bear but a poisonous fruit for the Cairo-Washington amity.  Its thrust might be weakening of the structure of peace in the new Middle East.

Yet, after all it might accelerate the pace of Egyptian self-reliance.  In the early 1980's, I interviewed Frank Wisner, the then US Ambassador to Egypt.  I asked him "What does he think of the American aid to Egypt?"  His response was, "Egypt does not need aid.  It needs trade."  Well said, Mr. Ambassador.  The Egyptian masses are with you.  They are wary of a relationship which fluctuates between hot and cold.  Hot for Mubarak's dictatorship; cold for Egypt's parade moving, in spite of the Muslim Brotherhood toward a democracy born from its authentic streetocracy.