The Remaking of an Egypt Worthy of the 21st Century

"Only God knows the future!!"  Now my late father, an Azhari ended his lectures on Islamic philosophy.  Thus I am left with predictions regarding an Egypt under the expected presidency of El-Sisi.  As I do so, a line from the great song about Don Quixote "The Quest" rings in my non-musical brain: "To reach for the unreachable star."  The only candidate for the Egyptian presidency, which is predicted (a safe prediction) to begin before this June, is that military gentleman, El-Sisi, turned civilian.  My vote for him is a vote for Egypt reaching "the unreachable star."

I am not in his pay.  He does not know me.  I have never met him.  But I carefully followed his trajectory from Chief of the Egyptian Air Force; to a successor to that good man, General Tantawi, as Field Marshal; to his submission of his name as of April 16 as a presidential candidate.  I also know his Cairo neighborhood of Al Gammaliyah which includes the tourist Mecca of the historic bazaar called "Khan El-Khalili."  That is where ancient Egyptian art embraces Coptic and Islamic Egyptian art.  And that is where my wife of 44 years, an American by the name of Grace to whom I was married at Al-Shahr Al-Aqari (Egypt's Notary Public Office) spent most of our vacation money.  More importantly, I followed his public meetings and utterances from July 3, 2013 when he endorsed the public outcry against Morsi and the Brotherhood till this date.

The objectives of reaching the unreachable star of an El-Sisi presidency (or to copy the Egyptian graffiti: an CC presidency) parallel those of the UN objectives.  These are: peace and prosperity.  Let us transpose these on the Egyptian scene.

In Egypt, "peace" starts with the safety of the Egyptian street.  The resurrected security apparatus, in terms of a re-trained police force, is now at work.  Their nearly daily attacks on its personnel, especially in Sinai and rural areas perpetrated by the Brotherhood and affiliates within its franchise, since the legitimate ouster of Morsi's islamist regime in July 2013, are acts of desperadoes dead-enders.  The role of the armed forces in these terrorist confrontations by the outlawed Brotherhood has made it necessary to have these forces act as "police auxiliaries."

Feeling the pain of the knock-out punches of the police and the army, the Brotherhood International has reached for its lowest ranks -university students.  Their demonstrations throughout the nearly 20 universities in Egypt (where tuition is free) are akin to other terrorist organizations using unthinking human shields.  To think that those infantile demonstrations are going to bring down the transitional government of Judge Adly Mansour is truly laughable.  More comic in their ineffectiveness is the Brotherhood's aim of giving to the outside world the false impression that they are a mass movement.  In reality, these outbursts on Egyptian university campuses prove daily that the Brotherhood is a "mess movement."  The Egyptian judiciary is now in an overdrive to bring the law-breakers to justice.

The peace objective which an El-Sisi presidency is expected to pursue shall be sought relentlessly also beyond Egypt.  A ring of steel around Hamas and Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis and Islamic jihad shall be perfected.  Their 1500 tunnels from Gaza into Sinai are mostly gone; Hamas coffers are losing now from $250 million to $400 million of annual revenue from tunnel smuggling; the banning of the Brotherhood branches in the Gulf, with the exception of Qatar, is in effect together with their criminalization as terrorist outfits, a la Egyptian model; and the British investigations in Brotherhood International activities are being assisted.

In his meeting of April 15 with the representation of Arab/Egyptian tribes, numbering 240, whose leaders hailed from Sinai, the Delta, southern Egypt, the western desert, and the eastern desert, El-Sisi uttered as follows: "Your role in bolstering Egypt's stability, and the aid you provide the State in restoring the country's peace and security, are crucial."

Branching out beyond the country's primordial need for security, an El-Sisi presidency shall undoubtedly pursue in foreign policy a new mode: non-interference in Egypt's internal affairs.  This is one area where the Brotherhood contributed to its own demise: the anti-Egyptian search for internationalizing the call for the return of Morsi to power.  Egypt, especially after the imposition of American limited sanctions on it, has pivoted eastward.  Russia for armament, China for trade, India for technology, the Gulf for investment in desert reclamation.

And in pursuit of the resurrected policy principle of "focus on Egypt," the new Egypt has distanced itself from husbanding "the Palestine Question."  With that in mind, the following questions have assumed a new urgency: "the Coptic question," "The Nuban question," "the African question in the context of the water issue."  No more Egyptian military footprint outside of Egypt, and all international agreements, including the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, shall be observed.

