The Second Egyptian Revolution of June 30, 2013 Has Waved a Final Goodbye to Exclusive Islamic Rule

Egypt has a durable face, and a changing face.  Its durability, expressed in stone, can be seen in the pyramids and the sphinx.  The same face is manifested institutionally in the armed forces, Al-Azhar, and the Coptic church.  The Egyptian changeable face could also be seen in its secular forces and its Islamist forces.

In this blog, I shall focus on one of the durables in Egyptian life, namely the armed forces.  This is in view of General El-Sisi's marshaling the power of the masses in his call made in July 24, 2013.  It was a call intended to put the Muslim Brotherhood on notice that the removal of Morsi shall not be reversed, and that the continuation of violence shall be met by force by both the army and the police.  In such a confrontation, the army undoubtedly has the upper hand.

Is this situation democratic, undemocratic, anti-democratic, liberal, illliberal street rule, mob democracy?  Here descriptions do not much matter.  The Egyptian revolution has not matured yet; the transitional government of July 16 is still feeling its way; the Brotherhood and their opponents have shed lots of blood (more than 200 dead); and the terms Selmia (peaceful) and Islamiah (Islamic) are now seen as definite opposites.

The heart of the matter is that the only institution which can save Egypt from civil war or even worse, disintegration, is the armed forces.  Since time immemorial, they have been an integral part of Egypt's political life.  Some Egyptian experts date that symbiosis to 3000 years B.C.

A good source on this is the book by Ahmed Abdulla, entitled "The Army and Democracy in Egypt" (1990, in Arabic).  That source is largely built on an earlier source by Anwar Abdel-Malek "The Army and the National Movement" (1974, in Arabic).

In my capacity as a guest lecturer at the Nasser Military Academy in 1974, following the October war of 1973 between Egypt/Syria and Israel, I made a discovery.  My host, the late field marshal Ahmed Ismail has allowed me to keep the texts of the 73 questions addressed to me by the top leadership of Egypt's armed forces.  The questions revealed an Egyptian military which was focused on the future of Egyptian politics.  Reflections of this could be found in the book by the very first Egyptian president, following the collapse of the monarchy in 1952.  That was the late General Muhammad Naguib in his book entitled "Egypt's Destiny."

Therefore it came as no surprise to those who follow this subject closely that the Egyptian Constitution of December 2012 assigns the military a special status.  Its task is "ensuring the safety and security of the country," and "shall be consulted about draft laws related to them" (Article 197).  The Constituent Assembly, dominated by the Islamists, signed on this.

In his call for public demonstrations issued on July 24, General El-Sisi reminded the nation, including the Brotherhood, that three reports had been submitted by the military to the then President Morsi.

• warning against the descent of Egypt into chaos resulting from the President's refusal to compromise with his secular opponents;
• expressing alarm at the Islamisation of the State through the merging of religion and the concept of the homeland; and 
• the rejection by the majority of the public of the Morsi mode of governance whereby that rejection was translated by the Morsi regime as a rejection of Islam itself.

In his call to the Egyptian street of July 24, El-Sisi made it clear that it became clear that "the conflict within Egypt was morphing into a religious conflict."

With the war in Sinai against Gazans, Bedouins, Syrians and Hezbollah infiltrators, the armed forces faced a military confrontation to the east, and a security confrontation with the pro-Morsi forces in Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban centers in the heart of the most populous country in the Arab world.  The Brotherhood seemed to be spoiling for a confrontation with the national army and the police using the fig leaf of the so-called "Shariyah" (legitimacy).

The Brotherhood most serious misfortune, marking the end of its peaceful co-existence with the armed forces, happened on August 5, 2012.  In Rafah, northeast of Sinai, a massacre perpetrated on the Egyptian army took place.  As troops sat to break their Ramadan fast, they were set upon by a group of terrorists who killed 16 soldiers in cold blood, and wounded 9 others.  The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), led by Field Marshal Tantawi, the de facto ruler of Egypt prior to the election of Morsi, issued the following pledge: "So God be our witness, we shall avenge our martyrs."

