A Possible Mutiny on the Nile

Is a mutiny against President Morsi possible?  Events in Egypt seem to answer this question in the positive.  The reasons are many, but the central causes are: deteriorating economy; unattainable dialogue between the Islamists and the secularists; confrontations between Morsi and the Judiciary; absence of confidence in the ability of the civilian government to manage its relationships with either the police or the military.

Is that mutiny imminent?  No one can tell.  What might it lead to?  Possible intervention by the armed forces.  What form of military intervention?  Either a military coup or, alternatively, a larger role for the military in the governance of Egypt.  If this happens, what would be the impact on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt?  Cutting its influence down to size.

Now to the indicators and the triggering events:

• Six Egyptian soldiers and policemen were abducted in Sinai by Egyptian bedouins who later released them unharmed.  It was a first, even in lawless Sinai: Egyptians on Egyptians.  The abductors had demanded release of fellow bedouins who are incarcerated by the Government.  Morsi refused to negotiate with the abductors, and the Minister of Defense, General El-Sisi, faced with a huge storm of anger by the Egyptian masses, counselled patience.  While military intelligence was securing the intermediacy of tribal chiefs, the armed forces, in a show of unprecedented military muscle, poured into northeast Sinai for a robust response.
• The episode generated public media reactions which reflected both the animosity between the Islamists and the secularists, as well as the dearth of informed analysis by the pundits, a dearth verging upon hallucination.  Those opposed to the Government and the Islamists opined that that act of abduction was pre-arranged by the Government which they accused of focusing on the islamization of the State, rather than on internal and external security.
• It was galling to both the armed forces and the secularists that President Morsi, at a meeting with the Ministers of Defense and Interior, and the Chief of National Intelligence, read out the demands of the abductors.  The list reflected what seemed to be a governmental sympathy for Hamas, as it was reported to read as follows: (1) stoppage of the destruction by the armed forces of the tunnels dug illicitly between the Egyptian town of Rafah and Gaza; (2) Removal of all military checkpoints; (3) evacuation by both the army and the police of certain Sinai locations; (4) release from jail of 65 "jihadis" who had been implicated in terrorist acts at Taba, Sharm El-Sheik (both Red Sea locations) and Al-Azhar; and (5) Presidential amnesty for some of those convicted in absentia and sentenced to capital punishment.

The public and the armed forces were stunned by what appeared to be the placement by the government of  Hamas and its Sinai supporters ahead of the dignity of the State.

• On Friday, May 17, General El-Sisi summoned Hamas leaders who are posted to Cairo.  He is reported to have told them in no uncertain terms that they were playing with fire, and that the destruction of the tunnels would proceed in spite of Hamas unhappiness with those measures.  "Egypt's security is a priority above all else," he warned Hamas.  
• On the following day, at a meeting with the Ministers of Defense and Interior, and with the Chief of National Intelligence, President Morsi seemed to chide General El-Sisi for his upbraiding of Hamas.  Morsi is reported to have told El-Sisi that the Government was very keen on its strategic relationships with Hamas.  The General was not to be intimidated by the President.  His response is reported to be: "We have irrefutable evidence that terrorist elements in Sinai have been receiving logistical support from inside Gaza.  We cannot allow this to continue under any circumstances."
• In response to that cleavage, leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to shift the blame for the abduction of the soldiers and policeman to El-Sisi.  One such leader, Hamza Zobaa, declared sarcastically that terrorism showed the ineptness of the leadership of the armed forces.  The clear aim was to float a veiled threat by the Islamists that El-Sisi might be relieved of his post by President Morsi.
• In the meantime, the movement called TAMARROD (mutiny) aiming at the removal of the elected President went on collecting signatures from all parts of Egypt.  TAMARROD described its actions as an open exercise of the popular will.  The movement was pointing up the failure of the Morsi government to reverse Egypt's economic collapse, and indirectly to the need for the army to step in and secure for the country both development and internal security.

The future of that historic revolution of January 25, 2011 remains uncertain.  It is quite possible that all of the above are mere manifestations of birth bangs of a new democracy.  It is to be hoped that this is the case.