With that focus on "Egypt First and Always," the daily manifestations of the search for Egypt's development and prosperity have been publicized by El-Sisi campaign whose "General Coordinator" is the highly qualified Ambassador Mahmous Karem, a valued friend of nearly 40 years.  Reporting on a visit to El-Sisi on April 17 by the Middle East envoy of the Government of Japan, the campaign highlighted El-Sisi's statement of welcome.  In it he said: "The Middle East is a region which faces great dangers and is in need of substantial and speedy aid in order not to fall prey to extremist influences...  The Egyptian public has, throughout the past period, waited patiently.  The coming phase calls for hard work to fulfill its expectations, and to solve its long-neglected developmental problems."

In that context, I recall an interview in the early 1980s with Frank Wisner, the then-U.S. Ambassador to Cairo. Reporting on that interview for Forbes Magazine, I quoted Wisner's response to one of my questions regarding U.S. aid to Egypt. The Ambassador responded succinctly: "Egypt does not need aid. It needs trade." An aspect of the new Egypt's search for dignity is its grudging acceptance of U.S. aid.  In fact, the Egyptian lower house of Parliament, before its dissolution by a court decree in 2012 had passed a non-binding resolution calling for refusal of U.S. aid. It is axiomatic to say that foreign aid is generally the other side of the coin of outside intervention -an anathema to the now rising Egypt.

It is common knowledge that Egypt's considerable natural resources have so far remained untapped. However, the real and durable resource is the huge untrained human resources whose skills are not up to the challenges of the 21st century, especially as regards to science and technology.

The unreachable star may yet be reached under this new presidency of El-Sisi which puts security first, and democracy and development as assured consequences of that security next. From these premises, begins the remaking of an Egypt worthy of the 21st century.

An Arab poet has once said: "The strong will to succeed exacts a price; that price is the exhaustion of the body to achieve its quest." Lost in this translation is the beauty of the cadence of Arabic poetry!!

Do Not Fool Yourself: In Its Entirety, The Brotherhood Is an International Organization!!

When a Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan) said "To Hell with Egypt" (Tozz Fi Masr), he was confessing an ideology.  The Brotherhood is concerned with pan-Islamism as an identity and as a program.  To it, Egypt is only a location where they were born 86 years ago, and where they will be reduced to a past nightmare in a much shorter time.  There exists no Brotherhood department or a section called "the International Organization Department."  Only the inept Egyptian media, and the ideologically-oriented foreign media espouse that huge fiction -a total falsehood.

Their funding is largely global; their affiliates, like Jihad and the Friends of Jerusalem in Gaza, are like commercial outlets in an international franchise akin to Walmart; their allies, like Turkey and Qatar, see in secular Egypt a field for destabilization; and their propaganda sites are in Europe spreading a message of victimization whenever they are the mischief makers; their way to exclusive power seems to have been copied from the Nazis and the Communists: use the openness of democracy and, once you are in, subvert it.

Their year in power in Egypt (June 2012 - July 2013), which was ushered in through democratic elections, witnessed the closure of the window to that nascent democracy.  Pushed out by 35 million demonstrators in June 2013 who were backed by the army, they cried "foul."  Under the guise of lamenting "a coup," they declared utter defiance of the transitional government, began an armed rebellion through "sit-ins," and for full six-weeks openly called for army defections.

They blamed their ouster on the Copts for supporting the forces of law and order, and turned deaf ears and throaty hooliganism on the government appeals for a peaceful end to that clear and present danger of urban warfare.

Arrayed against them were: the new laws regulating public demonstrations; Al-Azhar's declaration that "Islam, in its legislation, civilization, and history does not recognize a religiously-based" State; the long history of Egyptian cosmopolitanism; and the dedication of the judiciary, the armed forces, the police, and the overwhelming majority of public opinion, to maintain Egypt as a secular State.

Determination was winning over the Brotherhood's intimidation.  The man of the hour, Field Marshal El-Sisi, whose ultimatum to Morsi of July 2, 2013 which culminated in the replacement of Morsi by Judge Mansour, spoke for the nation.  He publicly put it this way to the Brotherhood: "Is it your choice either to rule us or kill us?"