All of Egypt went into national mourning; Morsi's reaction was tepid; the results of the investigation ordered by Morsi produced no results; and the finger of accusation by the armed forces pointed to terrorists and so-called jihadi groups in Sinai who may or may not have affiliation with Al-Qaeda, with some criminal Bedouin support.

Sinai became the real battleground between a secularist Egypt supported by its cohesive national army, and the Morsi regime which acted exclusively on the premise that winning the presidency by 50.50% of only 22% of Egyptian voters in June 2012 was a license for Islamization en masse.  That was not Morsi's contract with Egypt.

Morsi interpreted the results of the ballot box of June 2012 as if they were a mandate for politically-cleansing Egypt from the latent anti-Brotherhood opposition.  His targets were the judiciary, the liberal media, the House of Fatwas (religious interpretation through non-enforceable guidelines), the independence of Al-Azhar.  Also among Morsi's targets was  SCAF which, through its support of the January 25 Revolution, had pushed Mubarak out of power, and helped the electorate reach the ballot box.

Sieges by the Islamists of iconic Egyptian institutions such as the headquarters of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the sites of the Egyptian TV and Artistic Production, and the Ministry of Interior whose police forces refused to battle demonstrators constituted an expanding Islamic coup against the soul of secular Egypt.

In the midst of this chaos, Morsi ill-advisedly thought that he possessed some silver bullets.  He abruptly sacked the transitional leadership of SCAF (Field Marshal Tantawi and General Anan); ordered the reconvening of a dissolved House of Representatives; and had that rump session of ex-parliamentarians of whom 70% were either Brothers or Salafis resolve in 20 minutes that legislative powers be transferred to him pending the adoption of a new Constitution.  To the rank and file of the Egyptian masses, Morsi and Ramses II began to look the same.  But Ramses II had kept Egypt united; Morsi was fracturing the land of the Nile.

Former professor Morsi then issued a constitutional declaration in November 2012 declaring in effect that he was above the law -his decisions were not subject to judicial review.  That declaration produced a fire storm, as the populace saw in Morsi, especially on the eve of the hasty adoption of the Constitution of December 2012, another Mubarak.  Although that ominous declaration was quickly withdrawn, but the specter of Brotherhoodization of Egypt especially at the provincial level, assumed alarming proportions in the public mind.

The president of the Judges' Club, Counsellor El-Zind declared on April 21 that he might sue Morsi through the International Criminal Court, though legally he had no standing.  It was a sign of desperation.  Out of 27 Egyptian provinces (governerates), 13 had new governors who were members of the Brotherhood.

Analyzing the issue of legitimacy, in the context of the Second Revolution of June 30, 2013, both law and politics lead to the following conclusions:

• In June 2012, Morsi was handed an Egypt of diversity, secularism, and protection of minorities both Copts and Shiis; Islamic moderation proclaimed by Al-Azhar; gender equality under the law; a fairly independent judiciary; and an army with an autonomous status whose task has always been border security, and the safeguarding, together with the police, of internal peace.  That was the deal, the contract, the trust and the obligation.
• Regardless what the outside world may characterize the sacking of Morsi on July 3 by the armed forces, in response to the appeals of 23 million Egyptians on June 30 for the intervention by the army, "the guardian of the nation," ex-President Morsi had forged ahead through his base in the Brotherhood, to nullify his contract with his nation.  
• Through his lack of governing experience, and his reliance on the narrow base of the Muslim Brotherhood and its party (Freedom and Justice), the broad sectors of revolutionary Egypt found their First Revolution of January 25, which, in Tahrir, had raised no Islamist flags, being swallowed by the new regime.
• The Brotherhood's continuous waving of the flag of "Shariyah" (legitimacy) which calls for Morsi's reinstatement, shall only lead to more bloodshed.  Their man has breached his contract in both letter and spirit.  The El-Sisi call on the Egyptian Street to rise up again on Friday, July 26, 2013 had resonance with the transitional justice period of Egypt.  Thirty five millions answered that call.
• In his capacity as Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister and in the absence of a functioning homeland both economically and politically, El-Sisi has summed up the country's status: "The State's national security is facing severe dangers."
• With a war going on in Sinai against terrorism, the army of Egypt is broadcasting the only credible message of the Second Revolution: "We shall strike with all our might at terrorism in Sinai and anywhere in Egypt."  The Brotherhood is now being labelled by the armed forces as an ally of terrorism, at least in Sinai, which is witnessing a low grade civil war with the Bedouins, and an external war with alleged Hamas operatives.
• As of Friday, July 26, the lines of battle with the Muslim Brotherhood have been sharply drawn.  And the judiciary has also swung into action.  The public Prosecutor has issued an order of 15-day detention against former President Morsi on account of high treason.  The charges are expounded below.