In essence, Egypt was not going to be "an Islamic Republic of fear."  The Brotherhood's calls for a popular uprising against the Revolution of June 3, 2013 failed miserably, and with them, the dream of return to the Presidential palace.

The Brotherhood's shallow roots in Egyptian soil doomed it to a life outside the newly-emerging political system in Egypt.  That unhappy status became a solid reality between July 2013 and December 2013.  During those fateful six-months which culminated in declaring it a terrorist organization saw the true face of the Brotherhood.  Bombings in Sinai and in Cairo and other provinces; Brotherhood exaltation of Hamas for it shifting the battleground of conflict with Israel from Gaza to northern and southern Sinai; regular fatal attacks on the army and the police; the inception of an Al-Qaeda presence in Sinai; murder of Coptic workers in Libya; downing of a military helicopter in Sinai, and incessant propaganda against the new Egyptian system from Al-Jazeerah TV channel of Qatar, from Turkish controlled news outlets, and from London.

While Egyptian diplomatic relations with Qatar and Turkey were severed, diplomatic demarches in London led in April 2014 to Prime Minister David Cameron ordering an inquiry into the activities of the Brotherhood in London.

The objective was to determine whether the Brotherhood (calling them "Muslims" is an error) was using London as a base for planning extremist attacks in Egypt.  A specific aim of the British inquiry was to have the British intelligence service M16 report on any involvement by the Brotherhood in attacks in Egypt like the February 2014 attack on a busload of South Korean tourists in Sinai.  The leader of that investigation is Sir John Jenkins, Britain's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, a country which also branded the Brotherhood a terrorist organization in March 2014.

In Egypt, a provision in the 2014 Constitution closed the backdoor to a possible Brotherhood return to power.  Article 74 provided that "it is not permissible to undertake any political activity or to form any political party on a religious basis...or to engage in any activity which may be contrary to the democratic principles, to clandestine, or has a military or a para-military characteristic."

But that Brotherhood International finds in these provisions an anti-thesis of their core beliefs.  Events and revelations by Egypt's Minister of Interior, General Muhammad Ibrahim, strongly point to the Brotherhood's link to Qatari intelligence and petro-dollars.  Amin El-Sirafi an aide to former President Morsi has been detained on charges of spiriting documents on army deployments and arming the Egyptian armed forces to Qatar.

The Qatar/Brotherhood connection is also evidenced by Qatar's granting, not only asylum, but also Qatari citizenship to Brotherhood members who are considered fugitives from Egyptian justice.  Among these are Assem Abdel-Majid and Salah Abdel-Maqsood.

Mindful of the danger posed by that threat of a budding alliance between the Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda, through Muhammad El-Zawahiri, brother of the successor to Bin Laden, the Interim President of Egypt, Judge Adly Mansour, said recently in a televised interview that he "would take any measure necessary to safeguard Egyptian lives."  This is a code language for the possibility of returning to emergency laws in Egypt.  That declaration by the interim President came on the heels of an escalation of terrorist activity by Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis, a Brotherhood ally and Hamas-inspired group of so-called jihadis.

Army operations against terrorism in north eastern Sinai, especially in the areas of Al-Toma and Al-Mahdiya, leading to the death an Ansar field commander, Tawfik Mohamed Freij (Abu Abdullah), were a punitive response to Ansar.  Ansar had struck in late March at the army.  One of their attacks took place in Al-Zeitoun, and the second in Mustorod, both near Cairo.  Six soldiers were killed largely by non-Egyptian terrorists.

For the first time, a military spokesman, Ahmed Ali, openly made a direct link between the Brotherhood and Ansar.  That shift is consistent with security expert opinion which makes a strong connection between the Brotherhood and Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis.  Nageh Ibrahim, a former leader of Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyah group asserts that "January 25, 2011 gave the kiss of life to Al-Qaeda which created a branch for itself in Egypt."

So call it what you wish: an alliance; a rapprochement, or even a convergence of interest between the Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda.  Semantics are no cure for the perception in the Egyptian mind of a Brotherhood which is knee-deep in terrorism, in anti-Egyptian internationalism, and in amity with foreign actors who are in the business of using the term "islamic" to cover their failing attempts to replace a secular Egypt with an Egyptian province of an Islamic trans-continental emirate.  NUTS!!


No wonder that secular Egypt, in its hour of self assertion, is reaching out for a strong hand to lead its fight against the Brotherhood International.  Egypt of today sees in El-Sisi that strong hand.  Delegations from Sinai all the way across the country to the Libyan border are flocking to his door to pledge their votes in the mid-May presidential elections.  

This is a natural phenomenon in societies whenever they are in danger of having their identities submerged in an international avalanche of a destructive nature.  The prospective ascendary of El-Sisi to the Egyptian presidency shall represent the expression of a popular indigenous will that shall be immune from any distortion from beyond its national boundaries.  It is a transformative period for the new Egypt which is determined to leave the Brotherhood International in the dust of their murderous illusion of a pan-Islamic caliphate!!

The Coptic Question: Protecting Minorities During Periods of Upheavals

The Fordham Law School Institute on Religion, Law and Lawyer’s Work and SUNSGLOW - Global Training in the Rule of Law (CLE Credit)

Keynote Speaker: Dr. Yassin El-Ayouty Esq. April 10, 2014

U.S. Courthouse, Southern District of New York Court Room of US District Judge, Hon. Paul G. Gardephe, Room 705 40 Foley Square, New York

In my view, the most effective presentation of a case, is one that begins with the conclusions.  Most education in U.S. law schools, especially in Year One, the horrible year, begins by briefing cases, not by study guides.  Invariably I do the opposite.  Begin by defining the terms and the issues, then go to the 60-page case and you will quickly find the holding.

The same here tonight in studying “the Coptic Question” in Egypt.  It is vastly complex, and I hope that, through the principle of “start with the conclusions,” the details, which follow, shall be made clearer.

When I began my research on this question, I was fortunate to have among the resources brought to me by my friends from Cairo in Arabic, especially Mr. Wagdy Rizk of the U.N., a seminal report dated November 1972.  The significance of that report is that it was drafted by a blue-ribbon committee called Al-Etaiffi Committee.  It was made up of members of the Egyptian House of Representatives, Muslims and Copts.  The Committee was instructed by Parliament, and guided by a decree issued by the late President Anwar Sadat, to investigate terrible events of communal clashes in a town called El-Khankah in the Province of Qalyubiyah north of Cairo.

The central event was an attack by Muslims on Nov. 6, 1972 against the Headquarters of the Holy Bible Society, a Coptic organization, which was used as a Church without a government license.  The building was torched by a group which started from a mosque called Al-Ashraf mosque.  Six days later, in a show of coptic solidarity, a large group of Coptic Clergy and Coptic civilians, travelled from various places to El-Khankah and held prayers at the attacked site.  Counter Muslim demonstrations approached the site; a Copt is said to have fired a weapon in the air to ward off the approaching angry mob.  The result was torching his and his neighbor’s homes.  There were no human casualties.  End of El-Khankah episode of 42 years ago.

Studying this incident of communal clashes, one finds in it a typical example of the Coptic question which reveals, in a repetitive though more severe fashion, conclusions which I am now able to present:

1. The two issues involved in the Coptic Question are: Licensing to build churches, and the right to advocate and teach Christian orthodoxy;
2. The Muslim/Coptic confrontation incidents are usually described by the authorities, not as a “sectarian conflict,” but as threats to “national unity;”
3. Institutional responses to these incidents, from 1970s till the present, aim at containment, not at eradication of root causes;
4. These responses, whether effectual or ineffectual, involve the entirety of institutional Egypt.  This means from the top of the pyramid, Presidential decrees, through parliamentary committees of investigations, through the provincial levels (Governors, rural leaderships...etc), all the while guided by an advisory and reconciliation combination of Al-Azhar, the citadel of mainstream Islamic learning, and the Coptic Church;
5. The legal systems which impact upon the Coptic Question have their roots in the Ottoman system since 1517.  It is called the Millet system: namely each religious community, in matters of marriage, divorce, wills and charitable contributions, is governed by its own internal Canon Law and Sharia Law and Mosaic Law based on the Old Testament;
6. After the collapse of the old Parliamentary system, the rise of dictatorship in Egypt caused the concomitant rise of sectarianism.  The monolithic ruler, from Nasser in 1952 to the fall of Mubarak in 2011, tried at to govern through “Divide and Rule;”
7. Islamism in Egypt, a country which historically is secular, was bolstered unofficially by Wahhabi extremism, the radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood, the rise of the religious state in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia in 1932; Pakistan in 1947, Israel in 1948, and the post-Shah Iran in 1979;
8. The aggression against Coptic churches and establishments was met by laws which were unenforced, especially as regards the principle of equality before the law;
9. There is hope that Egypt, which got rid of Mubarak through a direct and solid amalgam of Muslims and Copts, promises to deal with the transgressions against the Copts through a robust legal and security system.  This is the dividend accruing from the victory in June 30, 2013 of secular Egypt over the Muslim Brotherhood which had promised a reign of anti-Coptic terror because of Coptic support of the ouster of Morsi; and
10. The term Egypt means “the land of the Copts.”  The roots of the Copts in Egypt could be traced religiously to the establishment of the first Christian Church only 200 years after Christ.  However, civilizationally, these roots go back 5000 years to Ancient Egypt where the ankh, the key-like cross symbolizing enduring life, was described by the great Chicago University historian, Breasted, as the direct predecessor of the Cross.  The Arab roots go back to the year 640 A.D. when Egypt came under Muslim control.  That was during the reign of Omar, the 2nd Caliph after Muhammad.