With a war raging in Sinai against terrorism, Egypt's armed forces are signalling their unwavering commitment to stamp out terrorism anywhere in Egypt.  The term "terrorism" now includes the Muslim Brotherhood.  Calls by the Brotherhood's spokesmen and other outlets for defections from these armed forces have put the Brotherhood in the defendant's box.  The attacks in Sinai against the army and the police have put them in the cross hairs of that mighty adversary.  Witness the declaration by Al-Beltagi, a Brotherhood leader, to the effect that the Sinai attacks shall not cease until Morsi is reinstalled.

With the battle lines between the armed forces and the Brotherhood so sharply drawn, the whole notion of a compromise has evaporated.  Signaling a no return, an armed forces ultimatum was issued to the pro-Morsi forces: end your disruptive demonstrations by July 27 or else.

On the civilian side of the crackdown, the Public Prosecutor remanded Morsi to a 15-day detention period.  Charges have been filed and investigations begun in alleged criminal activities including his jail break from Wadi El-Natroun prison assisted by Hamas operatives, murderous attacks against security forces, and espionage for Hamas (a foreign power).  The entire Islamist rule is now on trial.

The Brotherhood's response not only led to more bloodshed; it confirmed both the fact and perception of the danger to historic Egypt of an exclusive Islamist governance.  Such confirmation came in the form of elevating Morsi by the Brotherhood to divinity.  The Brotherhood's Supreme Guide called the unseating of Morsi: "worse than the dismantlement of the Kaaba (in Mecca where Muslims everywhere turn to prayer) stone by stone."  Morsi's supporters chanted "For Islam, we are ready to shed our blood."  And at Cairo University, bearded Muslim clerics urged their Muslim supporters to stand firm for "an Islamic State," and against "a secular State."

The counter response from 35 million Egyptians who thronged Squares all over Egypt honoring the call of El-Sisi for a mandate from the Egyptian street for the suppression of terrorism signaled where Egypt stood.  Those multitudes raised, not the black flags of Islamic governance, but the national flag of Egypt -the secular State.  With humor being a part of Egypt's DNA, the chants arose equating the Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan) with sheep (Al-Kherfan).  The Islamists appeals for outside intervention were regarded as high treason.

Regardless of the bloodshed which has unfortunately took place since June 30, the criticisms made abroad of the Egyptian military ascendancy, a pivotal point of no return has been reached in Egypt.  Islamic rule in Egypt has been discredited and those who are still visualising its possible comeback are seeing a mirage.

The Second Egyptian Revolution, which began with Tammarrod in April 2013 and culminated in both the ouster of Morsi and the massive response of Tahrir to El-Sisi call for a mandate "to end terrorism," has also tarnished beyond repair the Brotherhood affiliates in Tunisia, Libya, Syria, the Gulf and beyond.

The reader may be in search of a descriptive label for the June 30 Revolution.  Labels are misleading because they gravitate towards a simplistically-conventional description.  But I owe it to the reader to dig into my multiple backgrounds in education/history/political science/law to find a label.  Let us try this one: "A Revolt by the Masses Against a Coup."  Translation:  The coup was perpetrated by the Islamists against the January 25 Revolution whose premise was secularism.

Secular Egypt is striking back.  It is delivering a body blow to extremism in Islam and giving prominence to the Al-Azhar principle:  "Islam does not recognize a State based solely on religion."  This is huge!!