These are 10 basic conclusions of my presentation which now goes into the area of forensic analysis of the on-again, off-again eruptions of the Coptic crisis in the largest demographically Arab country Egypt whose best description was offered by the great late Shenouda, the Pope of Alexandria.  In a dialogue, two years before his death, that highly learned leader told me that “Egypt is not a country in which we live.  It is a country that lives in us.”  Now let us see how this country, whose map I am now holding in my hand, lives in the heart of all Egyptians, both Christians and Muslims.

There are five areas that are worthy of probing.  These are: (a) The demographics and the geography; (b) The anti-Coptic ideology; (c) The broad expanse of the anti-coptic attacks; (d) Containment: the historic, legal, and religious frameworks; and (e) What can be done?

(A)  The Demographics and the Geography:

As in the case of Lebanon, there has not been a census determining the exact percentage of the number of Christians in egypt.  We say “Christians,” because, in Egypt, there are Copts (orthodox); Catholics; and Anglicans. The rank and file of Egyptian Muslims lump all of those denominations together as “Copts.”  In my case, having been raised in a Coptic neighborhood in eastern Egypt, and belonging to a family which historically has been the administrative link between minorities and the seats of powers, I have always been interested in, let us say for ease of reference, “the Coptic Question.”

The percentage of Christians is generally considered to be anywhere from 10% to 15% of a population which now numbers approximately 90 million.

The geography of Coptic residence is not limited to one area of this country of nearly one million square kilometers.  The Christian population lives all over Egypt with the villages, especially in southern Egypt, housing Copts and Muslims side by side.  This factor is important in two ways: The absence of a Coptic region makes security a very local issue, but with national repercussions; and the Copts, being generally better educated, have a better understanding of the outside world than most of their Muslim neighbors.  In the job market, in a country with 40% illiteracy, the recruiter, if a Muslim, would generally be inclined to favor a Muslim applicant, especially that no Copt is called Muhammad, and no Muslim is called Guirgis (George).

In this regard, we exclude the composition of the Egyptian Cabinet, which invariably and by tradition, has included 2 Copts, neither of them occupies “sovereign portfolios” such as Defense, Foreign Affairs or Justice.  No Copt has ever been a President of Egypt.  This is although Copts have always been in the forefront of national movements for independence and national defense.

When the British granted Egypt self-rule in 1922, the Declaration of that status contained 4 reservations, including the right of Great Britain to intervene for the protection of minorities (i.e. largely the Copts).

(B) The Anti-Coptic Ideology:

Never in the history of Egypt has there been a horrific scene of what nowadays is called ethnic/religious cleansing, or generalized inter-communal hatred like what we see between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria or in the Central African Republic.  Or what we have witnessed in the case of Serbia vs. Bosnia Herzegovina, or are witnessing now in Syria, Iraq and Pakistan between Sunnis and Shiis.

Nonetheless, since the 1970s, after the death of Nasser, an anti-Coptic ideology has been fueled by several factors.  Foremost amongst these is the transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood from religious advocacy (DAWA) to the politics of power through force and coercion.  The Coptic issue was a ready-made Islamist instrument for recruitment and mass appeal.  The veil of moderation fell with the Islamists ascending to power in 2012, after the fall of Mubarak.  That ascendancy was through the defective mechanism of the Ballot Box, and the “hate -the Copts” ideology became structured, propagandizing the following mythology:

• The Copts are the enemies of an Islamic State, not only in Egypt, but anywhere.  Their opposition to a Caliphate is fueled by their desire to oppose Sharia, especially as a principal source of legislation;
• The Copts, in their quest for a secular Egypt see in the gradual and surreptitious conversion of the young Muslims, a path towards arresting that islamization;
• Copts converting to Islam are only seeking to benefit from the liberal divorce practices of the Muslims because the Coptic Church does not permit religious sanctification of divorce of Coptic spouses;
• The Copts, especially those who have immigrated from Egypt, are actively seeking to invite foreign intervention in Egypt through raising the cry of human rights violations, thus weakening the State and, with it, the right of the majority, namely the Muslims, to exercise a dominant nationalistic role.

There are other aspects of that anti-Coptic mythology beyond the enumeration herein presented.  Ironically, each one of the enumerated four aspects has a small kernel of factual validity.  The ideology of the recently assertive Muslim Brotherhood, and its more virulent allies, like the Salafis, became the oxygen keeping that anti-Coptism, not only alive, but entrenched.  Translation: Attack the Copts!!

Although January 7, the Orthodox Christmas was made a national holiday by Mubarak, and although the Arab Spring in Egypt was a Muslim/Coptic product, yet the national upheaval was later hijacked by a Muslim Brotherhood who at first condemned the rebellion then belatedly joined it and unsuccessfully tried to co-opt it.

Protecting the Copts became difficult for the new Egypt to maintain.  As of June 2012, Shafik, the military general, though supported by the Copts, lost his presidential bid to Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood.  During the turbulence from November 2012 to June 2013, the security of the Egyptian street became a thing of the past.

The Ministry of Interior which controls the Police became the enemy, due to the killing of nearly 900 Egyptian demonstrators and to a prior record of torture.  The only institutions which remained standing in a bureaucratic Egypt of 5000 years were: the army and the judiciary.  To the Copts, the Islamist rule by Morsi from June 2012 to July 2013, was a year of terror.  Its gradual evaporation caused by the armed forces, which are based on compulsory draft of both Muslims and Copts, (Coptic generals were in the forefront of the leadership of the war of 1973 under Sadat), gave the Copts the hope of a light at the end of the tunnel.  Their support for General El-Sisi, and of the post-Islamic Constitution of 2014, was a natural.  Yet a structural damage to Egypt’s national unity had already occurred: Brotherhood versus the State; Brotherhood versus the Copts; moderate Islam, the bedrock of Coptic security, versus terrorism.  Too many splits; precious little cures.  An El-Sisi presidency in Egypt, a near certainty, shall be an early Christmas for the Christians in historic Egypt.  It shall represent security wedded to, secularity.

(C) The Broad Expanse of Anti-Coptic Attacks

Translating the above into a saga of anti-Coptic attacks has been lucidly expressed by the large volume of official Coptic material provided to me by the Secretary-General of the Council of Egyptian Churches.  I was also provided by a large amount of photos to document those sad events which are available for the audience to review, but not to take away after this formal event.

Pastor Dr. Bishoy Hilmy, has provided us with an important document dated September 5, 2013, two months after unseating Morsi who is now on trial, but three months before the present Government declaring the Brotherhood in December 2013 a terrorist organization.  It is an official letter signed by Pastor Al-Biady, the Head of the Anglican Church; Patriarch Ishak, the leader of the Catholic Copts; and above all, by the Pope of Alexandria, His Eminence Pope Tawadros the Second, who presides over the Coptic Orthodox community.

The letter is addressed to Field Marshall El-Sisi and copied to General Taher Abdullah, who leads the Corps of Engineers of the nearly one-million armed forces.  This Corps has been active in rebuilding, at the cost of the State, Christian establishments damaged by the marauding hooligans affiliated with, or paid by, or Islamically misled by the Brotherhood in Egypt, and by Hamas and Qatar outside of Egypt.

The document reminds El-Sisi of an agreement reached with El-Sisi at a meeting in which El-Sisi asked for a comprehensive list of Coptic establishments damaged on August 14, 2013.  On that date, the army and the resurrected security forces stormed the militarized sit-ins by the Brotherhood at two locations, Rabaa and Al-Nahda.  After 6 weeks of appealing to the occupants of those armed enclaves to peacefully disband, official Egypt was striking back to assert the legitimacy of its Second Revolution of July 3, 2013 which the Brotherhood and most of the West, together with Turkey and Qatar and Gaza, dubbed as “a coup.”

The letter covered Churches, schools and other Christian facilities either burnt or damaged in whole or in part after August 14, 2013 by arson, molotov cocktails, and firing of various types of armaments.  It also documented theft, pillage and desecration in whole or in part.  The high-level signatories of this document requested action on El-Sisi’s resolute decision to rebuild and or compensate the Christian Churches and citizens.

It ended with the following phrase: “We pray for you to be blessed and to attain full success.  We ask the same for our beloved Egypt to enjoy security and prosperity.  We cherish you and our brave armed forces which constitute Egypt’s shield.”

We note here that that language by the Christian religious hierarchy reflects both anguish and resilience.  It reflects the historic official line which proclaims that “Egypt is not Iraq.  The Egyptian Society has different characteristics.  It is unified in the sense that there are no minorities.  The Egyptian people, by its own nature, is integrated.  Its Muslims and Christians occupy the same neighborhoods everywhere.”

But official lines and the facts on the ground in post-Mubarak Egypt suffer from a disconnect.  The reports which I have from the St. Mark Cathedral, thanks to the help of several Coptic friends, both clerical and laity, shows that in nearly all the Egyptian provinces which number 27, destructive attacks and desecration and theft, were perpetrated.  By comparison with Revolutionary Egypt, the reign of Mubarak looked in the rear view mirror to the Copts who brought it down, to have been a relatively golden age in regard to security which in this context trumps other values.

(D) Containment: The Historic, Legal and Religious Frameworks:

It is axiomatic to say that we live in an age of rage.  Law in Egypt suffers at present from an enforcement deficit, has nearly ceased to be a solution.  Obviously this affects not only the Copts, but also other important sectors of life in Egypt.  It also suffers nearly everywhere from erroneous re-interpretation.  Even in an iconic democratic system such as in the U.S.,  America has refused to apply an important international convention, such as the U.N. Convention on Civil and Political Rights, to situations outside U.S. borders.  Prior to this, there was even greater anomalies: discarding the Geneva Conventions of 1949 by the Bush Jr. administration as obsolete in the context of the war on terror, and the abstaining thus far from acceding to the Rome Convention of 1998 which created the International Criminal Court.

In the specific case of Egypt, there is a legal framework in existence since Ottoman times, which should have prevented anti-Coptic aggression.  During the reign of Sultan Abdel-Meguid the First, an important Ottoman decree was promulgated in February 1856 which regulated the issue of construction of places of worship for all faiths throughout the Empire including Egypt.  It went by the name of “The Hamayooni Line.”  And during the great age of Muhammad Ali, the founder of modern Egypt, from 1805 to 1849, all Ottoman decrees issued with adverse effects on the Copts were rescinded.  The Copts were allowed to build new churches, to carry arms, to join the armed forces, and to attain Cabinet ministerial ranks.  More importantly, during the reign of Said, one of Muhammad Ali’s sons (1854-1863), the tax imposed on the Copts, known by its Islamic term as “geziah” which was in force since the year 640, was eliminated and replaced by military service.  Therefore we have here a solid legal and historical foundation on which security for Egyptian minorities, whether Copts or Shiis can be rejuvenated.

We also have in Islamic jurisprudence, a non-recognition of the term “infidel,” total equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the co-existence between Sharia and legislated law.  Muhammad had married a Coptic woman, Mary, and the second Caliph after Muhammad, Omar had ordered the whipping of the son of his General Amre who conquered Egypt who had whipped a Coptic lad.  In this regard, Omar famously said: “Since when have you enslaved human beings whose mothers have given them freedom through birth.”  The Quran glorifies Mary and the immaculate conception 43 times, the only woman so mentioned by name in the Quran, and glorified Jesus as the word of God more than 30 times.  This is not all for that solid Islamic foundation in cosmopolitan Egypt for the protection of minorities during periods of upheavals.

The great declaration of Al-Azhar dated August 19, 2011, and endorsed by the Coptic Church states the following in its 4th, from among eleven principles:

“Full respect to the view of the others, which implicates the necessity of avoiding declaring others to be apostates and traitors; and the abuse of religion for the purposes of sowing divisiveness and hatred among the citizens.  Sectarian conflict and racist advocacy are criminally injurious to the homeland.”  

Moreover, the preamble of the post-Islamic Constitution of 2014 states that “Egypt is the birthplace of faith -all faith- and that the Egyptians have embraced the Virgin Mary and her son and offered thousands of martyrs in defense of the Church of Christ”

Its 94th Article proclaims that “the Rule of Law is the Basis of Governing the State.”

The first lines of the great history book on “The Flight of the Holy Family to Egypt,” is introduced by Egyptian Bishop Mataous.  It starts by this phrase: “The flight to Egypt is one of the most important historic events which took place over the soil of our dear Egypt over its long history.”

One of today’s great Coptic scholars in the U.S., Francis Basili, the son of a luminary from among the clergymen of the Coptic Church, states the following in “Sawt Biladi” (The Voice of my Homeland), the issue of February 2014:

“The conflict between the brethren of Egypt, Muslims and Copts developed only when the Muslim Brotherhood and their affiliations ignited the powder keg of religious militancy as of the 1970s.”

(E) What Can Be Done?

Now is the time to start anew in the new Egypt.  The upheavals of the Arab Spring should be followed by the return to Egypt’s roots, especially as regards the Coptic question.  I believe that we now have a clean slate in the country which is the engine which pulls the entire Arab train behind it.

Let us start with the process of re-education, to remind Egypt of its true identity.  In doing so, we do not need new laws, we need enforcement.  We have enough laws except for strengthening the judiciary and its independence, and of teaching the cops that the age of torturing suspects is over.

Both Al-Azhar and the Church in Egypt have a history of mutual respect, collaboration, and the compulsive need for containment, especially in the area of tormenting the Christians in other Arab Spring countries such as Libya and Syria.

By education, the teaching of Islamic law should be cleansed from the aberrations of archaic interpretations of how Islam should deal with non-Muslims.  Militant Islam at least in Egypt, I believe, is on the ropes.  I do not expect the Muslim Brotherhood will have the chance of a comeback.  The mosques are now being sequestered by the Government to prevent the pulpit from again becoming a free zone for hate speech.  Inter-faith events should be institutionalized.  Trials of religious malfeasants should be televised.  Compensation for the Copts should be legislated.  University education and curricula should stress what the Egyptians so far mouth, but do not practice: “Faith is for God; the homeland is for all.”

A final word about what not to do, and then what also should be done: First: any foreign intervention or internationalization of the Coptic question is immensely counter-productive.  The ethos of the Arab Spring is that reform and restoration are a home industry.  We must look upon these restorative values, especially in the critical area of education, as a cottage industry.  The rural areas must become the center; the capital is the periphery.  The individual and the local communities are the main actors.

Since we are dealing with faith, an area which is not negotiable, let Egypt, with its unique history of Muslim/Coptic co-existence, show other Arab and Muslim countries the way.  Al-Azhar which gave my father the way of culturally rearing me,  is the focus of teaching Islamic moderation.  This is why Al-Azhar is in the cross-hairs of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Its influence in Sunni and Shii learning is phenomenal  It was established in the year 975 A.D., together with Cairo, by Shiis.  Under Article 7 of the 2014 post-Islamic Constitution, Al Azhar’s independence was restored.  Al-Azhar/Cathedral intertwining, through joint educational programs, is a must.

The issues of the laws governing church construction without too much red-tape should be reviewed.  The public and private information systems should not muzzle up the events affecting communal relationships.  The Coptic community should feel that its impact on legislation, diplomacy, education, social services is assured.  Interfaith events should be multiplied and the basics of interpretation of Islamic law (ijtihad) should find their way to the textbooks as of the primary school.

The State, all over the world, has been overstretched, thus weakened.  Now, individual and communal action have their chance.  In that spirit, I am launching this summer in southern Egypt, where Muslims and Copts live together, a pilot project to uplift the level of University education.  Thanks-